2021 2 - TEXTO OBRIGATÓRIO 02 - Di Carpegna Falconieri - The Militant Middle Ages - Neuroanatomia (2024)

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<p><UN></p><p>The Militant Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p><UN></p><p>National Cultivation of Culture</p><p>Edited by</p><p>Joep Leerssen (University of Amsterdam)</p><p>Editorial Board</p><p>John Breuilly (The London School of Economics and Political Science)</p><p>Katharine Ellis (University of Cambridge)</p><p>Ina Ferris (University of Ottawa)</p><p>Patrick J. Geary (Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton)</p><p>Tom Shippey (Saint Louis University)</p><p>Anne-Marie Thiesse (cnrs, National Center for Scientific Research)</p><p>volume 20</p><p>The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/ncc</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://brill.com/ncc</p><p><UN></p><p>The Militant Middle Ages</p><p>Contemporary Politics between New Barbarians</p><p>and Modern Crusaders</p><p>By</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri</p><p>Translated by</p><p>Andrew M. Hiltzik</p><p>leiden | boston</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p><UN></p><p>First published in Italian as “Medioevo militante. La politica di oggi alle prese con barbari e crociati” –</p><p>© 2011 Giulio Einaudi editore s.p.a., Torino.</p><p>This publication has been produced with the contribution of the University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Depart-</p><p>ment of Human Sciences.</p><p>The translation of this work has been funded by SEPS (Segretariato Europeo per le Pubblicazioni</p><p>Scientifiche), Via Val d’Aposa 7, 40123 Bologna, Italy, seps@seps.it, www.seps.it.</p><p>Cover illustration: “Toy knight charging in my study.” Photography by T. di Carpegna Falconieri, 2019.</p><p>The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov</p><p>Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill.” See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.</p><p>ISSN 1876-5645</p><p>ISBN 978-90-04-36693-0 (hardback)</p><p>ISBN 978-90-04-41498-3 (e-book)</p><p>Copyright 2020 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.</p><p>Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi,</p><p>Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag.</p><p>All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system,</p><p>or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise,</p><p>without prior written permission from the publisher.</p><p>Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided</p><p>that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite</p><p>910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.</p><p>This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://catalog.loc.gov</p><p>http://lccn.loc.gov/</p><p>http://brill.com/brill-typeface</p><p><UN></p><p>Contents</p><p>Preface to the English Edition (2019)  vii</p><p>Acknowledgments  viii</p><p>Prologue  x</p><p>Introduction  1</p><p>1 The Neo-Medieval West  13</p><p>2 All New Barbarians and Same Old Crusaders  26</p><p>3 Once upon a Time in the Middle Ages  50</p><p>4 The Middle Ages of Identity  66</p><p>5 Merchants and Bowmen: Middle Ages of the City  77</p><p>6 Folk and Jesters: Anarchist and Leftist Middle Ages  88</p><p>7 Templars and Holy Grail: Middle Ages of Tradition  105</p><p>8 Warriors of Valhalla: Middle Ages of the Great North  133</p><p>9 Druids and Bards: Celtic Middle Ages  142</p><p>10 Popes and Saints: Catholic Middle Ages  153</p><p>11 Peoples and Sovereigns: Middle Ages of Nations  173</p><p>12 Emperors and Wanderers: Middle Ages of a United Europe  194</p><p>Epilogue  216</p><p>References and Sources  223</p><p>Index of Personal Names  269</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p><UN></p><p>Preface to the English Edition (2019)</p><p>In the Spanish and French editions, both from 2015, I found it opportune to</p><p>slightly update the text, introducing a few more recent examples of the politi-</p><p>cal use of the Middle Ages, compared to what appeared in the Italian original</p><p>(2011). Since then, however, many years have passed. National governments,</p><p>popes, and US presidents have come and gone, balances of power have shifted,</p><p>many events have transpired, and a new awareness of the fundamental impor-</p><p>tance of medievalism in the cultural and political life of the West has made it-</p><p>self known. For this reason, I have preferred not to continue the pursuit of a</p><p>chronology of facts, limiting myself to correcting a few imprecisions and to</p><p>augmenting the bibliography. Some more recent examples of political medie-</p><p>valism are discussed in the epilogue.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p><UN></p><p>Acknowledgments</p><p>I have talked about the many contemporary ways of imagining the Middle</p><p>Ages with friends, students, and colleagues, in encounters that led me down</p><p>many interesting roads. The debts I owe to those who study this subject are</p><p>great: as always, the dwarf sits on the shoulders of giants, even if the giants are</p><p>squeezed into bibliographical notes, reduced to fine print. I wish to thank Pat-</p><p>rick Geary and Gábor Klaniczay, directors of the international program, Medi-</p><p>evalism, Archaic Origins and Regimes of Historicity. Participating in this working</p><p>group comprising scholars of over twenty different nationalities has helped me</p><p>grasp the importance of medievalism and its political repercussions: in various</p><p>parts of the world the use of myths pertaining to the Middle Ages aids in con-</p><p>structing legitimate feelings of belonging, but also justifies ethnic cleansing,</p><p>holy wars, and death.</p><p>I would like to express my thanks to Amedeo De Vincentiis, who believed in</p><p>my project and presented it to the Einaudi publishing house, to Joep Leerssen,</p><p>who wanted to add this English edition to his prestigious book series, “National</p><p>Cultivation of Culture,” and to Andrew M. Hiltzik, who performed the transla-</p><p>tion. I would also like to thank Alison Locke Perchuk for a final rereading of the</p><p>English text and Davide Iacono for the new bibliography and index. For the</p><p>valuable suggestions that emerged in the course of seminars, study groups, and</p><p>intense conversations, I would particularly like to thank Alessandro Afriat,</p><p>Lorenzo Ascani, Giuseppe Maria Bianchi, William Blanc, Benedetta Borello,</p><p>Marco Brando, Elisabetta Caldelli, Franco Cardini, Massimo Ciavolella, Fran-</p><p>cesca Declich, Marco Dorati, Andrew Elliott, Riccardo Facchini, Valentina Ivan-</p><p>cich, Samantha Kelly, Margareth Lanzinger, Umberto Longo, Pedro Martins,</p><p>Raimondo Michetti, Maria Giuseppina Muzzarelli, Lorena Olvera de la Torre,</p><p>Francesco Pirani, Salvatore Ritrovato, Francesca Roversi Monaco, Ana Maria</p><p>S.A. Rodrigues, Matteo Sanfilippo, Raffaella Sarti, Felicitas Schmieder, Piotr</p><p>Toczyski, Richard Utz, Manuel Vaquero Piñeiro, Maria Elisa Varela Rodriguez,</p><p>Stefano Visentin, Lila Yawn, Marino Zabbia, and Nada Zečević. My conversa-</p><p>tions with so many people have allowed me to grasp the depth of the problem</p><p>and its powerful diversification, contained, however, in a fundamental unity.</p><p>I affectionately thank my wife and daughters, for their patience in bearing</p><p>the theft of time to which I fell victim while writing. Time that would have been</p><p>spent in other ways, living and laughing together, and that I still like to think</p><p>was not wasted. Books, indeed, have the virtue of safeguarding ideas, transmit-</p><p>ting them, and allowing readers to form them anew; for that reason, this book</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>December 1999, and 11 September</p><p>2001. The fear of an imminent global catastrophe took on a medieval hue in the</p><p>months immediately prior to the dawn of the year 2000, when the horror of the</p><p>“millennium bug” (in reality a tiny computing issue due to computers that</p><p>were programmed to date years with two digits rather than four) gave rise to</p><p>fear over the fate of humanity. The alarm was sounded online back in 1998, the</p><p>work of those prophets of misfortune with which the United States swarms,</p><p>and it spread like an oil stain through the “global village.” The transition into</p><p>the third millennium triggered a veritable state of panic, provoking waves of</p><p>collective psychosis that were compared—both by those who believed in the</p><p>catastrophe and by skeptics—to the presumed terror of those men who must</p><p>have found themselves, trembling, awaiting the dawn of the year 1000. In 1999,</p><p>the Apocalypse, Joachim of Fiore, and Nostradamus came back into style. It</p><p>was a tragedy waiting to happen, not divine but man-made, a technological</p><p>breakdown that Corriere della Sera represented in its December 31, 1999, issue</p><p>with a photo on the front page of carriage drawn by a horse. On the plain of</p><p>Megiddo (the modern name of Armageddon), in the Jezreel Valley, hundreds</p><p>12 F. Cardini, Medievisti “di professione” cit., p. 47. On the relationship between the Middle</p><p>Ages and post-modernism, see especially F. Alberoni, F. Colombo, U. Eco & G. Sacco, Do-</p><p>cumenti su il nuovo medioevo, Bompiani, Milano 1973; U. Eco, Dalla periferia dell’impero,</p><p>Bompiani, Milano 1977, n. ed.: Dalla periferia dell’impero. Cronache da un nuovo medioevo,</p><p>Bompiani, Milano 2003 (which also includes essays from the early 1970s); B. Holsinger, The</p><p>Premodern Condition: Medievalism and the Making of Theory, University of Chicago Press,</p><p>Chicago 2005; Postmodern Medievalisms, monograph issue of “Studies in Medievalism,”</p><p>XIII (2005).</p><p>13 For example, “il Venerdì di Repubblica” titled their 1,109th issue (June 19, 2009) 2012. È la</p><p>fine del mondo (e non ho niente da mettermi) (2012. It’s the end of the world, and I have</p><p>nothing to wear). In Autumn 2009, a disaster movie called 2012 was released.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 120</p><p><UN></p><p>of American Christians gathered to wage the final battle between Good and</p><p>Evil. Amid fears that bank accounts would vanish and nuclear missiles would</p><p>launch out of control, amid fireworks and champagne bubbles, 1 January 2000</p><p>arrived like any other astronomical day. The “millennium bluff,” as it soon came</p><p>to be called, made us breathe a sigh of relief much deeper than those of a thou-</p><p>sand years before, when almost the entirety of the population hadn’t the slight-</p><p>est idea in what year they were living. In Rome, the solemn celebrations of the</p><p>Catholic Jubilee came only later, a cyclical and perfect time of divine absolu-</p><p>tion, pronounced for the first time by Boniface viii in the year 1300.</p><p>The real catastrophe happened the following year. On September 11, 2001,</p><p>the Pentagon was attacked and the Twin Towers fell in New York, the result of</p><p>simultaneous terrorist attacks carried out with hijacked airplanes. This date is</p><p>so impressed on our memory as to be much more epochal than 2000: after</p><p>“September 11,” the world transformed and a new era began. For some, a new</p><p>Middle Ages. The mass of rubble, the number of casualties, the site of civic</p><p>memory that Ground Zero is today, introduce us to the most politically rele-</p><p>vant aspect of the medieval metaphor of recent years, as a perspectival center</p><p>of gravity. The fall of the Towers came unexpectedly, but was later considered</p><p>by many a sort of prophesy fulfilled, like an American apocalypse or a new</p><p>Tower of Babel. The idea of the Middle Ages might seem extraneous to all this,</p><p>but it is in fact central, operating through a theory of chronological develop-</p><p>ments. The collapse of the Towers has been interpreted as a point of no return</p><p>that brought us straight to a long-foretold “clash of civilizations” between mo-</p><p>dernity and barbarity, a global scenario that, according to post-modern thought,</p><p>has exploded so many certainties.14</p><p>One of the theories underlying this analysis is political science’s so-called</p><p>“New Medievalism,” which proposes structural analogies between the Medi-</p><p>eval and Modern Eras. This framework of thought, already well developed by</p><p>some Italian authors in the early 1970s, was formalized at the end of that de-</p><p>cade by Hedley Bull, and expanded mostly in the 1990s, to the point of becom-</p><p>ing a relatively homogeneous doctrinal system useful for explaining the fluid</p><p>evolution of international relations.15 Its strong point is the assertion that close</p><p>14 S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon &</p><p>Schuster, New York 1996. The eight “civilizations” in question would be the Chinese, Japa-</p><p>nese, Hindu, Muslim, Orthodox, Western, Latin-American, and African.</p><p>15 F. Alberoni [et al.], Documenti su il nuovo medioevo cit.; U. Eco, Dalla periferia dell’impero</p><p>cit.; H. Bull, The Anarchical Society. A Study on Order in World Politics, Columbia University</p><p>Press, New York 1977. A preview of the parallelism between the Middle Ages and moder-</p><p>nity in the realm of the privatization of public affairs is already present in V. Branca, Pre-</p><p>messa, in Id. (ed.), Concetto, storia, miti e immagini cit., pp. ix ff. Among the principal</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>21The Neo-Medieval West</p><p><UN></p><p>affinities exist between the current and the premodern eras, or in other words,</p><p>between today and the Middle Ages. The latter is understood in a primarily</p><p>negative sense, as a paradigm of the break-up and non-existence of the state,</p><p>although no proponent of this doctrine would think even for a moment of a</p><p>true “return to the Middle Ages.”</p><p>There also exists a positive interpretation that determines the orientation of</p><p>political action precisely in the analogies between the medieval and the mod-</p><p>ern. In Italy this manifests as federalism in the neo-medieval sense as theo-</p><p>rized by Gianfranco Miglio and promoted by the Northern League Party (the</p><p>Lega Nord).16 This “return” can also be interpreted in a neutral way, its final</p><p>outcome depending on our behavior: thus the strict comparison between the</p><p>current European Union and the Holy Roman Empire proposed by Jan Zielon-</p><p>ka.17 From many points of view, in short, we are moving “shrimpwise,” as Um-</p><p>berto Eco puts it—in other words, backwards.18</p><p>The national and territorial state, with its sovereign jurisdiction, army, laws,</p><p>borders, economy, language, culture, leaders, and citizens is a product of the</p><p>modern age: in the Middle Ages nothing of the sort existed. The state in</p><p>the modern sense has now reached a possibly irreversible crisis, one leading</p><p>towards the dissolution of its prerogatives and functions. Other political sub-</p><p>jects unconnected to the state have become the ones who define the bal-</p><p>ance of power in economic and political terms, in a new order that remains</p><p>studies that propose the concept of New Medievalism: R. Matthews, Back to the Dark Age:</p><p>World Politics in the Late Twentieth Century, School of Foreign Service, Washington DC</p><p>1995; St. J. Kobrin, Back to the Future: Neo-medievalism and the Post-modern Digital World</p><p>Economy, in “The Journal of International Affairs,” LI (Spring 1998), n. 2, pp. 361–386;</p><p>J. Rapley, The New Middle Ages, in “Foreign Affairs,” lxxxv (May–June 2006), n. 3, pp.</p><p>95–103; A. Gamble, Regional Blocks, New Order and the New Medievalism, in M. Telò (ed.),</p><p>European Union and New Regionalism. Regional Actors and New Governance in a</p><p>Post-hegemonic Era, Ashgate, London 2007, pp. 21–36; Ph. Williams, From the New Middle</p><p>Ages to a New Dark Age: The Decline of the State and US Strategy, in “Strategic Studies In-</p><p>stitute</p><p>United States Army War College,” June 2008, https://www.globalsecurity.org/mili</p><p>tary/library/report/2008/ssi_williams.pdf (cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>16 Starting with this study, which re-elaborated the jurist Carl Schmitt’s thoughts on pre-</p><p>modern and modern cultures in an original way, see for example G. Piombini, Prima dello</p><p>Stato. Il medioevo della libertà, L. Facco Editore, Treviglio 2004. On the Northern League’s</p><p>medievalism, see especially Chapters 9 and 11.</p><p>17 J. Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union, Oxford Univer-</p><p>sity Press, Oxford 2006. The subject is addressed in Ch. 12.</p><p>18 “A passo di gambero”: lit. “moving like a shrimp.” Cf. U. Eco, Turning Back the Clock: Hot</p><p>Wars and Media Populism, Mariner Books, New York 2008 (original edition: A passo di</p><p>gambero. Guerre calde e populismo mediatico, Bompiani, Milano 2006); today, see also</p><p>Z. Bauman, Retrotopia, Polity, Cambridge 2017.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2008/ssi_williams.pdf</p><p>https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2008/ssi_williams.pdf</p><p>Chapter 122</p><p><UN></p><p>incomprehensible and, to many observers, tends toward anarchy. We are deal-</p><p>ing with systems in competition with one another, with fragmented, overlap-</p><p>ping, and intersecting authorities, with geographical and virtual territories not</p><p>subject to control by the res publica understood in the traditional sense. These</p><p>political subjects are peoples and nations who often do not identify with a</p><p>state or indeed have no state that represents them; they are the organizational</p><p>structures of religions, non-governmental organizations, and multinational</p><p>corporations that control politics, the economy, world finance, private armies,</p><p>economic cartels, and even drug and terrorist cartels, and any ethnic group,</p><p>movement, party, or lobby that may pop up on the political scene to lay claim</p><p>to its own role. Ultimately, the Scottish Independence Movement, unesco,</p><p>the Hague tribunal, the World Trade Organization, Greenpeace, the Anti-</p><p>globalization Movement, and Coca-Cola share the same socio-political land-</p><p>scape as the Medellin cartel and Al-Qaeda. To this situation we must also add</p><p>cyberspace—the web of telecommunications and the internet—which allows</p><p>us to view and execute any action in any part of the world, rendering the con-</p><p>cept of modern concrete borders obsolete: Rai, cnn, Al-Jazeera, Microsoft, and</p><p>Google are, inherently, political subjects. In the end, the ever more accentuat-</p><p>ed mobility of persons belonging to different cultures brings with it the prob-</p><p>lem of integration, which until recently was addressed in the sense that host</p><p>countries—that is, the old colonizers—tried to assimilate immigrants as much</p><p>as possible into their own cultural model and their own judicial order. Today,</p><p>instead, identities are recognized as multiple. Immigrants and other histori-</p><p>cally marginalized groups claim the right to express their own culture, lan-</p><p>guage, lifestyle, and religious convictions, thus creating the problem of how to</p><p>proceed when these attitudes are unexpected or run contrary to the dominant</p><p>order. The motto cuius regio, eius religio—whose realm, his religion—that</p><p>sums up the 1555 Peace of Augsburg and is confirmed in the 1648 Peace of</p><p>Westphalia (an event that theorists of international relations usually consider,</p><p>more or less erroneously, the terminus a quo of the origin of the modern state)</p><p>no longer applies–just as the absolute identity between sovereignty and terri-</p><p>tory that was declared in the treaties themselves, and that would define the</p><p>general perspective on relations between states for three and a half centuries,</p><p>no longer applies.</p><p>From all this derives a strong ambivalence towards the legitimacy of power,</p><p>the sources of legitimacy, the relationship between public and private, the very</p><p>definitions of “public” and “private,” the positive attribution of authority, and</p><p>even sovereignty itself, which can be held by political subjects of any kind, not</p><p>just by state governments.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>23The Neo-Medieval West</p><p><UN></p><p>States may falter; they may no longer be able to govern. The world vacillates</p><p>between globalization and regionalization, poles of a highly fluid geopolitical</p><p>axis. And we see how the medieval metaphor reappears, stronger than ever, to</p><p>explain the phenomenon of this apparent globalization that tends toward an-</p><p>archy. The proposed similarities between the medieval and the post-modern</p><p>are many: the absence of territorial states, the polycentrism of power, the coex-</p><p>istence of overlapping and intersecting political actors of various natures, from</p><p>monarchs and ecclesiasts to feudal lords, citizens, and “peoples,” the very no-</p><p>tion of a jurisdiction tied to a well-defined territory, the instability of the bal-</p><p>ance of power, and many more still.</p><p>A few examples will suffice to better convey what we are talking about. Just</p><p>as a large corporation today both is subject to the laws of the country in which</p><p>it operates and has the power to exert political pressure, a medieval lord may</p><p>simultaneously swear fealty to multiple suzerains and still sway their politics.</p><p>In the same way a modern state delegates some public functions to private</p><p>subjects, a medieval vassal—or rather a lord who would later become a vas-</p><p>sal—is assigned some public functions and conflates them with his own patri-</p><p>mony, privatizing the state. A typical case, in Italy as elsewhere, is that of high-</p><p>way tolls, which are accused of perpetuating the nature of “tribute,” as the</p><p>proceeds are appropriated by private companies standing in for the state, and</p><p>dealing not with citizens but with clients.</p><p>In the same way that the state is not capable of maintaining full control over</p><p>some zones (for example, the dilapidated suburban spaces of big cities that</p><p>become no-man’s lands run by criminal organizations), the dimension of ter-</p><p>ritorial non-control is the most obvious and most common in the Middle Ages:</p><p>the king has limited power and other, originally illegitimate, subjects step for-</p><p>ward. And even the solutions to the modern failure to govern the territory are</p><p>neomedieval: the same way one might hire mercenaries or “contractors” or, in</p><p>Italy and other countries, one might organize citizen patrols, in the Middle</p><p>Ages they enlisted private militias, mercenary troops, and watchmen. Or rath-</p><p>er, in the same way that some rich citizens today protect themselves from the</p><p>dangers of the outside world by enclosing their own residences or even whole</p><p>communities with walls and suitable defenses (this applies equally to the gat-</p><p>ed communities in the United States and to the to the fortified villages in Isra-</p><p>el), the Medieval Era—as everyone knows—is the time of castles and fortress-</p><p>es. And as in the High Middle Ages, the ancient imperial infrastructure—roads,</p><p>bridges, fortresses, cities, trade hubs—decays and then vanishes, the same</p><p>happens, especially in the recent years of economic crisis, to the capillary</p><p>network of infrastructure that the modern state struggles to maintain. The</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 124</p><p><UN></p><p>connective tissue decays and disintegrates; secondary railway lines, flag carrier</p><p>airlines, and public services in general close down (or privatize), while, on the</p><p>other hand, enormous sums are allocated for pharaonic projects with powerful</p><p>symbolic impact: miles-long bridges and high-speed trains, like great cathe-</p><p>drals among mud huts.</p><p>And again, in the same way that in the post-modern age it is no longer pos-</p><p>sible to speak of borders, in the Middle Ages borders are not solid, but nebu-</p><p>lous zones where cultures meet and</p><p>melt together. Vice versa, tax havens are</p><p>such precisely because they continue to value their own internal laws, and thus</p><p>they are comparable to frontier fiefs, where (in the Early Modern Era) smug-</p><p>glers practice their trade. In the same way that corporations with their head-</p><p>quarters in one state can follow the laws of another depending on their regula-</p><p>tory practices, in the same way that drafters of international commercial</p><p>contracts may decide to apply a “neutral” law, that is, one other than that of the</p><p>state to which either party belongs, or even to submit parts of the contract to</p><p>different state laws, so in the High Middle Ages the law was personal, in that</p><p>the individual does not live according to the rules of the territory he inhabits,</p><p>but according to that of his own family and community: which is to say that in</p><p>a single judicial negotiation and in a single civil suit one may use multiple legal</p><p>systems at the same time. And finally, just as today’s “clash of civilizations” pits</p><p>Islam and the West against each other, the very same clash transpired in the</p><p>Middle Ages, the time of the Crusades.</p><p>The Medieval Era and its post-modern counterpart assume a positive value</p><p>when a constructive meaning is attributed to their dynamicity, while they as-</p><p>sume a negative value when the same concept sinks to a pejorative sense, turn-</p><p>ing into uncertainty, indeterminacy, and anarchy. From the point of view of</p><p>historians of the Middle and Early Modern Ages, these analogies are interest-</p><p>ing, but in need of some adjustment. Neo-medieval theory has adopted the</p><p>idea of the fluidity and co-presence of multiple systems and hybrid cultures</p><p>during the Middle Ages, in other words, of the Medieval Era understood as an</p><p>age in motion—an approach that is also popular in contemporary medieval</p><p>studies, following the “dissolution of the myth of the great State as a touch-</p><p>stone for expressing judgments of approval or condemnation.”19 Today, accul-</p><p>turation, dynamicity, processes of construction, and experimentation with</p><p>political systems and social orders are widely discussed.20 This is quite the</p><p>19 O. Capitani, Medioevo passato prossimo: appunti storiografici tra due guerre e molte crisi, il</p><p>Mulino, Bologna 1979, p. 263. Cf. G. Sergi, L’idea di medioevo cit., pp. 101–106.</p><p>20 G. Tabacco, Sperimentazioni del potere nell’alto medioevo, Einaudi, Torino 1993; S. Carocci</p><p>(ed.), La mobilità sociale nel medioevo, École française de Rome, Roma 2010; G. Sergi, Anti-</p><p>doti all’abuso della storia cit., Part 3: Medioevo senza chiusure.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>25The Neo-Medieval West</p><p><UN></p><p>opposite of the backwards Middle Ages represented, for example, by the so-</p><p>called “feudal pyramid,” the marvelous structure of vassals, vavasours, and sub-</p><p>vassals that was erected in the nineteenth century and that remains a persis-</p><p>tent cliché, firmly entrenched in even my memory, thanks to the illustrations</p><p>in my primary school textbooks. The New Medievalism, however, is based on</p><p>rigid models that in practice fail to take into account the true developmental</p><p>modalities of medieval and early modern civilizations, making use of them</p><p>only as a secondary framework whose structure is determined once and for all.</p><p>Both the medieval and the early modern function as immobile concepts, even</p><p>as historical research has dramatically complicated the over-all frame of refer-</p><p>ence. The system of coalition government, defined by shifting equilibriums,</p><p>multiple subjects, informal management groups, oligarchies, and the lack of</p><p>rigid borders—even in the presence of a national state—that students of</p><p>neomedievalism attribute to the Middle Ages in clear opposition to the mod-</p><p>ern age, for the express purpose of constructing the neomedieval metaphor, is</p><p>instead a European characteristic of the entire ancien régime, in which the</p><p>peace of Westphalia is an important, but internal, event. Hence, to be more</p><p>sustainable, neomedievalism should take into account the idea of the Long</p><p>Middle Ages, which extends to both the French and Industrial Revolutions.</p><p>The period when people theorized and successfully attempted a form of gov-</p><p>ernment where everything was within the State and nothing was outside it</p><p>lasted a relatively short time, from Napoleon to the Second World War, and</p><p>even in this case there were numerous exceptions to the rule. And still today,</p><p>despite the supposed gradual breakdown of the state, the system of national</p><p>states is still quite strong—so much so that the achievement of national inde-</p><p>pendence is still a widespread political ideal. One need only look at how the</p><p>states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are configured and to</p><p>what they lay claim.21 Ultimately, neomedieval theory is crippled by the im-</p><p>measurability of the frame of reference, yet remains quite effective as a meta-</p><p>phor. If it had not trotted out the medieval with its barbaric evocations, it prob-</p><p>ably would never have worked.</p><p>21 Cf. Chapter 11.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004414983_004</p><p><UN></p><p>Chapter 2</p><p>All New Barbarians and Same Old Crusaders</p><p>“Hurrah for the Holy Imperial crown!” cried Kurt.</p><p>“And down with the sultan!” replied the sentinel. “Please, though,</p><p>when you get to headquarters, do ask ‘em to send along my relief. I’m</p><p>growing roots out here!”</p><p>i. calvino, The Cloven Viscount (1951)</p><p>Here we are again in the Middle Ages: there is nothing to be pleased about.</p><p>Catastrophism and, in part, New Medievalism give a shape to the feeling of</p><p>unease and insecurity that comes from the belief that the world is no longer</p><p>what we once knew. The plunge into the darkness of the Middle Ages is, for</p><p>some, an actual fact, for others only a metaphor, but even in this second sense</p><p>it opens onto sinister meditations.</p><p>But have we all been thrown back into the Dark Ages? Of course not. “Medi-</p><p>eval” is a versatile and polysemic concept, used primarily—in political terms—</p><p>to identify an opposition. If the medieval is the negative frame of reference,</p><p>then its corresponding positive would still be modernity. In a globalized soci-</p><p>ety where everything moves and everything is simultaneous, who, then, is me-</p><p>dieval, and who modern? The former, evidently, would be those who cause</p><p>crises that make civilization regress, while the latter would be those who de-</p><p>fend their own culture and their own prosperity, and do not want to lose either</p><p>thanks to recent arrivals: they are the defenders of the classical modernity they</p><p>have crafted with their own hands. If, therefore, neomedievalism lays out the</p><p>thesis that the post-modern condition is a sort of collective return to the Mid-</p><p>dle Ages, in reality a conspicuous part of Western public opinion does not</p><p>know or does not accept this analogy, which can easily be criticised as absurd.</p><p>How can anyone think that the wealthy West is returning to the Middle Ages?</p><p>If such a return happens, the West can hardly be to blame. And if it happens,</p><p>the West must be defend itself. Precisely from these considerations arises an-</p><p>other usage of our political metaphor.</p><p>This time, the Medieval Era is not a symbol of the West imploding from self-</p><p>consumption, as in the catastrophist perspective and in some developments of</p><p>the theory of New Medievalism, but rather a symbol of the West fearing that it</p><p>shall succumb to the menace of the Other, the enemy that invades and de-</p><p>stroys, first infiltrating in a seemingly innocuous way, then quickly taking the</p><p>upper hand, and ultimately engineering the collapse of the system. In other</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>27All New Barbarians and Same Old Crusaders</p><p><UN></p><p>words, a catastrophe that originates from an attack on</p><p>a healthy body, like an</p><p>epidemic. The theory of a return to the Dark Ages framed in these terms has</p><p>very remote origins, deriving first of all from Greek thought—from Hesiod—</p><p>through late antique and early medieval reflections on history in terms of</p><p>sweet infancy, prosperous maturity, and horrible senescence, and finally from</p><p>the application of this biological cycle to the fate of civic institutions. Augus-</p><p>tine, Orosius, and Gregory the Great are with us, now more than ever, in these</p><p>bleak premonitions, already formalized in terms of an anthropomorphized</p><p>civilization in Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West (1918–1922).1</p><p>Insofar as it pertains to our discussion, these premonitions, already wide-</p><p>spread during the 1970s, became even more noticeable as a reality in the course</p><p>of the 1980s in conjunction with the initial dismantling of welfare and the so-</p><p>cial state in various Western countries, starting with Great Britain. From the</p><p>end of that decade onward, their growth becomes exponential. The breaking</p><p>point can be dated between 1989 and the years immediately following, corre-</p><p>sponding with the end of the opposition between the West and the Soviet Bloc.</p><p>The victory of Solidarność in Poland (June 4 and 18, 1989), the dismantling</p><p>of the Iron Curtain in Hungary (August 23, 1989), the demolition of the Berlin</p><p>Wall (November 9, 1989), the first Iraq War (August 2, 1990—February 28, 1991),</p><p>the reunification of Germany (October 3, 1990), the break-up of the Warsaw</p><p>Pact (July 1, 1991), and the Russian Federation’s declaration of independence</p><p>(August 24, 1991) are the principal dates of the new landscape in which the</p><p>Medieval functions as a grand allegory that explains everything in terms of</p><p>conflict. Seeing these dates all grouped together (not to mention the uprising</p><p>in Tienanmen Square in Beijing, in April 1989), I do not deny that this historian</p><p>of the Middle Ages, accustomed to quarter-century-long chronologies, feels a</p><p>bit out of place and disoriented, even though he was already an adult at the</p><p>time.</p><p>As Tzvetan Todorov has written, the hope for a new world order in the wake</p><p>of the end of the conflict between East and West was entirely disillusioned:</p><p>Only twenty or so years later, it has to be admitted that this hope was</p><p>illusory…The great conflict between East and West had relegated various</p><p>1 O. Spengler, The Decline of the West, Allen & Unwin, London 1954 (original edition: Der Unter-</p><p>gang des Abendlandes. Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte, C.H. Becksche Verlags-</p><p>buchhandlung, München 1918–1922). See also J. Le Goff, Storia e memoria cit., p. 322; F. Car-</p><p>dini, Rileggere Spengler, Sept. 1, 2008, www.francocardini.net/Appunti/1.9.2008a.html (cons.</p><p>Feb. 2, 2010; the page was found to be inactive when cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.francocardini.net/Appunti/1.9.2008a.html</p><p>Chapter 228</p><p><UN></p><p>kinds of hostility and opposition to the background: these soon started to</p><p>re-emerge.2</p><p>The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and communist ideology did not mean the re-</p><p>unification of the world under a single banner or a single ideology, since a new-</p><p>yet-old conflict arose immediately and with a vengeance: that between differ-</p><p>ent cultural regions, to which different degrees of civilization were attributed.3</p><p>In other words, a conflict was declared between Western civilization and</p><p>barbarism.</p><p>We arrive at the muddy metaphor of the Imperial Eagle. The civilization par</p><p>excellence, of course, is Rome, and after her, the United States, which, with its</p><p>vassal kingdoms and colonies, is the true heir to the translatio Imperii initiated</p><p>by Constantine and pursued by Charlemagne and Frederick I, only to finally</p><p>land across the Atlantic. Some will recall the incipit of the letter that an ob-</p><p>scure writer from Pontus Ausonius (Italy) sent to Emperor Ford in 1977:</p><p>Ad Geraldum Fordulum Balbulum, Foederatorum Indianarum ad Occa-</p><p>sum Vergentium Civitatum Principem. Hail to you, Prince and Emperor,</p><p>Light of the West Indies, Upholder of the Pax Atlantica, and to the Senate</p><p>and People of America, hail.4</p><p>Umberto Eco’s irony then yielded the floor to more sinister voices. In 1992, the</p><p>end was announced in a book by Gore Vidal that evoked the Middle Ages right</p><p>in its title by paraphrasing Edward Gibbon: The Decline and Fall of the American</p><p>Empire.5 In recent years the analogy has been constantly re-proposed, in so</p><p>many other book titles and blogs.6</p><p>2 T. Todorov, La peur des barbares, R. Laffont, Paris 2008, p. 12.</p><p>3 Cf. S.P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations cit. (but with a long tradition behind it: just</p><p>think of Arnold Toynbee). In the same years as Huntington’s book, the computer strategy</p><p>game Civilization, created by Sid Meier in 1991, was taking off. The objective was to develop a</p><p>vast empire over the course of millennia. There were fourteen civilizations to choose be-</p><p>tween. If you chose the American civilization, you received the surprise of beginning the</p><p>game with an initial advantage. Furthermore, the form of government capable of ensuring</p><p>the greatest prosperity (but also the most difficult to maintain) was Democracy. You won ei-</p><p>ther by destroying the other civilizations, or by being the first to colonize outer space.</p><p>4 U. Eco, Dalla periferia dell’impero cit., pp. 7–10. See also ibid., Crisi della Pax Americana, pp. 194</p><p>ff. (TN: Pontus Ausonius is a play on words referring to Pontus Euxinus—the coast of the Black</p><p>Sea in modern-day Turkey, considered the extreme Eastern limit of the Roman Empire’s</p><p>reach—and Ausonia, an early Greek word for the Italian peninsula.)</p><p>5 G. Vidal, Decline and Fall of the American Empire, Odonian Press, Tucson 1992.</p><p>6 For example: N. Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire, Penguin, Lon-</p><p>don 2004; among the many blogs and articles online: S. Wojtowicz, The Fall of the Ameri-</p><p>can Empire (1993), www.slawcio.com/republic.html (cons. Apr. 28, 2019); J. Quinn, Decline</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.slawcio.com/republic.html</p><p>29All New Barbarians and Same Old Crusaders</p><p><UN></p><p>If the West is like the crumbling Empire, the other half of the metaphor de-</p><p>ploys the external barbarians, who undermine the Empire’s foundations and</p><p>want to destroy it. A new opposition between civilization and barbarism is</p><p>wrapped up in the conflict between rich peoples and poor peoples, North and</p><p>South, between the West and the East of the globe. In Europe, a tautological</p><p>analogy is often constructed around the migrations that distinguish our mo-</p><p>dernity from the barbarian invasions, the Völkerwanderungen of the fourth to</p><p>sixth centuries. The old communists—Romanians, Poles, Moldavians, Ukraini-</p><p>ans, even the isolated Albanians—invade the West and are considered the new</p><p>barbarians. Since the early Nineties, we have seen a deluge of books, films, and</p><p>television shows that—usually, but not always, in a comedic vein—inform us</p><p>of these “new barbarian invasions,” turning the metaphor into a widely-believed</p><p>cliché.7 And then there are those that come from the South: Africans, Kurds,</p><p>landless peoples who die on the high seas in leaky barges, floundering in the</p><p>Mediterranean. Men and women who are even poorer, even more technologi-</p><p>cally backwards, and thus guilty of being even more barbaric and anti-modern.8</p><p>Men and women who are even more culturally distant: in other words, Mus-</p><p>lims, just like their infamous ancestors who split the Mare nostrum in half and</p><p>determined—at least according to Henri Pirenne—the true start of the Mid-</p><p>dle Ages in the seventh century.9</p><p>and Fall of the American Empire, Aug. 2, 2009, www.financialsense.com/editorials/quinn/</p><p>2009/0802.html (the page required an authorization when cons. July 23, 2018, and was found</p><p>to be inactive when cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>7 A metaphor</p><p>anticipated by U. Eco, Dalla periferia dell’impero cit., p. 194. In the Italian post-</p><p>apocalyptic film The New Barbarians (1982), set in 2019, the fiercest gangs around are called</p><p>the “Templars.” Among the most recent examples: The Barbarian Invasions, a television pro-</p><p>gram directed by Daria Bignardi from 2004 to 2011. In the homonymous Canadian film (2003),</p><p>the attack on the Twin Towers lurks in the background. Its director, Denis Arcand, was previ-</p><p>ously the director of the film, The Decline of the American Empire (1986). For another exam-</p><p>ple, see M. Warschawski, Les nouveaux barbares, in “Alternatives International,” Feb. 22, 2007,</p><p>www.alterinter.org/article641.html?lang=fr (cons. Apr. 28, 2019): here, the “new barbarians”</p><p>are the Israelis and the Americans. Alessandro Baricco considers the “barbaric” transforma-</p><p>tion of our society not in terms of an invasion or an apocalypse, but as a profound mutation</p><p>that involves and is caused by everyone: Id., The Barbarians: An Essay on the Mutation of Cul-</p><p>ture, Rizzoli International Publications, New York 2014 (original edition: I barbari. Saggio</p><p>sulla mutazione, Feltrinelli, Milano 2006).</p><p>8 On the North-South opposition, especially in this allegorical key: see J.-Ch. Rufin, L’Empire et</p><p>les nouveaux barbares, Lattes, Paris 1992.</p><p>9 H. Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne, Martino Fine Books, Eastford (CT) 2017 (original</p><p>edition: Mahomet et Charlemagne, Nouvelle société d’éditions - Felix Alcan, Bruxelles-Paris</p><p>1937). His thesis, which states that the true Middle Ages only began with the Arab con-</p><p>quest of the Mediterranean, has been refuted, though it continues to represent a question of</p><p>fundamental importance. See also O. Capitani, Medioevo passato prossimo cit., pp. 75–101.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.financialsense.com/editorials/quinn/2009/0802.html</p><p>http://www.financialsense.com/editorials/quinn/2009/0802.html</p><p>http://www.alterinter.org/article641.html?lang=fr</p><p>Chapter 230</p><p><UN></p><p>Many political parties ride the wave of fear of the Other, in what manifests</p><p>now as an inescapable “clash of civilizations.” The medieval metaphor plays a</p><p>not-insignificant role in all this, clarifying—insofar as it leads back to the cat-</p><p>egory of the “dreaded return of something that already happened”—a situa-</p><p>tion that is far from clear. And indeed that never actually transpired during the</p><p>late antique and early medieval eras, but is happening now for the first time.</p><p>The medieval metaphor is an “image of the past [that] modifies the perception</p><p>of the present.”10 It takes responsibility away from political actors, who carry</p><p>on with the conviction, shared by that segment of the populace who also sub-</p><p>scribe to the metaphor, that they are resisting historical processes imagined as</p><p>analogous to ancient ones.11</p><p>The West exports civilization, but at the same time, some say, it gets barba-</p><p>rized.12 Thus, in the last twenty years, vast sectors of Western public opinion</p><p>have had the opportunity to create an effective representation of the presumed</p><p>enemy, the barbarian, the one excluded from “civilization” (an absolutized and</p><p>undebated term), and consequently the opportunity to create an equally effec-</p><p>tive representation of themselves: as paladins and crusaders, as defenders of</p><p>the Limes, the ancient imperial border. They cannot accept the opening of bor-</p><p>ders and the expansion of the European Union to the east in positive terms, as</p><p>it reminds them all too much of the Constitutio Antoniniana of 212, with which</p><p>Caracalla granted Roman citizenship to all subjects of the Empire, opening the</p><p>door to its downfall—that is, to the Middle Ages.</p><p>If xenophobic parties in the government and anti-immigrant groups are by</p><p>now common throughout Western Europe, the United States of the previous</p><p>Republican administration is the country where the melding of the theme of a</p><p>“clash of civilizations” with the medieval metaphor of the new barbarians has</p><p>so far reached its most heated level, coming to illustrate above all the US’s rela-</p><p>tionship with Islam. Here too we find a lengthy history, for behind the declared</p><p>opposition between Islam and the West, which has substituted the Cold War</p><p>opposition Soviet Union-West, we see a recasting of the old Orientalism, that</p><p>A synthesized presentation of the historiographical debate is in G. Vitolo, Medioevo.</p><p>I caratteri originali di un’età di transizione, Sansoni, Firenze 2000, pp. 104–106.</p><p>10 T. Todorov, La peur des barbares cit. Perhaps precisely so as not to fall victim to the barba-</p><p>rism/fall of the Empire analogy, which would have negative consequences for his hypoth-</p><p>esis, Todorov never uses the concept of “barbarian” in reference to the populations pres-</p><p>ent in the Roman Empire or around its borders, but only the concept of “barbarism” as</p><p>elaborated by the Greeks.</p><p>11 See P.J. Geary, The Myth of Nations cit.</p><p>12 For example, J. Monnerot, Racisme et identité nationale, in “Itineraires,” 1990 (online:</p><p>http://julesmonnerot.com/RACISME_IDENTITE.html, cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://julesmonnerot.com/RACISME_IDENTITE.html</p><p>31All New Barbarians and Same Old Crusaders</p><p><UN></p><p>representation of the “East” constructed across the nineteenth century with ste-</p><p>reotypical formulas (lax customs, laziness, cruelty, exoticism, irrationality, mys-</p><p>ticism, fanaticism, despotism, etc.), a vision that has become the vessel of a</p><p>universal symbol.13 This process finds analogy in the earliest ethnographic stud-</p><p>ies, which considered the indigenous African and American populations to be</p><p>“primitive”—in other words, objectively similar to our ancestors—except that,</p><p>as eternal children, they have not evolved, while we have.</p><p>A second precondition to the creation of this paradox has to do with the way</p><p>that the United States presents itself as the paradigm of modernity, precisely in</p><p>relation to the European Middle Ages as the symbol of anti-modernity. It is, in</p><p>fact, a way of refiguring the relationship between the “Old Europe” that shows</p><p>in the periodization of the Middle Ages as ending precisely with the “discovery</p><p>of America,” and that was already quite concrete by the end of the nineteenth</p><p>century. After having experienced a long season of romantic infatuation with</p><p>the Middle Ages, the United States, along with the rest of the West, had dis-</p><p>tanced herself from it.14 By 1889, when Mark Twain published his novel A Con-</p><p>necticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court, satirizing the idealization of the Middle</p><p>Ages and, with it, the Old World itself, the divorce was already final.15 Oscar</p><p>Wilde’s Canterville Ghost (1887) can be read the same way: the contrast between</p><p>the old, English world and American modernity is produced by a parody of the</p><p>Gothic romance, and the poor ghost of Sir Simon de Canterville finds himself</p><p>forced to use the extraordinary Rising Sun Lubricator, made in America, to oil</p><p>13 E.W. Said, Orientalism, Pantheon Books, New York 1978; cf. J.M. Ganim, Medievalism and</p><p>Orientalism: Three Essays on Literature, Architecture and Cultural Identity, Palgrave Mac-</p><p>Millan, New York 2008; W. Calin, Is Orientalism Medievalism? Or, Edward Said, Are You a</p><p>Saracen?, paper in Medievalism. 22nd International Conference at Western Ontario, London</p><p>(ON, Canada), Oct. 4–6, 2007, published in The Year’s Work in Medievalism, 2008 cit., pp.</p><p>63–68; see also: G. Leardi, “La musa m’ispiri, Santa Sofia m’illumini e l’imperatore Giustini-</p><p>ano mi perdoni”. L’orientalismo rubato di Edmondo De Amicis e la Santa Sofia di Costanti-</p><p>nopoli, in T. di Carpegna Falconieri, R. Facchini (eds.), Medievalismi italiani (secoli XIX–</p><p>XXI), Gangemi, Roma 2018, pp. 67–74.</p><p>14 In general: B. Rosenthal and P.E. Szarmach (eds.), Medievalism in American Culture,</p><p>Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, Binghamton (NY) 1989;</p><p>R. Bordone, Lo specchio</p><p>di Shalott cit., pp. 199–210; M. Sanfilippo, Il medioevo secondo Walt Disney. Come l’America</p><p>ha reinventato l’Età di Mezzo, Castelvecchi, Roma 1993; Medievalism in North America,</p><p>monograph issue of “Studies in Medievalism,” VI (1994); A. Lupack and B. Tepa Lupack,</p><p>King Arthur in America, D.S. Brewer, Cambridge 2001. Medievalism in North America is a</p><p>common theme at the International Congress on Medieval Studies held annually at the</p><p>University of Western Michigan in Kalamazoo, Michigan.</p><p>15 M. Twain, A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court, Charles L. Webster & Company,</p><p>New York 1889.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 232</p><p><UN></p><p>his rattling chains.16 All the way up to our time: when, in early December of</p><p>2009, a young US college student studying Italy was convicted of her friend’s</p><p>murder, some in the United States launched a campaign against the sentence</p><p>handed down by the Perugian courts, which they accused of being swayed by</p><p>“medieval superstitions.”17 And what more could you expect, they said, from a</p><p>small, backwater town in the heart of Italy? Or indeed from Italy in general,</p><p>since, as one could read on Wikipedia for a short time, “Italian laws are directly</p><p>descended from the Inquisition.”18 Then comes the media trial founded on the</p><p>ancient precept sat pulcher qui sat bonus (who is beautiful must be good), sub-</p><p>stituting for the judicial process founded on the examination of evidence and</p><p>testimony. It makes one wonder where we should really be seeking the “Middle</p><p>Ages.”</p><p>To go back before 1989, the accusation of living in the Middle Ages could</p><p>never really work with respect to the Soviet Union and its allies. They were</p><p>enemies, sure enough, even baby-eating ogres, and, if you wanted to draw</p><p>attention to their cruelty and characteristically “Oriental” inefficiency, the</p><p>members of the Party or the Politburo could even be “satraps.” But the two su-</p><p>perpowers in a race for the conquest of space and control of the planet at least</p><p>acknowledged the fact that they were both “modern,” even though their two</p><p>developmental models diverged at the root. The West’s relationship with Is-</p><p>lam, however, is a whole other thing. Even in the early Eighties, the Italian jour-</p><p>nalist Oriana Fallaci, invited to Afghanistan as a reporter when the Taliban</p><p>were still heroic warriors against the Red Army (and the Iraqis defended the</p><p>West against the Iranian lion), could rail against Western Realpolitik and claim,</p><p>regarding the Afghan militants: “To see the word of God coupled with the mor-</p><p>tar blast sent shivers down my spine. I felt like I was in the Middle Ages.”19</p><p>16 O. Wilde, The Canterville Ghost, in “The Court and Society Review,” III (1887), n. 4,</p><p>pp. 183–186, 207–211.</p><p>17 B. Severgnini, Amanda e il tifo sbagliato dell’America, in “Corriere della Sera,” Dec. 4, 2009,</p><p>pp. 1 e 24–25.</p><p>18 “Italy’s laws are direct descendants of the Inquisition”: Murder of Meredith Kercher,</p><p>en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder_of_Meredith_Kercher. Consulted on Dec. 15, 2009, the site</p><p>(considered explicitly “non-neutral”) did not contain the sentence. Upon a later visit</p><p>(June 21, 2011) the site turned out to be protected and no longer modifiable. The link be-</p><p>tween the Amanda Knox’s trial and the Inquisition can nevertheless be found on numer-</p><p>ous sites. After a long, drawn-out process, Amanda Knox was definitively absolved by the</p><p>Italian Supreme Court in January 2018.</p><p>19 O. Fallaci, The Rage and the Pride, Rizzoli International Publications, New York 2002 (orig-</p><p>inal edition: La rabbia e l’orgoglio, Rizzoli, Milano 2001, p. 58). The same idea that Afghani-</p><p>stan was dwelling in the darkest Middle Ages, hence the justification for Soviet interven-</p><p>tion, was still shared by the militant left: Cf. Ch. Amalvi, Le goût du Moyen Âge cit., p. 201.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder_of_Meredith_Kercher</p><p>33All New Barbarians and Same Old Crusaders</p><p><UN></p><p>Since September 11, 2001, the conviction of being faced with a clash of</p><p>civilizations—namely, a clash between modern and medieval—has become</p><p>common coin. The United States has lost her invulnerability. New York in 2001</p><p>is like Rome in 410, fallen prey to Alaric’s hordes. On September 14, 2001, the</p><p>noted journalist Thomas Friedman wrote that Islam had for years been wracked</p><p>by a civil war between “modernists” and “medievalists.” Between the two,</p><p>Americans should have backed the “good guys,” who certainly weren’t the</p><p>latter.20</p><p>According to the medieval historian Bruce Holsinger, since September 11</p><p>medievalism has become a journalistic and political paradigm for making</p><p>sense of the first five years of the “War on Terror.” All the US’s top government</p><p>officials, from President George W. Bush to Secretary of Defense Donald Rums-</p><p>feld, employed the medieval metaphor in their speeches on international ter-</p><p>rorism in the form of Islamic fundamentalism. They used it whether talking</p><p>about themselves as “new crusaders” (thus also assigning a positive value to</p><p>the Middle Ages, a point to which we will return), or assigning to terrorists and</p><p>the leaders of terrorist countries the label of “medievalists,” that is to say, medi-</p><p>eval men. Now, in proper English the word “medievalist” refers not to a person</p><p>living in the Middle Ages, but to a scholar of the Middle Ages: this is where</p><p>Holsinger’s concern stems from, as a historian who found himself equated, at</p><p>least terminologically, to Osama Bin Laden, Saddam Hussein, and Al-Zarqawi,</p><p>which spurred him to put his hands to work on an incisive little book.21</p><p>The chain of analogies is simple and easy to reconstruct: the Medieval Era</p><p>is barbaric, uncivilized, backwards, violent, fanatical, and anti-modern, and</p><p>therefore also anti-American, since America represents, traditionally, the fu-</p><p>ture. The Islamic terrorists are equally barbaric, uncivilized, backwards, vio-</p><p>lent, fanatical, anti-modern, and furthermore anti-American: therefore, they</p><p>are also men of the Middle Ages. This confirmed, in the hallucinatory days</p><p>following September 11, 2001, the equivalency between the Middle Ages and</p><p>Islamic terrorism.22</p><p>20 Th. L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs; Smoking or Non-Smoking?, in “The New York Times,” Sept.</p><p>14, 2001, www.racematters.org/friedmansmokingornonsmoking.htm (cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>21 Br. Holsinger, Neomedievalism, Neoconservatism, and the War on Terror, Prickly Paradigm</p><p>Press, Chicago 2007.</p><p>22 For references to the French press (from 1998 to 2001): Ch. Amalvi, Le goût du Moyen Âge</p><p>cit., pp. 320–322. The same equivalence, but with a different interpretation, can be found</p><p>in a book by F. Cardini and G. Lerner, Martiri e assassini. Il nostro medioevo contempora-</p><p>neo, Rizzoli, Milano 2002. See also the review of B. Placido, I martiri tecnologici dell’Islam</p><p>ci stanno trascinando dentro a un nuovo medioevo contemporaneo, in “la Repubblica,” Jan.</p><p>27, 2002, p. 32.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.racematters.org/friedmansmokingornonsmoking.htm</p><p>Chapter 234</p><p><UN></p><p>Holsinger’s analysis leads us to consider points of intersection between the</p><p>vision of US neo-conservatives and the theory of New Medievalism. The ter-</p><p>rorists are medieval primarily because they are tribal, culturally and economi-</p><p>cally under-developed, and fanatical. They act in a tactically medieval way,</p><p>nimbly, adapting to every situation, conducting a mobile, deviously intelligent,</p><p>asymmetric war, which combines medieval—in other words, brutal—</p><p>sensibilities with modern technology, using “dirty” bombs, trying to set off</p><p>anthrax pandemics, just like the “plague spreaders” and just like in disaster</p><p>movies. They reject the state, instead joining up with international crime orga-</p><p>nizations determined to impose a neomedieval landscape and demolish the</p><p>established order. Indeed, some states where Islamic fundamentalism rules are</p><p>called “State Sponsors of Terror.” From this derives the assumption that, to ef-</p><p>fectively wage and win the “War on Terror,” America must abandon the rule of</p><p>international law and adopt a new doctrine for its own security, that it must</p><p>adopt an agile strategy, reclaiming the high ground by accepting the gauntlet</p><p>thrown down on the new battlefield. One must fight medieval with medi-</p><p>eval—in other words, with the non-state.</p><p>Thus neomedievalism, in the sense of deregulation, justifies previously ille-</p><p>gitimate approaches. For these reasons, a member of the Taliban or Al-Qaeda,</p><p>or even a mere captured soldier, is subject to unique laws that the US itself can</p><p>set as if it were dealing with an internal matter. Being a man of the Middle</p><p>Ages, and thus a man who according to the New Medievalism lives “without a</p><p>state,” the terrorist cannot be considered a citizen of a sovereign state (as arti-</p><p>cle 15 of the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Man has affirmed since</p><p>1948); he need not be recognized as a soldier and enemy combatant, nor need</p><p>he be protected by the Geneva Convention, even if captured in uniform, in Iraq</p><p>or Afghanistan for instance. Declaring the Afghan state failed redefines the</p><p>Taliban not as soldiers, but as armed bandits and international terrorists ruled</p><p>by feudal lords. We see, then, how the New Medievalism, if applied to the War</p><p>on Terror, allows the United States to arm itself with ideological and legal</p><p>premises that lead, in two characteristic examples, to “Preemptive War” and to</p><p>Guantanamo Bay Prison, which does not house prisoners of war, but criminals.</p><p>Ultimately, according to Holsinger, the medieval metaphor transforms the</p><p>“ ontological nature of the enemy.”23 To find similar examples, it is not neces-</p><p>sary to go back to the Middle Ages, for this treatment reflects the kind that was</p><p>23 Br. Holsinger, Neomedievalism cit., p. 72. For another interesting comparison between ter-</p><p>rorism and the concept of the pirate as a contemporary paradigm of the universal adver-</p><p>sary, see D. Heller-Roazen, The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations, Zone Books,</p><p>New York 2009.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>35All New Barbarians and Same Old Crusaders</p><p><UN></p><p>inflicted on “bandits,” that is to say partisans, by occupation forces: it doesn’t</p><p>reflect the Third Crusade so much as the Second World War.</p><p>The medieval metaphor is far from the exclusive prerogative of the West.</p><p>Certainly, the term in question is not truly the “Middle Ages,” since Islamic</p><p>culture (like other not-yet-entirely Westernized cultures) does not employ</p><p>this periodization. Nevertheless, the references to historical events witnessing</p><p>conflict between Islam and Christianity that we date to the Middle Ages are</p><p>numerous.</p><p>One important link to the Middle Ages takes us directly back to the Taliban</p><p>and Al-Qaeda. The declarations by members of the US’s Republican adminis-</p><p>tration regarding the anti-modernism and consequent medievalism of the ter-</p><p>rorists and Islamic fundamentalists are not born exclusively from comparative</p><p>analysis, but from facts and claims that originate from those factions them-</p><p>selves. The members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda actually judge modernity as</p><p>something impure, they are truly anti-democratic and anti-Western, and they</p><p>fight for a “return” to the glorious seventh century of Arab conquests under the</p><p>banner of Islam. The American analysis, therefore, captures an authentic as-</p><p>pect of the Taliban’s view of the world.24</p><p>But from there it’s only a short leap to considering all of Islam “medieval”</p><p>and thus anti-Western, and even inherently terroristic. On September 26, 2001,</p><p>the Prime Minister of Italy Silvio Berlusconi claimed that Western civilization</p><p>was superior to Islamic civilization and that Islam was still 1,400 years behind</p><p>the West.25 Despite the outcry, this way of imagining the West’s relationship</p><p>with Islam is common everywhere. The risk is of it spiraling out of control,</p><p>which we have all witnessed. Many may recall the effects of the publication of</p><p>several satirical cartoons depicting Mohammed in the major Danish newspa-</p><p>per Jyllands-Posten on September 30, 2005. Eleven Islamic countries formally</p><p>protested against Denmark; some ambassadors were recalled, some Western</p><p>embassies were attacked, and the Danish embassy in Beirut was set on fire;</p><p>Danish products were boycotted, an Italian priest was killed in Turkey. The car-</p><p>toons were republished by many Western newspapers under the claim of free-</p><p>dom of the press; one of them was even glimpsed on television, printed on a</p><p>t-shirt that the Italian minister Roberto Calderoli was wearing under his suit.</p><p>24 L. Wright, The Looming Tower. Al Qaeda’s Road to 9/11, Penguin, London 2007, pp. 233</p><p>ff. and passim.</p><p>25 See S. Folli, Tra orgoglio culturale ed equivoco politico, in “Corriere della Sera,” Sept. 27,</p><p>2009, p. 9.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 236</p><p><UN></p><p>After an attack on the Italian consulate in Benghazi, Libya, claimed several</p><p>casualties, the minister resigned.26</p><p>Ultimately, the political responses that spring from the neomedievalist anal-</p><p>yses of American neoconservatives run the risk of conflating Islam with funda-</p><p>mentalism sic et simpliciter, and allowing (even impelling) those of the Muslim</p><p>faith—every one of them—to consider themselves anti-Western by birth.</p><p>These analyses do not necessarily have to accept the field of battle chosen by</p><p>their adversary, which is always and only terrorism: though it may be true that</p><p>Islamic terrorists are fighting for something like a return to what we would call</p><p>medieval, that does not mean that we have to medievalize ourselves to oppose</p><p>them. But that is what we have seen happen, for, aside from transforming the</p><p>ontological nature of the enemy, the neoconservatives have even tried to trans-</p><p>form that of the friend, utilizing the medieval metaphor as a reality and con-</p><p>sidering the “defenders of the West” as new crusaders. In fact, in addition to the</p><p>reference to the seventh century, even the Crusades have returned today to</p><p>represent the minefield where the two sides meet. Since Islam resisted the</p><p>Crusades, the modernization of those distant events (a leitmotif present</p><p>throughout the twentieth century) leads to the perception of the Americans,</p><p>Israelis, and Westerners in general as the natural successors of those who per-</p><p>petrated the invasions that began at the end of the eleventh century and were</p><p>halted by the Battle of Hattin (July 4, 1187), only to reappear with colonialism.27</p><p>The Muslims won the Crusades, and they know it.</p><p>As the Lebanese-born author Amin Maalouf wrote in 1983, “Israel is equat-</p><p>ed, in both popular opinion and in some official discourse, to a new Crusader</p><p>state,” and “the Arab world cannot simply decide to consider the Crusades a</p><p>mere episode in a closed past.”28 Already in 1956, the Suez Crisis in Egypt was</p><p>judged the same way as the Third Crusade, which was predominately Anglo-</p><p>French. And on May 13, 1981, “the Turkish Mehmet Ali Ağca [shot] at the Pope</p><p>after explaining in a letter, ‘I have decided to kill John Paul ii, supreme leader</p><p>of the Crusaders.’”29 The Nineties witnessed an escalation in the use of this</p><p>26 For more on the affair, see T. Todorov, La peur des barbares cit., pp. 231 ff.</p><p>27 B. Lewis, From Babel to Dragonmans, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004; A. Maalouf,</p><p>Les croisades vues par les Arabes, Lattes, Paris 1983, pp. 286–288: “Of the three divisions of</p><p>the Palestine Liberation Army, one still bears the name of Hittīn (Hattin).”</p><p>28 Ibid., p. 287.</p><p>29 Ibid. Furthermore, as soon as Ali Ağca was released from prison (January 2010), he de-</p><p>clared himself to be Jesus Christ and announced the imminent end of the world. See, for</p><p>example Ali Ağca torna libero: “Io sono Gesù,” in “La Stampa.it,” 18 January 2010, https://</p><p>www.lastampa.it/2010/01/18/esteri/ali-agca-torna-libero-io-sono-ges-7iAasdvdgpDhXv-</p><p>28lZHPoK/pagina.html (cons. May 5, 2019).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>https://www.lastampa.it/2010/01/18/esteri/ali-agca-torna-libero-io-sono-ges-7iAasdvdgpDhXv28lZHPoK/pagina.html</p><p>https://www.lastampa.it/2010/01/18/esteri/ali-agca-torna-libero-io-sono-ges-7iAasdvdgpDhXv28lZHPoK/pagina.html</p><p>https://www.lastampa.it/2010/01/18/esteri/ali-agca-torna-libero-io-sono-ges-7iAasdvdgpDhXv28lZHPoK/pagina.html</p><p>37All New Barbarians and Same Old Crusaders</p><p><UN></p><p>metaphor, owing to the broadening of the conflict. The Americans are archi-</p><p>tects of the new “Oil Crusades,” as per the title of a recent book.30 And, while I</p><p>was searching the web for information, I was struck by a cartoon posted on</p><p>many sites, depicting George W. Bush dressed as a medieval knight, kneeling,</p><p>one hand extended in a gesture of benediction and the other resting on a</p><p>shield emblazoned with an oil pump.</p><p>In various communiqués between 2001 and 2002, Osama bin Laden spoke of</p><p>nato as the collective of kingdoms that launched the Third Crusade (1189–92),</p><p>comparing Bush to Richard the Lionheart and his allies to Frederick Barbaros-</p><p>sa and Saint Louis of France.31 The United States is, naturally, the Evil Empire,</p><p>an epithet previously coined by Ronald Reagan to describe the Soviet Union.</p><p>In November 2006, on the occasion of Benedict xvi’s trip to Turkey, the organi-</p><p>zation Al-Qaeda in Iraq accused the pope of “preparing a Crusade against the</p><p>Islamic countries.”32 The same juxtaposition of Westerners and Crusaders</p><p>punctually returned in March of 2011, during the Libyan Revolution, which re-</p><p>ceived support from nato. Muammar Qaddafi was not the only one who</p><p>mocked the missiles launched in this “Crusade against Islam.” Even Vladimir</p><p>Putin declared that UN Security Council Resolution 1973 of March 17, 2011,</p><p>which authorized the international community to employ any means neces-</p><p>sary to protect civilians and impose a cease-fire, “recalls a medieval call to the</p><p>Crusades” rather than an act of international law, thus justifying Russian</p><p>rearmament.33</p><p>The figure of Saladin is the one around which, for the whole of the twentieth</p><p>century, the myth of heroic resistance to and ultimate victory over the “West-</p><p>ern Crusade” was primarily constructed.34 The unifier of Islam from the Tigris</p><p>to Cyrenaica and from Yemen to northern Syria, liberator of Jerusalem in 1187,</p><p>Saladin has become the icon par excellence of the victorious unity of Islam.</p><p>30 A.Y. Zalloum, Oil Crusades: America through Arab Eyes, Pluto Press, London-Ann Arbor</p><p>(MI) 2007.</p><p>31 O. Guido, Osama è ancora vivo: ecco il suo nuovo video, in “Corriere della Sera,” May 20,</p><p>2002, p. 6. The English Prime Minister Tony Blair, as soon as he initiated military opera-</p><p>tions in Afghanistan, was dubbed “Tony Coeur de Lion” by “Le Monde”: Ch. Amalvi, Le</p><p>goût du Moyen Âge cit., p. 321.</p><p>32 Turchia. Benedetto XVI è arrivato a Istanbul. Al Qaeda: “Sta preparando la crociata,” www</p><p>.rainews24.rai.it/it/news.php?newsid=65653 (cons. Jan. 18, 2010, the page was found to be</p><p>inactive when cons. Apr. 28, 2019). See G. Miccoli, In difesa della fede. La Chiesa di Giovanni</p><p>Paolo II e Benedetto XVI, Rusconi, Milano 2007, p. 318.</p><p>33 See, for example, Medvedev contro Putin: “Astensione scelta giusta, non si tratta di una cro-</p><p>ciata,” in “Il Messaggero,” Mar. 22, 2011, p. 2.</p><p>34 A.-M. Eddé, Saladin, Flammarion, Paris 2008, especially pp. 9–10 and Ch. 6, par. 28: Le</p><p>mythe du héros arabe, pp. 570–582.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.rainews24.rai.it/it/news.php?newsid=65653</p><p>http://www.rainews24.rai.it/it/news.php?newsid=65653</p><p>Chapter 238</p><p><UN></p><p>Both the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Iraqi President Sad-</p><p>dam Hussein (who declared himself successor to the sultan, similarly born in</p><p>Tikrit), identified with this figure suspended between myth and reality, pro-</p><p>posing themselves as new charismatic leaders with the capacity to win the war.</p><p>And even the Turkish Prime Minister, now President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan</p><p>has been received in his country as “the new Saladin.”35</p><p>Their failure to comprehend non-religious societies and their rejection of</p><p>the concept of a secular state allows fundamentalists to believe that the link</p><p>between current events and the medieval crusades is still firm, insofar as they</p><p>were opposed and are opposable today by jihad, understood as “holy war”: in</p><p>other words, a “war of religion” applicable to both sides.36 A parallelism be-</p><p>tween jihad and Crusade—which corresponds to a stated parallelism between</p><p>two societies similar inasmuch as religion is the linchpin to both—is an easy</p><p>message to spread because it is so basic, but it still does not make logical or</p><p>historical sense. The parallelism does not hold water, starting with the fact that</p><p>the Crusades are events datable to a precise era, while jihad is a Quranic pre-</p><p>scription: the one is past, the other is current. Moreover, it is very limiting to</p><p>think of jihad as a mere synonym for “holy war,” as it actually translates to</p><p>“struggle” and has a much broader spectrum of meaning.37 But what historians</p><p>(and Catholics) may judge to be senseless has actually found support in the</p><p>fact that some Christian traditionalist movements and the US administration</p><p>itself, led by Bush, have spoken of the conflict as a new Crusade, attributing a</p><p>religious and positive value to the term. The word “crusade,” in fact, condenses</p><p>in itself our entire discourse: like the idea of the Middle Ages, it is extraordi-</p><p>narily ambivalent. The War on Terror has even been written and talked about</p><p>as a “Tenth Crusade,” positioning the modern war in a logical, chronological</p><p>35 R. De Mattei, Preface to A. Del Valle, Perché la Turchia non può entrare in Europa, Guerini</p><p>e Associati, Milano 2009.</p><p>36 Cf. O. Fallaci, The Rage and the Pride cit., p. 84: “You don’t realize or don’t want to realize</p><p>that a war of religion is being carried out. A war they call Jihad.” P. 83: “You don’t under-</p><p>stand, or don’t want to understand, that a Reverse Crusade is on the march.” On a Saudi</p><p>woman’s inability to understand secularism, see the anecdote ibid, p. 113.</p><p>37 S.P. Huntington, Clash of Civilizations cit., maintains that religions represent the principal</p><p>identifying characteristics of civilizations, such that the clash between the latter consti-</p><p>tutes a religious war. See, however, T. Todorov, La peur des barbares cit., pp. 154–162;</p><p>M. Meschini, Il jihad e la crociata: guerre sante asimmetriche, Ares, Milano 2007. Harsh is</p><p>the judgment of F. Cardini, Franco Cardini e il falso scontro di civiltà, on YouTube, www</p><p>.youtube.com/watch?v=fZGZMb6ii1k (cons. Apr. 28, 2019): “Lo scontro di civiltà è una</p><p>balla ideologica travestita da studio sociologico” (“The clash of civilizations is an ideologi-</p><p>cal myth dressed up like sociological study”).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fZGZMb6ii1k</p><p>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fZGZMb6ii1k</p><p>39All New Barbarians and Same Old Crusaders</p><p><UN></p><p>sequence with the nine medieval Crusades—despite a temporal gap of more</p><p>than 700 years.38</p><p>In Italy, the reaction to Islam has become particularly powerful in recent</p><p>years and, naturally, often in the name of the new Middle Ages. For example,</p><p>I found a history book that reads:</p><p>I believe we should be grateful to those who fought the Crusades for two</p><p>reasons: first of all, because so many centuries later, they prove that</p><p>one may live and die for one’s faith. Secondly, because</p><p>through their sac-</p><p>rifice our liberty today has been to some extent, but still effectively,</p><p>safeguarded.39</p><p>While in 1967 Paul vi restored the banners of the galleys defeated at Lepanto to</p><p>Turkey, we see now how political parties like the Northern League (Lega Nord,</p><p>est. 1989) and the New Force (Forza Nuova, est. 1997) arise in Italy, making</p><p>Catholic fundamentalism, in an anti-Islamic key, one of their central tenets.40</p><p>The New Force’s symbol is two crossed hammers (the same that appear in Pink</p><p>Floyd’s film, The Wall). Its adherents believe themselves to be “new knights of a</p><p>post-modern Middle Ages, crusaders deployed in defense of White Europe.”41</p><p>And note the birth of magazines like “Lepanto” and “Radici cristiane” and</p><p>political circles like Militia Christi, which, in the exact words of Roberto De</p><p>Mattei, vice president of Italy’s National Research Council from 2003 to 2011</p><p>and president of the Lepanto Foundation, defines itself as a “Catholic political</p><p>movement,” and has a youth branch called Saint Louis ix.42 On August 8, 2008,</p><p>the Leaguist member of the European Parliament (mep) Mario Borghezio</p><p>38 Cf. Tenth Crusade, Wikipedia article, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tenth_Crusade (cons.</p><p>Aug. 9, 2011). When I visited the page in 2011, the article existed only in English, Japanese,</p><p>and, significantly, Arabic. On April 28, 2019, I found the entry https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/</p><p>Tenth_Crusade_(CounterPunch), published exclusively in English. Consider, however, that</p><p>the Ninth Crusade (1271–1272) is generally considered part of the Eighth (1270).</p><p>39 L. Negri, False accuse alla Chiesa. Quando la verità smaschera i pregiudizi, Piemme, Casale</p><p>Monferrato 1997, p. 127. See U. Eco, Turning Back the Clock cit. (pp. 23–27 and 213–242 of</p><p>the Italian edition).</p><p>40 On the Northern League’s flag, which presents a white cross on a red field (originally the</p><p>standard of the city of Milan), see the remarks of E. Voltmer, Il carroccio, Einaudi, Torino</p><p>1994, p. 28: “Con essa viene espresso molto bene lo spirito di crociata che anima questo</p><p>movimento di protesta e rinnovamento” (“This expresses so well the spirit of the Crusades</p><p>that animates this movement of protest and renewal”).</p><p>41 C. Cernigoi, Nuova destra, radici vecchie, in “terrelibere.org,” Mar. 21, 2005, www.terrelibere</p><p>.org/index.php?x=completa&riga=192 (cons. Feb. 4, 2010, the page was found to be</p><p>inactive when cons. May 6, 2019).</p><p>42 Cf. www.facebook.com/miliziachristi/ (cons. Apr. 14, 2019).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tenth_Crusade</p><p>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tenth_Crusade_(CounterPunch)</p><p>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tenth_Crusade_(CounterPunch)</p><p>http://terrelibere.org</p><p>http://www.terrelibere.org/index.php?x=completa&riga=192</p><p>http://www.terrelibere.org/index.php?x=completa&riga=192</p><p>http://www.facebook.com/miliziachristi/</p><p>Chapter 240</p><p><UN></p><p>announced, in the church of the Commandery of St. John of Pré in Genoa, cur-</p><p>rently the seat of the Knights of Malta—a church which the city of Genoa</p><p>planned to transform into an interfaith center—a solemn oath worthy of a</p><p>Crusader:</p><p>We warrior knights swear to defend, always and forever and by any means</p><p>necessary, the Commandery of Prè for the defense of Christianity from</p><p>the profanation of Islam. I swear it.43</p><p>Thus, crusaders against warriors of the faith and Christianity against Islam.</p><p>Reasoning this way triggers an interpretive mechanism that, even if founded</p><p>on updated assumptions about the historical Middle Ages, leads not to a con-</p><p>flict between Islamic fundamentalism’s “medieval” vision based on anarchy</p><p>and a “modern” Western vision founded on the rule of law, so much as a con-</p><p>flict between two visions that, reluctantly embracing the metaphor, become</p><p>equally “medieval.” They in fact justify and adopt illegitimate oppositions and</p><p>maintain that the conflict is an authentic “clash of civilizations” founded—on</p><p>both sides—on religion. As if what really distinguishes the West today from</p><p>the terrorists and Islamic fundamentalist states (and also permits the publica-</p><p>tion of books like this one) was an alternate faith in a homologous political</p><p>theocracy, and not in fact the opportunity and capacity to affirm that society,</p><p>state, and religion are non-overlapping principles—unlike in the Middle Ages.</p><p>But, in the end, the Middle Ages are over, while Medievalism triumphs.</p><p>Nor should one believe that everyone is in agreement about using the Cru-</p><p>sades as an eternal symbol of the defense of the West against Islam. Saint Louis</p><p>ix, the Crusader king who in immediate post-war France was still considered</p><p>“one of the providential founders of the colonial Empire,” is no longer a politi-</p><p>cal symbol outside of Catholic traditionalist circles.44 Saladin, who in the Me-</p><p>dieval West once represented the ideal of a magnanimous knight (Dante puts</p><p>him in Limbo, while Mohammed is found in Hell), is today, as Anne-Marie</p><p>Eddé writes, probably “the only Muslim sovereign in history who Hollywood</p><p>studios can imagine in the role of a hero.”45 Indeed in 2005 Kingdom of Heaven</p><p>was released, a film on the Crusades with obviously modernized references,</p><p>albeit in the name of mutual respect, tolerance, and the common goal of peace:</p><p>43 A. Costante, Rassegna Stampa sul comizio antiislamico dell’eurodeputato della Lega</p><p>Nord Borghezio, www.ildialogo.org/islam/BorghezioAGenova10082008.pdf (cons. Apr. 28,</p><p>2019).</p><p>44 Cf. Ch. Amalvi, Le goût du Moyen Âge cit., pp. 91 ff.</p><p>45 “Le seul souverain musulman de l’Histoire auquel les studios de Hollywood puissent</p><p>imaginer de donner un role de heros”: A.-M. Eddé, Saladin cit., p. 10.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.ildialogo.org/islam/BorghezioAGenova10082008.pdf</p><p>41All New Barbarians and Same Old Crusaders</p><p><UN></p><p>here Saladin, with his wisdom and nobility, is perhaps the most memorable</p><p>character.46</p><p>Starting with Voltaire, and especially after the publication of Diderot and</p><p>d’Alembert’s Encyclopédie (1751–1772), a positive judgment of the Crusades is by</p><p>and large rejected by progressive culture, which instead—with simplifications</p><p>analogous yet contrary to those we have discussed so far—comes to judge</p><p>them episodes of barbarism and violence by which “western civilization” was</p><p>imposed.47 Moreover, the use of the idea of the Crusades to deceptive and anti-</p><p>Islamic ends is opposed on many fronts, even in conservative or otherwise</p><p>right-wing circles. There are, in fact, Catholic and conservative historians who</p><p>describe the Crusades as the time and place of a fertile meeting of cultures.48</p><p>The infamous name “Osama” also belonged to a twelfth-century Arab emir</p><p>who had a friendly relationship with Knights Templar.49 There is even an ap-</p><p>parently Islamophile current of thought within so-called “post-Fascism”: not</p><p>only, as one might think, because it is anti-Israel, but also because, following</p><p>the interpretive tradition of Friedrich Nietzsche, René Guénon and Julius Evo-</p><p>la, it finds in Islam those traditional, common (and non-Christian) values that</p><p>are being forgotten in Europe.50 Its symbol might be Frederick ii Hohenstaufen,</p><p>who negotiated for peace instead of conflict during the Crusades, and who</p><p>46 V. Attolini, Le Crociate di Ridley Scott, in “Quaderni medievali,” XXX (2005), n. 60, pp. 141–</p><p>152; A.-M. Eddé, Saladin cit., p. 565; S. Kudsieh, Neo-Medieval Adaptations of the Myth of</p><p>Saladin: The Case of Sir Walter Scott’s Talisman (1825) and Ridley Scott’s “Kingdom of Heav-</p><p>en” (2005), paper presented in: Medievalism. 22nd International Conference at Western On-</p><p>tario, London (ON, Canada), Oct. 4–6, 2007. On cinema and the Crusades: N. Haydock and</p><p>E.L. Risden (eds.), Hollywood in the Holy Land. Essays on Film Depictions of the Crusades</p><p>and Christian-Muslim Clashes, McFarland, Jefferson (NC) 2009.</p><p>47 Cf. F.</p><p>Cardini, Le Crociate fra Illuminismo ed età napoleonica, in E. Menestò (ed.), “Le Tene-</p><p>bre e i Lumi,” Il medioevo tra Illuminismo e Rivoluzione, proceedings of the conference held</p><p>on the occasion of the third edition of the International Ascoli Piceno Prize, Ascoli Pice-</p><p>no, June 9–11, 1989, Amm.ne comunale, Ascoli Piceno 1990, pp. 53–95, especially pp. 54–</p><p>55, 67–78; K. Armstrong, Holy War. The Crusades and Their Impact on Today’s World, An-</p><p>chor Books, New York 2001.</p><p>48 F. Cardini, Studi sulla storia e sull’idea di crociata, Jouvence, Roma 1993; Id., L’invenzione</p><p>del nemico, Sellerio, Palermo 2006.</p><p>49 F. Gabrieli, Le crociate viste dall’Islam, in V. Branca (ed.), Concetto, storia, miti e immagini</p><p>cit., pp. 183–198: 196 ff.</p><p>50 L. Lanna, F. Rossi, Fascisti immaginari: tutto quello che c’è da sapere sulla destra, Vallecchi,</p><p>Firenze 2003, pp. 237–247; U. Eco, Turning Back the Clock cit. (p. 225 of the Italian edition).</p><p>On the Crusades as equivalent to jihad, both being holy wars (but in the Middle Ages) and</p><p>thus positive symbols of a unity of traditional spirit, though contrasting: J. Evola, Revolt</p><p>Against the Modern World, Inner Traditions, Rochester (VT) 1995; original edition: Rivolta</p><p>contro il mondo moderno, U. Hoepli, Milano 1934; new edition (from which we cite):</p><p>Edizioni Mediterranee, Roma 20073, pp. 167 ff. On the Middle Ages of “Tradition” see Ch. 7.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 242</p><p><UN></p><p>“pursued the political and esoteric dream of the meeting—and perhaps</p><p>fusion—of the Christian West and Muslim civilization.”51 Nothing could be</p><p>further, then, from the Northern League, who detest not only Muslims but also</p><p>Frederick ii, as he was a bitter enemy of the Lombard League in the thirteenth</p><p>century.52</p><p>More complex and controversial is the discourse regarding the Roman</p><p>Catholic Church’s attitude toward the Crusades and their modern equivalent.</p><p>Here one should keep in mind that, in today’s broad usage of the medieval</p><p>metaphor, the most recent popes have also often been defined as “neomedi-</p><p>eval.” We may read an example of this in a blog:</p><p>We must be clear: the start of the neomedieval era is marked above all by</p><p>the pontificate of a great medieval pope: John Paul ii.53</p><p>We find similar judgments expressed by illustrious scholars who have a great</p><p>deal of familiarity with the Middle Ages: in 1985, Umberto Eco compared Pope</p><p>Wojtyła to a “pop-culture Heroic Fantasy,”54 while in 1982, Jacques Le Goff</p><p>spoke with ambiguous subtlety of the success of the Middle Ages (the Middle</p><p>Ages being inherently ambiguous), locating it in the pontiff:</p><p>I believe that a particularly spectacular expression of the success of the</p><p>Middle Ages and its myth today is embodied by the current pope. This</p><p>pope who, with his behavior, ideas, and words is a man of the Middle</p><p>Ages, but at the same time a man of mass media, which he uses perfectly.</p><p>For me, the current Pope John Paul ii is the Middle Ages plus television.</p><p>He is ultimately the symbol, the sum, the very expression of the ties that</p><p>exist between the modern world and the Middle Ages.55</p><p>Two days after the pope’s death on April 2, 2005, the front page of “Corriere</p><p>della Sera” published an article by Francesco Alberoni titled The Arms of the</p><p>Last Prophet: Faith, Hope, Technology, which opened with:</p><p>51 L. Lanna, F. Rossi, Fascisti immaginari cit., p. 247.</p><p>52 M. Brando, Lo strano caso di Federico II di Svevia. Un mito medievale nella cultura di massa,</p><p>pref. by R. Licinio, postf. by F. Cardini, Palomar, Bari 2008; Id., L’imperatore nel suo la-</p><p>birinto. Usi, abusi e riusi del mito di Federico II di Svevia, Tessere, Firenze 2019.</p><p>53 A. Cavallo, Il nuovo medioevo. Seconda parte: il Giubileo, Aug. 18, 2000, www.eurinome.it/</p><p>medioevo2.html (cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>54 U. Eco, Dreaming of the Middle Ages cit., p. 61.</p><p>55 J. Le Goff, Intervista sulla storia, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1982, p. 132; cf. F. Cardini, Medievisti</p><p>“di professione” cit., p. 33.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.eurinome.it/medioevo2.html</p><p>http://www.eurinome.it/medioevo2.html</p><p>43All New Barbarians and Same Old Crusaders</p><p><UN></p><p>To my judgment there have been three great popes in the history of the</p><p>Church: Gregory vii, Innocent iii, and Pope Wojtyla.56</p><p>The sunny Middle Ages of the three greatest popes was soon echoed in an ar-</p><p>ticle by Primo Mastrantoni, president of the Association for the Rights of Users</p><p>and Consumers (aduc), which polemically asked: “Is John Paul ii a medieval</p><p>pope?” thus reversing the point of view with a simple application of the “other</p><p>way” of understanding the Middle Ages.57 More recently, in January 2009 the</p><p>German theologian Hans Küng interpreted Benedict xvi’s attempt to bring</p><p>four Lefebvrian bishops—one of them a Holocaust denier—back into the fold</p><p>of the Catholic Church as a kind of return to the medieval darkness of the ob-</p><p>scurantist Church.58</p><p>The interpretation of the Church and these two recent popes as medieval—</p><p>in a decidedly negative sense—challenges the “return backwards” toward hier-</p><p>archization, the most traditional cult forms, the loss of a role for the laity, and</p><p>the chilling of dialogue with other religions, criticizing the interpretation of</p><p>the Vatican ii Council as status quo rather than revolution offered by John Paul</p><p>ii and Cardinal Ratzinger, later Benedict xvi. An accusation of a return to the</p><p>Middle Ages inasmuch as the papacy is experiencing a restoration: which, for</p><p>those familiar with the papacy of the nineteenth century, has a more meta-</p><p>phorical meaning. In any case, it is worth keeping mind that we are talking</p><p>about externally defined denominations, which do not correspond to the way</p><p>the Church itself imagines and uses the Middle Ages, but function well enough</p><p>because they avail themselves of a convenient and time-tested classification.</p><p>The pope who is usually called “medieval” today is not Gregory vii but Pius xii,</p><p>who in his anti-modernism was rivalled only by his recently beatified nine-</p><p>teenth-century predecessor, Pius ix.59</p><p>56 F. Alberoni, Le armi dell’ultimo profeta: fede, speranza, tecnologia, in “Corriere della Sera,”</p><p>Apr. 4, 2005, p. 1.</p><p>57 P. Mastrantoni, Giovanni Paolo II: un papa medievale?, Apr. 4, 2005, in “ADUC. Associazione</p><p>per i diritti degli utenti e dei consumatori,” www.aduc.it/comunicato/giovanni+paolo+ii+</p><p>papa+medievale_8656.php (cons. Apr. 28, 2019). On the judgment of “pontificate of</p><p>contradictions” declared after 27 years of John Paul II’s reign, see G. Miccoli, In difesa della</p><p>fede cit., p. 10.</p><p>58 L. Annunziata, Intervista ad Hans Küng, in In mezz’ora, Rai3 program, Feb. 8, 2009, www</p><p>.tg3.rai.it/dl/RaiTV/programmi/media/Content Item-62172e41-2f7e-4cd5-b50c-c7537f371</p><p>847.html?p=2 (cons. Feb. 2, 2010, the page was found to be inactive when cons. Apr. 28,</p><p>2019); Küng, attacco a Benedetto XVI. “Riporta la Chiesa al medioevo,” in “la Repubblica,”</p><p>Oct. 15, 2009, p. 27.</p><p>59 This topic will be taken up again in Chapter 10.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.aduc.it/comunicato/giovanni+paolo+ii+papa+medievale_8656.php</p><p>http://www.aduc.it/comunicato/giovanni+paolo+ii+papa+medievale_8656.php</p><p>http://www.tg3.rai.it/dl/RaiTV/programmi/media/Content%20Item-62172e41-2f7e-4cd5-b50c-c7537f371847.html?p=2</p><p>http://www.tg3.rai.it/dl/RaiTV/programmi/media/Content%20Item-62172e41-2f7e-4cd5-b50c-c7537f371847.html?p=2</p><p>http://www.tg3.rai.it/dl/RaiTV/programmi/media/Content%20Item-62172e41-2f7e-4cd5-b50c-c7537f371847.html?p=2</p><p>Chapter 244</p><p><UN></p><p>But turning back to the Crusades, it is widely known that the Holy See op-</p><p>posed the war in Iraq with all its diplomatic means and was careful not to refer</p><p>to the mission led by the United States as a “Crusade,” which would have justi-</p><p>fied</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>ixAcknowledgments</p><p><UN></p><p>and the time it took to write it are dedicated to my wife Anna and to my</p><p>daughters. So that, when they are a little bit bigger, Livia, Sofia, and Vittoria will</p><p>know once and for all why I locked myself in my study or ran off to the</p><p>library instead of playing Red Light/Green Light with them.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p><UN></p><p>Prologue</p><p>It’s a beautiful day in May, the sun is shining, and the cathedral bells are chim-</p><p>ing in the distance. The tournament lists are built, and the taverns have opened</p><p>their shutters. All around, there is a to-and-fro of people, passing by merchants’</p><p>boutiques, candy stalls, jugglers, and acrobats. The town mayor, small but</p><p>stately, is dressing for the ceremony. His garments are so vast that he almost</p><p>disappears among them. He wears a fiery red greatcloak and a large collar, car-</p><p>ries a scepter, and is searching for his fine, plumed hat. When he’s finally found</p><p>it, he marches down the street, accompanied by buglers, bodyguards, and</p><p>bowmen.</p><p>A few hundred miles away, a man with a long beard has just finished an il-</p><p>lustration of a knight in chainmail, with a red cross on his surcoat. He looks</p><p>over the product with satisfaction. Beyond the mountains, a youth with hair</p><p>shaved down to his scalp (but obviously blond), has put on mail just like the</p><p>kind drawn by the bearded man and has hidden himself in ambush among the</p><p>tangled brush of the undergrowth. Even farther, to the East, a green-eyed child</p><p>is buying bread. He counts his money and hands it to the baker, who glances at</p><p>it distractedly before putting it away. The cash depicts the face of a sovereign</p><p>with a crown of gold lilies. Somewhere, in another happy corner of the globe, a</p><p>girl with red hair and a white dress is singing a ballad, accompanied by a harp:</p><p>she sings a tale of love, death, and passion. Farther yet, in a land much nearer</p><p>to the Pole, a group of men are drinking ale and laughing. The warriors bear</p><p>colorful shields and horned helmets; their camp tents have carved dragons on</p><p>the pales. Elsewhere, beyond the sea, a zealous preacher speaks to an attentive</p><p>town square: “God wills it!” he cries to those present. “It is time to launch a</p><p>crusade to reclaim our civilization and spread it throughout the world!” And</p><p>then, there is a man wandering about the halls of a university. He catches snip-</p><p>pets of lectures and conversations and finally sits, exhausted, with his head in</p><p>his hands like a gargoyle of Notre Dame.</p><p>It’s a beautiful day in May, but what year is it? The mayor marches down the</p><p>street surrounded by a retinue of bodyguards, but then he climbs into a car and</p><p>drives to the parade that’s just about to set off from the historic district. The</p><p>man with the long beard puts his drawing on a scanner and sees it reappear on</p><p>the computer screen: it’s for the posters he’s designing. The hidden boy is play-</p><p>ing wargames, along with his merry friends in the woods. When they’ve finished</p><p>playing, he’ll recount his thrilling adventures on his blog. The boy buying bread</p><p>with a king’s head is using a two-hundred-forint bill from the Republic of Hun-</p><p>gary. The girl singing the Irish ballad is interrupted by the untimely ring of a</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>xiPrologue</p><p><UN></p><p>cell phone. The Vikings with the horned helms are camped out in Australia,</p><p>and their beer comes in cans, while the preacher shouting in the public square</p><p>is connected to half the world through the television and is announcing the</p><p>birth of a social network to round up his new crusaders. The last character has</p><p>traveled many highways and taken several airplanes to finally reach the cam-</p><p>pus of a university in Michigan, where he hears fragments of words with his</p><p>head between his hands like a gargoyle. Across so many anonymous, identical</p><p>non-places, he has finally found a place where they are talking about a great</p><p>utopia. This utopia is the Middle Ages.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004414983_00�</p><p>205137</p><p>Introduction</p><p>Medieval: the word means very different things depending on where you find</p><p>it. There is a considerable gap between the Medieval Era studied in research</p><p>institutions and the one found in newspapers, novels, films, and other media of</p><p>our contemporary society. While to some it may still seem absurd, the more-or-</p><p>less fabricated Medieval Era in the media is just as subject to study and inter-</p><p>pretation as the one studied and taught in universities. This research should be</p><p>done not to restore an illusory  “effectual truth of things” (as Machiavelli writes),</p><p>claiming to explain what the Middle Ages really were, but rather because the</p><p>common idea of the Medieval—also called neo-medieval or medievalism—is</p><p>a vessel of such vast proportions that we face it every day. There is, perhaps, no</p><p>other historical epoch that provides our contemporary world with so much</p><p>nourishment for our own imaginations.1</p><p>Not only is the Medieval Era present as a trace of the past, it is also a concept</p><p>that our current age utilizes constantly. And we even use it in the field of poli-</p><p>tics. In the last decade in particular, themes and topics that are medieval</p><p>in various ways have come to the fore. Medievalism is not just an innocuous</p><p>divertissement, a more or less fleeting fashion, like the superficial symptom of</p><p>1 This book makes frequent use of three similar terms, often seen as overlapping: “Medieval</p><p>Era” (or “Middle Ages”), “medieval history,” and “medievalism.” The first term is defined as the</p><p>period extending from the fifth to the fifteenth century. The second term identifies the disci-</p><p>pline that has the medieval period as its subject, with the aim of comprehending its historical</p><p>dynamics. An issue of the journal “Studies in Medievalism” was dedicated to the definition of</p><p>medievalism, the principal subject of this book: Defining Medievalism(s), XVII (2009).</p><p>See also R. Utz, Coming to Terms with Medievalism, in “The European Journal of English Stud-</p><p>ies,” xv (2011), n. 2, pp. 101–113; E. Emery and R. Utz (eds.), Medievalism: Key Critical Terms, D.S.</p><p>Brewer, Woodbridge 2017; B. Bildhauer and C. Jones (eds.), The Middle Ages in the Modern</p><p>World: Twenty-first Century Perspectives, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2017. “Medievalism”</p><p>is a concept that identifies the post-medieval representation, reception, and use of the Mid-</p><p>dle Ages in every aspect, from revivals to its modernization in a political sense. The study of</p><p>medievalism thus covers all the forms in which the Medieval Era has been represented from</p><p>the fifteenth century to today, including historiography, archaeology, and art history. As the</p><p>bibliography on medievalism is constantly expanding, I refer the reader to the open access</p><p>review journal Medievally Speaking, http://medievallyspeaking.blogspot.it, an excellent and</p><p>frequently updated resource. Among the more recent books, I must at least mention Andrew</p><p>Elliott’s, which also addresses the relationship between medievalism and politics, but from</p><p>the perspective of the sociology of communication. A.B.R. Elliott, Medievalism, Politics and</p><p>Mass Media. Appropriating the Middle Ages in the Twenty-first Century, D.S. Brewer, Cam-</p><p>bridge 2017. See also: Daniel Wollenberg, Medieval Imagery in Today’s Politics, Arc Humanities</p><p>Press, Leeds 2018.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://medievallyspeaking.blogspot.it</p><p>Introduction2</p><p>205137</p><p>an escape fantasy, or magic</p><p>the theocon conceit of considering the conflict a religious war—one in</p><p>which the new Urban ii, however, would have been George W. Bush. In this</p><p>way, John Paul ii tried to prevent the creation of an axiomatic opposition be-</p><p>tween Christianity-West and Islam-East. This goal was so powerful that one</p><p>might also consider it one of the reasons for his decision to no longer use the</p><p>pontifical title “Patriarch of the West,” a custom that despite its late antique ori-</p><p>gins might today lead to inappropriate interpretations.60 It is also noteworthy</p><p>that the Holy See and other ecclesiastical hierarchies, though they do not dis-</p><p>play a full unity of intent, have until now reined in—but not halted—the zeal</p><p>of Catholic traditionalists, mostly in terms of immigration policy: for example,</p><p>by protesting against the “Crusader’s Oath” of mep Borghezio. In early Decem-</p><p>ber 2009, the Northern League railed against the Cardinal Archbishop of Milan</p><p>Dionigi Tettamanzi, calling him an imam because of his openness to Islam, and</p><p>yet pretending at the same time to interpret the tradition of the Catholic</p><p>Church authentically.61</p><p>The Crusades evoked by the Bush administration and extremely common in</p><p>the political vocabulary of Catholic traditionalists are nowhere to be found in</p><p>60 See the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity’s Press release regarding the sup-</p><p>pression of the title “Patriarch of the West” in the “Annuario pontifico” 2006, www.vatican.va/</p><p>roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/general-docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_20060322_</p><p>patriarca-occidente_it.html (cons. Apr. 28, 2019): “Currently, the meaning of the term</p><p>‘West’ recalls a cultural context that does not refer to Western Europe alone, but extends</p><p>to the United States of America and all the way to Australia and New Zealand. Clearly, this</p><p>use of the term ‘West’ is not intended to describe an ecclesiastical territory, nor can it be</p><p>employed as the definition of a patriarchal territory. If one wishes to give the term ‘West’</p><p>a meaning applicable to the ecclesiastical juridical language, it would apply only to the</p><p>Latin Church. Thus, the title ‘Patriarch of the West’ would describe the special relation-</p><p>ship between the latter and the Bishop of Rome, and could express the particular jurisdic-</p><p>tion of the Bishop of Rome over the Latin Church. Consequently, over the course of his-</p><p>tory, the title ‘Patriarch of the West,’ which has always been somewhat vague, has become</p><p>obsolete and practically useless. It therefore seems senseless to insist on dragging it with</p><p>us.”</p><p>61 Onorevole Tettamanzi, in “La Padania,” Dec. 6, 2009, p. 1; G. Reguzzoni, Come un gregge</p><p>senza pastore, ibid., Dec. 8, 2009. A reference to the Middle Ages is always possible: cf.</p><p>G. Zizola, Un ritorno al medioevo e alla lotta per le investiture, in “la Repubblica”, Dec. 7,</p><p>2009, p. 13: “Per come è stata presentata, questa rivolta del potere civile contro una carica</p><p>ecclesiastica fa regredire la scienza politica moderna alla lotta per le investiture dell’anno</p><p>Mille” (“As presented, this revolt of the civic power against an ecclesiastical charge re-</p><p>duces modern political science to the struggle for the investiture of the year 1000”).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/general-docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_20060322_patriarca-occidente_it.html</p><p>http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/general-docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_20060322_patriarca-occidente_it.html</p><p>http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/chrstuni/general-docs/rc_pc_chrstuni_doc_20060322_patriarca-occidente_it.html</p><p>45All New Barbarians and Same Old Crusaders</p><p><UN></p><p>the pope’s speeches. Nevertheless, Islam’s holy war was given a name on Sep-</p><p>tember 12, 2006, in the course of a masterclass on the relationship between</p><p>faith and religion held by Benedict xvi at the University of Regensburg. The</p><p>pope cited the Byzantine emperor Manuel ii Palaiologus, who at the end of the</p><p>fourteenth century remarked to a learned Persian:</p><p>Show me, then, what Mohammed brought that was new, and you will</p><p>find only wicked and inhuman things, such as his directive to spread by</p><p>the sword the faith that he preached.</p><p>The citation of the medieval text, a passage that must be understood within a</p><p>complex university lecture, raised such violent protests in the Muslim world</p><p>that the pope had to reaffirm, in the following Sunday’s Angelus prayer and ad-</p><p>dress, broadcast live on Al-Jazeera, that this did not reflect his own thought,</p><p>expressing regret for the reactions it provoked.62 A small correction followed in</p><p>the adaption from the speech’s text to the published version, a phrase added to</p><p>maintain that the Byzantine emperor’s reasoning was not shared by the Ro-</p><p>man pontiff.63 Nevertheless, what was said was said, especially considering</p><p>that despite the alteration the published lecture continued to declare the irra-</p><p>tional character of a faith that insists on asserting itself with violence, and do-</p><p>ing so while speaking of Islam and jihad, both named directly, and not Christi-</p><p>anity and the Crusades, which the pope failed to mention. The silence around</p><p>the Crusades, in this case, prevents the closure of the parallelism: the judg-</p><p>ment on jihad is clear, on the Crusades no verdict is passed. And it was a missed</p><p>opportunity, because in other circumstances the pope has been quick to con-</p><p>demn wars “declared by invoking, on one side or the other, the name of God.”64</p><p>62 Meeting with the representatives of science. Lecture of the Holy Father, Aula Magna of the</p><p>University of Regensburg, Tuesday, 12 September 2006, Faith, Reason and the University.</p><p>Memories and Reflections, http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2006/</p><p>september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg.html (cons. Apr.</p><p>28, 2019). Cf. the considerations of T. Todorov, La peur des barbares cit., pp. 256–265;</p><p>G. Miccoli, In difesa della fede cit., pp. 314 ff.</p><p>63 The text he read stated: “[The emperor], in a surprisingly brusque tone, brusque to the</p><p>point of shocking, simply turns to his interlocutor with the central question on the rela-</p><p>tionship between religion and violence in general.” The expression quoted here in italics</p><p>was corrected to “brusque to the point that we found it unacceptable.” Note that the unac-</p><p>ceptability of the question posed by Manuel Palaiologos lies not in the merit but the</p><p>method, that is, in the tone of voice.</p><p>64 Meeting with representatives of some Muslim communities. Address of His Holiness</p><p>Pope Benedict XVI, Cologne, Saturday, Aug. 20, 2005, http://w2.vatican.va/content/</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg.html</p><p>http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg.html</p><p>http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2005/august/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20050820_meeting-muslims.html</p><p>Chapter 246</p><p><UN></p><p>John Paul ii and Benedict xvi—with all due respect to those who are more</p><p>Catholic than the pope—have not turned a benevolent eye on the Crusades.65</p><p>Which does not mean that the Church considers itself in the wrong. If there</p><p>was a wrong, the responsibility is laid on the men—the Crusaders and mem-</p><p>bers of the clergy—who strayed from the Gospel. Men and even ecclesiastical</p><p>institutions can err, but not the Church, which is guided by the Holy Spirit and</p><p>marches toward salvation. The Crusades may be a black mark in the history of</p><p>the Church, but they do not represent the Church, which is the “mystical body</p><p>of Christ” whose essence is inscribed in a theological and eschatological—and</p><p>thus ahistorical—design.66 As if to say: the crusaders,</p><p>embroiled in the rhythm</p><p>of history, were in the wrong, but the Church remained pure. The distinguo is</p><p>powerful: the pope can ask forgiveness for the sins committed by the sons of</p><p>the Church, but never lays the blame on her.67</p><p>The distinction between the purity of the abstract entity and the impurity of</p><p>her historically bound human sons is certainly understandable, but only with-</p><p>in a logic that considers history as grafted onto theology and does not allow for</p><p>relativism. In acknowledging it, one would have to recognize the fact that the</p><p>medieval Church, though it was always the same institution that has come</p><p>down to us over the centuries, expressed different ways of living and thinking</p><p>that were as common then as they are uncommon today. The idea of the</p><p>benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2005/august/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20050820_meeting-</p><p>muslims.html (cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>65 L. Accattoli, Quando il papa chiede perdono: tutti i mea culpa di Giovanni Paolo II, Monda-</p><p>dori, Milano 1997; Id., La “purificazione della memoria” da Giovanni Paolo II a Benedetto</p><p>XVI. Conferenza di Luigi Accattoli ai Mercoledì della Cattolica, June 6, 2007, www.luigiaccat,-</p><p>toli.it/blog/?page_id=430 (cons. Apr. 28, 2019). On May 14, 2001, John Paul II asked forgive-</p><p>ness for the Sack of Constantinople perpetrated by participants in the Fourth Crusade</p><p>(1202–04). Accattoli repeats a statement from 2002 by then-Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger:</p><p>“Speaking of the Crusades we might cite a statement by Cardinal Ratzinger contained in</p><p>a text on Francis of Assisi, who first dreamed of the Crusade (it was the time when the</p><p>‘Fourth Crusade’ of Wojtyła’s mea culpa was being prepared) but then—the cardinal</p><p>says—when he ‘truly knew Christ he understood that even the Crusades were not the</p><p>right way to defend the rights of Christians in the Holy Land, but it was better to take the</p><p>message of the imitation of the crucifixion at its word.’”</p><p>66 Cf. John Paul II, Memory and Identity: Conversations at the Dawn of a Millennium, Rizzoli,</p><p>Milano 2005 (Italian edition: Giovanni Paolo II, Memoria e identità, intr. by J. Ratzinger</p><p>pope Benedict XVI, Rizzoli, Milano 20102, pp. 29, 93–97, 142 ff., 178, 181–185).</p><p>67 Cf. O. Fallaci, The Rage and the Pride cit., p. 81: “Tell me, Holy Father: is it true that some</p><p>time ago you asked the sons of Allah to forgive the Crusades that Your predecessors fought</p><p>to take back the Holy Sepulchre? But did the sons of Allah ever ask you to be forgiven for</p><p>having taken the Holy Sepulchre?” In any case, John Paul II asked forgiveness for the</p><p>Fourth Crusade. Aside from the fact that it was condemned by Innocent III while it was</p><p>being waged, it was directed against the Byzantine Empire, not the Muslims.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2005/august/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20050820_meeting-muslims.html</p><p>http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2005/august/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20050820_meeting-muslims.html</p><p>http://www.luigiaccattoli.it/blog/?page_id=430</p><p>http://www.luigiaccattoli.it/blog/?page_id=430</p><p>47All New Barbarians and Same Old Crusaders</p><p><UN></p><p>Crusades as a “just war” was perfectly ecclesiastical, though today it no longer</p><p>is, for we cannot deny that the entire Christian religion has witnessed, over</p><p>time, a profound process of transformation.68 Therefore, from a truly historical</p><p>point of view this reasoning doesn’t work: the medieval Church that declared</p><p>the Crusades was the authentic Church in a phase of its history and the Cru-</p><p>saders were its most devoted children. Fighting to liberate the Holy Sepulchre</p><p>was a way into Heaven. Ultimately, no discussion of the Crusades can end in an</p><p>accord. This reference to the Middle Ages remains instrumental in both the</p><p>East and West, such that it really makes one want to say, along with Giuseppe</p><p>Sergi: “It could all go well—or almost—but history won’t bother.”69</p><p>So where are the Middle Ages taking us now? On January 22, 2009, American</p><p>newspapers reported that upon setting foot in the White House for the first</p><p>time, the staff of the incoming president Barack Obama encountered the “Dark</p><p>Ages” for the absolute lack of any advanced communication technology. The</p><p>Bush Era, then, was immediately labeled a dark time from which we were fi-</p><p>nally free, much in the same way Americans speak of the “witch hunts” during</p><p>McCarthyism in the Fifties. On July 21, 2009, forty years to the day after man</p><p>first landed on the Moon, plugging the exact phrase “Obama is the Messiah”</p><p>into Google gave me 80,800 results. Typing “Obama is the Antichrist,” I found</p><p>57,400. At Christmas in 2010, Pope Benedict xvi compared the crisis of values</p><p>of our age with the end of the Roman Empire.70 In that same season between</p><p>November 2010 and January 2011, the “Bunga Bunga” and “Ruby Rubacuori”</p><p>scandals, whose protagonist was the Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, renewed</p><p>the feeling that Italy was plunging into a Late Imperial decadence, that it was</p><p>plummeting “in free fall towards a television Middle Ages,” and that, to para-</p><p>phrase Dante (Purg. vi, 78), it had been reduced to a brothel.71</p><p>68 Cf. G. Miccoli, In difesa della fede cit., pp. 212 ff.</p><p>69 G. Sergi, L’idea di medioevo cit., p. 61.</p><p>70 A. Riccardi, Se il papa evoca la caduta dell’Impero, in “Corriere della Sera,” Dec. 21, 2010,</p><p>pp. 1 and 50.</p><p>71 Silvio Berlusconi ou le scandale permanent, in “Le Monde,” November 1st, 2010, p. 1; M.</p><p>Brambilla, Basso Impero, in “La Stampa,” 12 November 2010, https://www.lastampa</p><p>.it/2010/11/12/cultura/basso-impero-x7TAy5Zk8wXohrVRR5lAKM/pagina.html</p><p>(cons. May 5, 2019): Compare to U. Eco, Turning Back the Clock cit. (pp. 181–183 of the</p><p>Italian edition, article appearing in “L’Espresso,” October 2002). C. De Gregorio, Le altre</p><p>donne, in “L’Unità. Blog. Invece,” Jan. 18, 2011, http://concita.blog.unita.it/le-altre-don</p><p>ne-1.266857 (cons. June 21, 2011, the page was found to be inactive when cons. Apr. 28,</p><p>2019): “This is the harm caused by the five decades we have lived through, this is the politi-</p><p>cal crime committed: emptiness, the flight in free fall towards a television Middle Ages, in</p><p>the end, Italy reduced to a brothel.”</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>https://www.lastampa.it/2010/11/12/cultura/basso-impero-x7TAy5Zk8wXohrVRR5lAKM/pagina.html</p><p>https://www.lastampa.it/2010/11/12/cultura/basso-impero-x7TAy5Zk8wXohrVRR5lAKM/pagina.html</p><p>http://concita.blog.unita.it/le-altre-donne-1.266857</p><p>http://concita.blog.unita.it/le-altre-donne-1.266857</p><p>Chapter 248</p><p><UN></p><p>Finally, on July 22, 2011, the thirty-two-year-old Norwegian Anders Behring</p><p>Breivik detonated a car bomb in downtown Oslo, causing eight deaths and</p><p>thirty injuries, and immediately afterward went to the tiny island of Utøya and</p><p>massacred a summer camp full of children belonging to the labor party’s youth</p><p>branch, shooting sixty-nine people to death and wounding sixty-six. Of the</p><p>seventy-seven people who lost their lives, fifty-five were under twenty years</p><p>old. The killer declared himself a “knight justiciar grand master of the Knights</p><p>Templar of Europe.”72 His nom de guerre was “Sigurd the Crusader.” Ferociously</p><p>anti-Islamic, his manifesto-memorial of over 1,500 pages, which bears a large</p><p>templar cross on the frontispiece, describes in minute detail the war that the</p><p>new militia of the Pauperes commilitones Christi Templique Solmonici (Poor</p><p>Fellow-Soldiers of Christ and of the Temple of Solomon), founded by himself</p><p>in 2002, must wage from now until 2083 to save Europe from Islam, Marxism,</p><p>and multi-culturalism. His work—lucid, methodical, and obsessive—can be</p><p>read online:73 it proposes, among many other considerations, a history of the</p><p>Crusades and the need to revive them in the modern era by way of the new</p><p>Templar order, which must become a triumphant</p><p>army. He describes the de-</p><p>grees, uniforms, and distinctions of this order, the words of the oath, the rite of</p><p>initiation, the guarantee of indulgences, all the way to the shape the tombs of</p><p>the fallen will take. The document even contains a diary of his preparation for</p><p>72 Also “Justiciar Knight Commander for Knights Templar Europe and one of the several</p><p>leaders of the National and pan-European Patriotic Resistance Movement.”</p><p>73 Andrew Berwick [alias of Anders Behring Breivik], 2083. A European Declaration of Inde-</p><p>pendence. De Laude Novae Militiae. Pauperes Commilitones Christi Templisque Solomonici,</p><p>London 2011, for example at www.slideshare.net/darkandgreen/2083-a-european-decla</p><p>ration-of-independence-by-andrew-berwick (cons. Apr. 28, 2019). On July 26, 2011, in the</p><p>course of a Radio24 broadcast, the Leaguist member of European Parliament Mario Bor-</p><p>ghezio (the same who pronounced the “Crusader Oath” at Genoa in 2008) endorsed the</p><p>positions expressed by Breivik: “Sono posizioni sicuramente condivisibili” (“They are po-</p><p>sitions that certainly can be shared”); “buone alcune delle idee espresse al netto della vio-</p><p>lenza, direi, in qualche caso, ottime” (“Some of his ideas on the net result of violence are</p><p>good, sometimes even great”). “Il sostenere la necessità di una forte riforma cristiana an-</p><p>che in termini di crociata contro questa deriva islamista e terrorista e fondamentalista</p><p>della religione islamica, e questo tentativo di conquista dell’Europa—il progetto del ca-</p><p>liffato in Europa—beh, è sacrosanto” (“His belief in the necessity of a powerful Christian</p><p>reform, even in terms of a Crusade, against the Islamic religion’s drift towards Islamism,</p><p>terrorism, and fundamentalism, and this attempt at the conquest of Europe—this goal of</p><p>a caliphate in Europe—well, it’s sacrosanct”): www.youtube.com/watch?v=_XK8XRezt8E</p><p>(cons. Apr. 28, 2019). The same day, interviewed by Radio Tehran, Borghezio confirmed his</p><p>positions, although condemning the heinous act of violence: www.youtube.com/watch?v</p><p>=0hXOS_6wONE&feature=related (cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.slideshare.net/darkandgreen/2083-a-european-declaration-of-independence-by-andrew-berwick</p><p>http://www.slideshare.net/darkandgreen/2083-a-european-declaration-of-independence-by-andrew-berwick</p><p>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_XK8XRezt8E</p><p>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0hXOS_6wONE&feature=related</p><p>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0hXOS_6wONE&feature=related</p><p>49All New Barbarians and Same Old Crusaders</p><p><UN></p><p>the attacks, up to 12:51 on the day of the killings. At 3:25:22 PM the bomb ex-</p><p>ploded; less than two hours later, Breivik the Templar started shooting.74</p><p>74 It would be an arduous task to catalog the numerous new publications about the current</p><p>reuse of the medieval dichotomy between Islam and the West, a theme that seems obvi-</p><p>ous today to a broad public and about which we will say more in the epilogue to this book.</p><p>I would only like to note, in French: W. Blanc, Ch. Naudin, Charles Martel et la bataille de</p><p>Poitiers. De l’histoire au mythe identitaire, Libertalia, Paris 2015; in Italian: M. Di Branco, Il</p><p>califfo di Dio. Storia del califfato dalle origini all’ISIS, Viella, Roma 2017; R. Facchini,</p><p>Sognando la “Christianitas”: l’idea di Medioevo nel tradizionalismo cattolico italiano post-</p><p>conciliare, in T. di Carpegna Falconieri, R. Facchini (eds.), Medievalismi italiani cit., pp.</p><p>29–51. As for English, aside from A. Elliott, Medievalism, Politics, and Mass Media cit.,</p><p>which is centrally concerned with the theme, I would note that in 2018, the publisher</p><p>Routledge launched a series called “Engaging the Crusades,” comprising short books that</p><p>“offer initial windows into the ways in which the crusades have been used in the last two</p><p>centuries; demonstrating that the memory of the crusades is an important and emerging</p><p>subject” (https://www.routledge.com/Engaging-the-Crusades/book-series/ETC, cons.</p><p>Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>https://www.routledge.com/Engaging-the-Crusades/book-series/ETC</p><p>© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004414983_005</p><p><UN></p><p>Chapter 3</p><p>Once upon a Time in the Middle Ages</p><p>He who controls the present controls the past.</p><p>G. ORWELL, 1984 (1949)</p><p>We left off with a comment on the Bush Era, which was accused of being dark</p><p>and medieval no sooner than it was over. Now we are setting off from the Ken-</p><p>nedy Era. The same White House that in 2009 was called medieval for its lack</p><p>of technological equipment, was between 1961 and 1963 referred to as Camelot.</p><p>In the wake of the enormous success of the eponymous musical by Alan Jay</p><p>Lerner, which debuted less than a month after the 1960 elections, the Presi-</p><p>dent’s cabinet became the Knights of the Round Table, while John Fitzgerald</p><p>and his consort Jacqueline were Arthur and Guinevere.1 Almost fifty years lat-</p><p>er, various observers wondered whether Camelot had come again to the White</p><p>House, weaving parallels between the smiling Kennedy and Obama families.2</p><p>Thus, within a sixty year period, the United States would see four returns to the</p><p>Middle Ages: twice in the name of darkness (McCarthyism and the Bush ad-</p><p>ministration) and twice in the name of Arthur’s splendid chivalry (the Kenne-</p><p>dy and Obama administrations). Moreover, in recent years the Bush adminis-</p><p>tration has been censured anew not just because it was perversely “medieval,”</p><p>but also for the exact opposite reason: because it had completely disregarded</p><p>the great tradition of the Magna Carta, whose lesson on liberty sanctioned by</p><p>laws still endures today.3 George W. Bush thus becomes a disturbing character</p><p>1 The comparison was first conceived by John Steinbeck. On that subject: Br. A. Rosenberg,</p><p>Kennedy in Camelot: The Arthurian Legend in America, in “Western Folklore,” xxxv (1976),</p><p>n. 35, pp. 52–59; V. Ortenberg, In Search of the Holy Grail cit., pp. 167 ff.</p><p>2 For example: N. Tucker, Barack Obama, Camelot’s New Knight, in “The Washington Post,” Jan.</p><p>29, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/28/AR20080128</p><p>02730.html (cons. May 5, 2019); “Camelot” Returning to the White House?, in “The Early Show,”</p><p>Nov. 7, 2008, www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/07/earlyshow/main4581583.shtml (cons.</p><p>Apr. 28, 2019); N. Bryant, Obama Echoes JFK’s Camelot Romance, in “bbc News,” Jan. 15, 2009,</p><p>http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7786440.stm (cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>3 Cf. N. Turse, Repealing the Magna Carta, in “Mother Jones,” Jan. 6, 2006, http://motherjones</p><p>.com/politics/2006/01/repealing-magna-carta (cons. Apr. 28, 2019); P. Linebaugh, The Magna</p><p>Carta Manifesto. Liberties and Commons for All, University of California Press, Berkeley-Los</p><p>Angeles-London 2008, pp. 11, 267; see p. 275: “Magna Carta is required to open the secret state.</p><p>Magna Carta is needed for the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay.” Linebaugh’s book is a study of</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/28/AR2008012802730.html</p><p>http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/28/AR2008012802730.html</p><p>http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/07/earlyshow/main4581583.shtml</p><p>http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7786440.stm</p><p>http://motherjones.com/politics/2006/01/repealing-magna-carta</p><p>http://motherjones.com/politics/2006/01/repealing-magna-carta</p><p>51Once upon a Time in the Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>both as a symbol of the dark Middle Ages and as someone ignorant of the en-</p><p>lightened Middle Ages—even as he himself accused fanatical extremists of</p><p>sinister, anarchical, and feudal medievalism and claimed to be a Crusader</p><p>mandated with a mission to defeat them. This is where the two-sided idea of</p><p>the Middle Ages has led us, even</p><p>in America, a land that throughout that his-</p><p>torical era remained unknown to the West.</p><p>The first two chapters presented some reflections on the medieval as a nega-</p><p>tive concept. In the cases previously considered, the robust Middle Ages serve</p><p>as a touchstone for the modern age. Apart from the case of New Medievalism,</p><p>which can take a neutral point of view, and also apart from the positive use of</p><p>the idea of the Crusades (which nevertheless arises only in the context of bitter</p><p>conflict), in general the medieval and its correlate the post-modern have been</p><p>judged as equally sinister. The key word has been “analogy”: we are like them,</p><p>equally wretched. Now, however, our conversation moves in a different direc-</p><p>tion. The argument of this chapter and those to follow aligns with the preced-</p><p>ing, in the sense that here too we find a critique of current events accom-</p><p>plished through constant references to the Middle Ages. The metaphor stands,</p><p>but turned on its head. “Medieval” becomes not a term of similarity, but a place</p><p>of opposition. The key word is no longer analogy, but distance. The rhetori-</p><p>cal device shifts from parallelism to antithesis. Antithesis between a corrupt</p><p>civilization —the current one—and a better civilization, which is held to be</p><p>the medieval one. The Middle Ages return not to frighten, but to enchant. This</p><p>is made possible, and we cannot say this enough, because the word “medieval,”</p><p>which has become polysemic over the course of the centuries, contains in it-</p><p>self both condemnation and celebration. I now want to discuss this second</p><p>aspect of the theme, examining the many ways the Medieval Era produces</p><p>positive reference points for political events of the last fifty years.</p><p>Readings of the Middle Ages as a positive period can be found in the vast litera-</p><p>ture of the critique of progress. We are dealing with a new querelle des anciens</p><p>et des modernes in which, contrary to the judgments passed in the seventeenth</p><p>and eighteenth centuries, the palm of victory goes to the anciens. In this sense,</p><p>our debt to late-eighteenth- and nineteenth-century culture is immense: from</p><p>Luddism, the movement against the society of machines, through Novalis and</p><p>François-René de Chateaubriand, through John Ruskin, the Pre-Raphaelites,</p><p>and William Morris, we can trace a line to contemporary environmentalism,</p><p>the uses, interpretations, and omissions to which two documents from the thirteenth cen-</p><p>tury (the Magna Carta and the Charter of the Forest) have been subjected from the sixteenth</p><p>century to today.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 352</p><p><UN></p><p>realizing that the affect is always the same. All tell us of an uncontaminated</p><p>world, of a lost paradise that precedes the horrors of standardization, consum-</p><p>erism, pollution, overpopulation, and automation: a world of virgin forests,</p><p>independent heroes, and free peoples sustained by an authentic faith.</p><p>Medievalism as a cultural movement was born in England around 1760, has</p><p>been expressed with greater or lesser intensity depending on the place, and has</p><p>undergone various metamorphoses. As a unifying element it saw a wide diffu-</p><p>sion across Europe and the United States during the nineteenth century—a dif-</p><p>fusion possible precisely because of its inherent multiformity.4 The long, multi-</p><p>faceted nineteenth century, a century of progress and reaction, of poetry and</p><p>history, of industry, science, and war, was also the time of the Middle Ages. This</p><p>is when the genesis of the “common understanding of the Middle Ages” must</p><p>be sought, inasmuch as “Romanticism” and “Medievalism” are two terms that</p><p>have long been interchangeable.5 This happens not because the idea of the</p><p>4 The bibliography on this topic is growing longer year by year. Among the most significant ti-</p><p>tles in the Italian language one might recall Il sogno del medieovo cit.; R. Bordone, Lo specchio</p><p>di Shalott cit.; Studi medievali e immagine del medioevo cit.; G. Cavallo, C. Leonardi, and</p><p>E. Menestò (eds.), Lo spazio letterario del medioevo. 1. Il medioevo latino, vol. iv, L’attualizzazione</p><p>del testo, Salerno Editrice, Roma 1997; P. Boitani, M. Mancini, and A. Vàrvaro (eds.), Lo spazio</p><p>letterario del medioevo. 2. Il medioevo volgare, vol. iv, L’attualizzazione del testo, Salerno Edi-</p><p>trice, Roma 2004; E. Castelnuovo and G. Sergi (eds.), Arti e storia nel medioevo, vol. iv, Il me-</p><p>dioevo al passato e al presente, Einaudi, Torino 2004. Among the numerous titles in other</p><p>languages I must cite at least Ch. Amalvi, Le goût du Moyen Âge cit.; M. Alexander, Medieval-</p><p>ism. The Middle Ages in Modern England, Yale University Press, New Haven-London 2007;</p><p>V. Ortenberg, In Search of the Holy Grail cit. ; V. Groebner, Das Mittelalter hört nicht auf. Über</p><p>historisches Erzählen, C.H. Beck, München 2008; V. Ferré (ed.), Médiévalisme: modernité du</p><p>Moyen Âge, L’Harmattan, Paris 2010; O.G. Oexle, Die Gegenwart des Mittelalters, Akademie</p><p>Verlag, Berlin 2013; T. Pugh, A.J. Weisl, Medievalisms. Making the Past in the Present, Routledge,</p><p>Oxon-New York 2013; D. Matthews, Medievalism: A Critical History, D.S. Brewer, Woodbridge</p><p>2015; L. D’Arcens (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Medievalism, Cambridge University</p><p>Press, Cambridge 2016; K.P. Fazioli, The Mirror of the Medieval cit.; The Middle Ages in the</p><p>Modern World cit.; Medievalism: Key Critical Terms cit.; A. Elliott, Medievalism, Politics and</p><p>Mass Media cit. A continuously updated bibliography on the topic can be found on the</p><p>“Timeline” page of the online journal “Medievally Speaking,” http://medievallyspeaking</p><p>.blogspot.com/2009/09/timeline.html (cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>5 The coincidence of meanings is already found at the end of the eighteenth century in Herder:</p><p>M. Domenichelli, Miti di una letteratura medievale. Il Nord, in E. Castelnuovo and G. Sergi</p><p>(eds.), Arti e storia nel medioevo, vol. iv cit., pp. 293–325: 293. Cf. in general Romanticismo/</p><p>Medievalismo, monograph issue of “La Questione romantica,” V (1999), n. 7/8. In Italian, the</p><p>noun “medioevo” (a translation of medium aevum, from the seventeenth century) and the</p><p>adjective “medievale” cannot be found earlier than the nineteenth century: Cf. C. Battisti, G.</p><p>Alessio, Dizionario etimologico italiano, G. Barbera, Firenze 1975, ad voces. Even in English, the</p><p>adjective “medieval” is first attested in 1827: Cl. A. Simmons, Medievalism: Its Linguistic His-</p><p>tory in Nineteenth-Century Britain, in “Studies in Medievalism,” XVII (2009), pp. 28–35: 29 ff.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://medievallyspeaking.blogspot.com/2009/09/timeline.html</p><p>http://medievallyspeaking.blogspot.com/2009/09/timeline.html</p><p>53Once upon a Time in the Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>Middle Ages per se was born then—as we have seen it was already centuries</p><p>old—but because only during this long century do we find the first, full social-</p><p>ization of ideas and the development of a widespread political culture, trans-</p><p>ferred from the elite environments of the courts and salons to cafés, theaters,</p><p>squares, and those virtual spaces of society that are magazines and newspa-</p><p>pers. The very concept of the Middle Ages, which is far from intuitive in that it</p><p>presupposes a familiarity with the notion of “history” in which it should be</p><p>situated, simply could not have had a mass effect before that time. The Middle</p><p>Ages already existed, but it was enclosed in the minds of an educated few. On</p><p>the other hand—and this is why we must come to terms with nineteenth-cen-</p><p>tury medievalism in order to truly understand modernity—during the nine-</p><p>teenth century the Middle Ages became a widespread myth at the bourgeois</p><p>and even the popular level.</p><p>Finally the people had both the tools to imagine and reimagine history, and</p><p>the information to create a secular history. Never before had there been a such</p><p>a widespread and pervasive way</p><p>to interpret the journey of man outside of re-</p><p>ligion. Popular and children’s literature were born precisely in that period</p><p>when all of Europe was pervaded by a Romantic longing for the Middle Ages,</p><p>with the result that this literature received a corresponding “imprint.” We</p><p>should be clear that this message did not pass through literature to historio-</p><p>graphical or theoretical works on medievalism, such as those of Viollet-le-Duc,</p><p>Pugin, and Ruskin, but rather that both reflect the magnitude of medievalism</p><p>as an overarching cultural framework. Medievalism was disruptive and omni-</p><p>present, and proposed a clear, unitary, and effective message that presented</p><p>history as a narrative. It was a living evocation of times past and thus of all our</p><p>ancestors, in every country that subscribed to this model. The medieval was</p><p>related in a colorful way—moving images that foreshadowed the cinema—the</p><p>market, the peasants, the village, the knight’s garb, the construction of the ca-</p><p>thedral, the battlefield, the settlement of a people in their land. Medievalism</p><p>was present in objects visible to everyone (great monuments, museums, na-</p><p>tional expositions, scenography en plein air), shared culturally (songs, operatic</p><p>arias), and fairly accessible economically (replica crafts, cheap editions of fa-</p><p>bles, legends, and novels, prints, even collections of figurines and stamps).</p><p>The tremendous impact of this medieval revival is above all tied to the pop-</p><p>ularity of historical novels, illustrations, and neo-Gothic, neo-Romanesque,</p><p>and (in Spain and parts of the US) neo-Moorish architecture. Considering that</p><p>iconographic sources and materials from the final centuries of the Middle Ages</p><p>are much richer and more abundant than those from earlier times, these cen-</p><p>turies of the Middle Ages’ “waning” became the visual paradigm containing</p><p>in itself the entire medieval millennium. A Crusader could don fifteenth- or</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 354</p><p><UN></p><p>sixteenth-century tournament gear and a damsel of the twelfth century could</p><p>dress like a lady of that later era, wearing a coned hat like a fairy. We are dealing</p><p>with a process of standardization that has led to stereotypes of medieval fashion</p><p>derived from the Late Middle Ages, Renaissance, and even the sixteenth centu-</p><p>ry. It is precisely this autumn of the Middle Ages, useful for dressing up even</p><p>barbarian chiefs and crusaders, that has come down to us, through the illustra-</p><p>tions in children’s books and especially through cinema, without much</p><p>alteration.6</p><p>But why did this medieval myth come to have such a wide reception? The</p><p>question is fundamental, because the answer can help explain the reuse of the</p><p>Middle Ages in modernity. The starting point to keep in mind is the following:</p><p>almost since their end the Middle Ages have been, in Western culture, one of</p><p>the most preferred settings for the marvelous, whether in a bright and benevo-</p><p>lent tone—fairy magic and the knight’s quest—or a terrifying and sinister</p><p>one—as they said in the nineteenth century, “gothic”: ghosts, mysterious</p><p>happenings, and witchcraft. The word “medieval” is so evocative of this fantas-</p><p>tical setting that the two are practically synonymous.7 Such superposition of</p><p>6 For cinema with medieval themes, see in general: V. Attolini, Immagini del medioevo nel cin-</p><p>ema, Dedalo, Bari 1993; Ch. Amalvi, Le goût du Moyen Âge cit., pp. 63–68; G. Gandino, Il cine-</p><p>ma, in E. Castelnuovo and G. Sergi (eds.), Arti e storia nel medioevo, vol. iv cit., pp. 737–755;</p><p>M. Sanfilippo, Historic Park. La storia e il cinema, Elleu multimedia, Roma 2004, pp. 99–134;</p><p>V. Ortenberg, In Search of the Holy Grail cit., pp. 193–223; K.J. Harty, The Reel Middle Ages:</p><p>American, Western and Eastern European, Middle Eastern and Asian Films about Medieval Eu-</p><p>rope, McFarland, Jefferson (NC) 20062; N. Haydock, Movie Medievalism. The Imaginary Middle</p><p>Ages, McFarland, Jefferson (NC) 2008; M. Sanfilippo, Cavalieri di celluloide, in M. Mesirca and</p><p>F. Zambon (eds.), Il revival cavalleresco. Dal Don Chisciotte all’Ivanhoe (e oltre), Pacini, Pisa</p><p>2010, pp. 243–254, also online: http://dspace.unitus.it/bitstream/2067/950/1/Testo%20San</p><p>filippo.doc (cons. Apr. 28, 2019); B. Bildhauer, Medievalism and the Cinema, in L. D’Arcens</p><p>(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Medievalism cit., pp. 45–59. Specific themes have also</p><p>been the subject of monographs, such as, for example, M. Sanfilippo, Il medioevo secondo</p><p>Walt Disney cit.; Id., Camelot, Sherwood, Hollywood. Re Artú e Robin Hood dal medioevo inglese</p><p>al cinema americano, Cooper, Roma 2006; B. Olton (ed.), Arthurian Legends on Films and Tele-</p><p>vision, McFarland, Jefferson (NC) 2008; P. Dalla Torre, Giovanna d’Arco sullo schermo, Studi-</p><p>um, Roma 2004; M.W. Driver, S. Ray and J. Rosenbaum (eds.), The Medieval Hero on Screen:</p><p>Representations from Beowulf to Buffy, McFarland, Jefferson (NC) 2004; Hollywood in the Holy</p><p>Land cit.; L. D’Arcens, Comic Medievalism. Laughing at the Middle Ages, D.S. Brewer, Wood-</p><p>bridge 2014. The journal “Quaderni medievali,” active from 1976 to 2005, contains a number of</p><p>articles dedicated to cinema. One website on the topic is Cinema e medioevo, www.cineme</p><p>dioevo.net (cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>7 G. De Turris, L’immaginario medievale nel fantastico contemporaneo, in Il sogno del medioevo</p><p>cit., pp. 93–109; R. Bordone, Il medioevo nell’immaginario dell’Ottocento italiano cit.; Id., Me-</p><p>dioevo oggi, in G. Cavallo [et al.] (eds.), Lo spazio letterario del medioevo, 1, vol. iv, L’attua-</p><p>lizzazione del testo cit., pp. 261–299; M. Oldoni, Il significato del medioevo nell’immaginario</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://dspace.unitus.it/bitstream/2067/950/1/Testo%20Sanfilippo.doc</p><p>http://dspace.unitus.it/bitstream/2067/950/1/Testo%20Sanfilippo.doc</p><p>http://www.cinemedioevo.net</p><p>http://www.cinemedioevo.net</p><p>55Once upon a Time in the Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>meanings does not exist in the idealization of other epochs: the concepts of</p><p>the ancient, modern, and contemporary ages do not immediately bring about</p><p>this alignment of thought. Yet the popular fairy tale itself always seems to be set</p><p>in the middle ages: not the time of the authors, as in the collections of Perrault</p><p>or La Fontaine, or even in Aesop’s fables, but that of traditional folk legends.</p><p>When we speak of magic, fairies, and heroes, we are of course referring to</p><p>archetypal imaginary forms that respond to the profound and universal exi-</p><p>gencies of humankind. These archetypes require no precise historical time; it</p><p>is enough for them to conjure up an “other” time, ancient inasmuch as every</p><p>myth refers to a remote past. This is the time of “once upon a time.” Outside the</p><p>West the Middle Ages are not a fitting vessel, even though in Persian, African,</p><p>and American Indian tales we find the same archetypes. The Middle Ages may</p><p>be the setting of European tales, but it does not represent their essence so</p><p>much as their color.</p><p>To be clear, our basic problem is not understanding how much was truly</p><p>medieval in the nineteenth century’s historical, artistic, and literary re-imagin-</p><p>ing of the Middle Ages, how much, in other words, historiographical analyses</p><p>and rewritings respected medieval sources. What is essential is that we com-</p><p>prehend how the entire process carried out in the nineteenth century involved</p><p>coloring archetypal and fantastical situations with medievalizing hues—even</p><p>if such situations were not actually medieval. The Brothers Grimm, Victor</p><p>Hugo, Walter Scott, and Robert Louis Stevenson, along with Gustave Doré, Wal-</p><p>ter Crane, and a hundred other great and minor authors have, in a word, histo-</p><p>ricized the “once upon a time,” and called it Medieval.</p><p>We might call this process of adapting fables and legends in the template of</p><p>medieval culture a normalization of the fantastic.</p><p>Yet in coloring the arche-</p><p>types, the very word medieval is transformed into something evocative of myth.</p><p>The fantastic, the mysterious, and the fairytale are reduced to a standard, a</p><p>canonical formula, a code of communication understood by all. This is not</p><p>a new process: during the Medieval Era itself and, mutatis mutandis, during</p><p>the Renaissance, an analogous approach enabled the weaving of bonds with</p><p>Classical Greece and Rome, through both history and mythology. And already</p><p>in the Early Modern era, authors like Ariosto, Tasso, Cervantes, Spenser, and</p><p>Shakespeare, vanguards and precursors to medievalism, recreated their Middle</p><p>Ages. In our case the influence is even more broad, extending even to children</p><p>and the illiterate.</p><p>contemporaneo, in Medioevo reale, medioevo immaginario. Confronti e percorsi culturali tra</p><p>regioni d’Europa, conference proceedings (Torino, 26–27 May 2000), Città di Torino, Torino</p><p>2002, pp. 187–208.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 356</p><p><UN></p><p>Even absent Romanticism, the pre-existing fantastical motifs would have</p><p>continued to serve their functions in popular culture: heroes fight and win, we</p><p>know, just not necessarily in chain mail. These fantastical motifs are neverthe-</p><p>less garbed in courtly dress throughout the long nineteenth century. By the</p><p>first decades of the next one, the Middle Ages had become the preferred ste-</p><p>reotype for fantastic narrative. Thus, we can easily say that the nineteenth cen-</p><p>tury definitively transformed the way that Europeans represented the fantasies</p><p>with which they supplied the West: they medievalized them, providing them</p><p>with a “historical” landscape.</p><p>And thus we see a canon taking shape, a motif-index of popular imagination</p><p>pertaining to the Middle Ages that persists almost unaltered to the present day,</p><p>as one can see, to take a random example, in the comic strip The Wizard of Id</p><p>(1964–). The character types are the king and queen, the dame and damsel</p><p>(usually in distress), the prince, the knight, the troubadour or minstrel, the</p><p>jester, the bard, the friar, the merchant, the innkeeper, the peasant, the serf,</p><p>the pope, the emperor, the fairy, the witch, the inquisitor, the dragon, the mage,</p><p>the hermit, the saint, the rebel, the wolf, the barbarian, the conjurer, the char-</p><p>latan, the thief, the churchman… With whom are we dealing, Chaucer? Boc-</p><p>caccio? They are already distant specters, concealed behind so many rewrit-</p><p>ings. The typical places where these stories transpire are the cathedral, the city,</p><p>the forest, the tournament list, the battlefield, and, naturally, the castle. Which,</p><p>to be recognized as canonical, must have its crenellations (Guelph or Ghibel-</p><p>line), its drawbridge, catapults, four towers, possibly cylindrical and preferably</p><p>with coned roofs. Without crenellations it’s not a real castle, or it’s at least a</p><p>shoddy one. And then there must be double- or triple-arched windows, vault-</p><p>ed ceilings, grotesque sculptures, great hearths, tapestries, and pelts. Are we</p><p>talking about a real fortress? Absolutely not: it’s an Idealtypus that takes its in-</p><p>spiration primarily from the neomedieval castles of Pierrefonds and</p><p>Neuschwanstein (this last the one on which Walt Disney’s Sleeping Beauty</p><p>Castle is based) and which is easy to find, even today, in children’s books.8</p><p>8 The literature on neomedieval castles, which, along with churches, university buildings, and</p><p>seats of public institutions represent the crown jewels of neomedievalism, is quite vast, start-</p><p>ing with K. Clark, The Gothic Revival. An Essay in the History of Taste, John Murray, London</p><p>1928. Various studies on the subject can be found in the volume of E. Castelnuovo and G.</p><p>Sergi (eds.), Arti e storia nel medioevo, vol. iv cit.; See also, specifically, N.R. Kline (ed.), Castles:</p><p>An Enduring Fantasy, State College Art Gallery, Plymouth 1985; T. Lazzari, Castello e immagi-</p><p>nario dal Romanticismo a oggi, Battei, Parma 1991; R. Bordone, Lo specchio di Shalott cit.,</p><p>pp. 121–137 and 173–184; M. Sanfilippo, Il medioevo secondo Walt Disney cit.; R. Licinio, Castelli</p><p>reali, castelli virtuali, castelli immaginari, in “Quaderni medievali,” xxii (1997), n. 43, pp. 94–</p><p>118; R.R. Taylor, The Castles of the Rhine: Recreating the Middle Ages in Modern Germany,</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>57Once upon a Time in the Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>Nineteenth-century historians, architects, illustrators, and novelists shaped</p><p>public opinion and planted the models that have since taken root and ramified</p><p>ad infinitum. Their glossy and, in part, fabricated Middle Ages have remained</p><p>alive in popular imagination because they had two considerable advantages:</p><p>they were described in a way that left no room for doubt, and they were ever</p><p>present before the eyes of the people. The Medieval Era is alive because, during</p><p>the nineteenth century, it was largely constructed or reconstructed in a mi-</p><p>metic tone that did not bother to distinguish—with some exceptions—the</p><p>possible original element from the artificial one: a principle that applies</p><p>equally to architecture as to costumes and scenery. The quantity of products</p><p>proposed as medieval was so tremendous that they have had continued to con-</p><p>dition every interpretation to come. Someone with no philological training</p><p>still has trouble today distinguishing (and has no reason to do so) between the</p><p>Middle Ages invented in the nineteenth century and the “real,” historically</p><p>verifiable era—which also has the defect of being less monumental, less com-</p><p>plete, and more imperfect, because it has been corroded by the years. Why</p><p>should an Englishman and a Hungarian know that the seats of their parliaments</p><p>were both erected in the nineteenth century, seeing as they were both taught</p><p>that their respective nations— represented precisely by those buildings—</p><p>date back to the Middle Ages? And why should an Italian know that her festival</p><p>costumes—the symbols of civic identity—are much closer to the ones found</p><p>in opera and film than medieval paintings? It is therefore thanks to the nine-</p><p>teenth-century revival that the modern world has been able to construct a col-</p><p>lective imaginary and call it, sic et simpliciter, medieval.</p><p>What are the political implications of all this? Even if we limited ourselves</p><p>to collecting fantastical elements, the Middle Ages would still emerge as cen-</p><p>tral to the construction of the Western imagination, but our work would stop</p><p>there. In reality, however, the crucial step with which we have yet to reckon is</p><p>the mobilization of these feelings of distance, wonder, the sacred, and the ar-</p><p>cane in service of an identitarian political sentiment. Medieval does not just</p><p>mean magic, black or white as the case may be, but above all a historical patria,</p><p>a sense of a place (possibly even physical, with monuments, lieux de mémoire),</p><p>a feeling of belonging to a community, a group, a religion, a sect. This is the</p><p>hook on which hangs a large part of political medievalism.</p><p>The nineteenth-century artistic and literary movements, which at first glance</p><p>appear out of touch with the hard realities of the everyday life that they sought</p><p>to transcend, harbor a profound and deep-rooted politics without which they</p><p>Wilfried Laurier University Press, Waterloo (ON) 1998; A.-M. Thiesse, La création des identités</p><p>nationales. Europe xviiie-xxe siècle, Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1999, pp. 146–149.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 358</p><p><UN></p><p>do not make sense. If we look but a little bit closer, we see that the medievalism</p><p>of the Restoration is not that of the July Revolution, nor that of the People’s</p><p>Spring, the Italian Risorgimento, the irredentist states of Eastern Europe or the</p><p>United Kingdom, of labor unions, Russian</p><p>pan-Slavism, the foundation of the</p><p>Second Reich or the late, decadent nineteenth century. Its instrumental use can</p><p>be twisted to any possible interpretation: conservative, revolutionary, patriotic,</p><p>neo-Guelph or neo-Ghibelline, individualist (the solitary hero) and collectivist</p><p>(the industrious city, the people in action), such that it has been spoken of as a</p><p>“great repertoire of ambiguously polyvalent metaphors.”9 In fact, nineteenth-</p><p>century political medievalism, born with a clear stamp of reaction and counter-</p><p>revolution, has also been revolutionary, liberal, constitutionalist, and parliamen-</p><p>tarian. François-René de Chateaubriand, that great figure of post-Napoleonic</p><p>Restoration, made use of it, but so too did Freidrich Engels, Marx’s co-author for</p><p>the Communist Manifesto; John Ruskin, who dreamed of a return to a Middle</p><p>Ages of original purity, his disciple Walter Crane, who gave it a socialist reading,</p><p>and finally Richard Wagner, who constructed the myth of the Great Germany</p><p>upon it. A veritable shared language, propagated by a hundred “national bards,”</p><p>from the mysterious Ossian all the way to Giosue Carducci and William Butler</p><p>Yeats.10</p><p>According to nineteenth-century principles recently returned to fashion,</p><p>the Middle Ages are the before-time of national kings who ensured the birth of</p><p>the state in the great countries like France, Spain, England, already institution-</p><p>alized in this era, or else—in countries that were still “irredentist” in the nine-</p><p>teenth century, like Italy, Poland, or Ireland—the glorious time of liberty be-</p><p>fore the imperialist invasions of vicious and soulless Others, be they English,</p><p>Austrian, Spanish, German, Russian, or Turkish. “History is the nation,” wrote</p><p>Guizot. “It is the patria across the centuries.”11</p><p>9 R. Bordone, Il medioevo nell’immaginario cit., p. 115. He notes the contradiction inherent</p><p>in the Italian judgment on the Middle Ages: ibid., p. 128.</p><p>10 The studies on nineteenth-century political medievalism are numerous and represented</p><p>by almost all contemporary nations, to the point that it is difficult to provide even a basic</p><p>representative sample. See, however: A.-M. Thiesse, La création des identités natio-</p><p>nales cit.; Ch. Amalvi, Le goût du Moyen Âge cit., especially pp. 185–202 and 230–241;</p><p>J. Leerssen, National Thought in Europe: A Cultural History, Amsterdam University Press,</p><p>Amsterdam 2006; V. Ortenberg, In Search of the Holy Grail cit., pp. 99–117; P.J. Geary, The</p><p>Myth of Nations cit., pp. 15–40; Id., Writing the Nation: Historians and National Identities</p><p>from the Nineteenth to the Twenty-first Centuries, in The Middle Ages in the Modern World:</p><p>Twenty-first-century Perspectives cit., pp. 73–86. This topic is addressed more fully in Ch. 11.</p><p>11 “L’histoire c’est la nation, c’est la patrie à travers les siècles”: F. Guizot, Mémoires pour ser-</p><p>vir à l’histoire de mon temps, Michel Levy Frères, Paris 1858, vol. I, p. 28.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>59Once upon a Time in the Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>In the course of the nineteenth century, the search for the beginning, the</p><p>founding day, found a perfect response in the identification of the first settle-</p><p>ments of the gens, of its most ancient songs, of warrior heroes, of royal corona-</p><p>tions and battles won, foreshadowing the new battles that the gens is called to</p><p>fight and the new kings who hope to put themselves on the throne. The Medi-</p><p>eval Era, de facto timeless even when meticulously dated to the Early and High</p><p>Middle Ages, serves this process by imposing a historical category and ethics of</p><p>judgment according to which the present-day winners are not those who truly</p><p>have justice on their side, but those who “were there first”: the peoples who</p><p>first drained the swamps and cleared the forests, who erected and defended</p><p>their cities. The conquered are redeemed and return as the potential patrons of</p><p>their land, bearing their ancestral presence as a deed of ownership. The posi-</p><p>tion according to which justice is on the side of those who were there before</p><p>and not those who came after with numbers or the force of arms, is at the base</p><p>of every nationalist and irredentist claim of the nineteenth century and many</p><p>political movements today: the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and the Israeli-</p><p>Palestinian conflict, for instance. The Middle Ages become indispensable for</p><p>demonstrating the continuity that can confirm the right of precedence.12</p><p>In establishing antithesis, the enemy is the secret ingredient to producing</p><p>synthesis and creating identity.13 The Middle Ages are the great time of heroes</p><p>who fight for their people and their country, both the one that once existed but</p><p>is now endangered, and the one that must, necessarily, find its final form in the</p><p>state that one day—hopefully soon—will be reborn: heroes like El Cid, Alexan-</p><p>der Nevsky, Robin Hood, Joan of Arc, William Tell, William Wallace, Jan Hus,</p><p>and Alberto da Giussano. In this manner the medieval hero operates as a high-</p><p>ly effective exemplum of a whole population understood as an active and com-</p><p>batant subject. And it operates just as effectively for the intellectuals of the</p><p>consolidated national states as for those leading patriotic movements aspiring</p><p>to the formation of a governing state: Greeks, Italians, Bohemians, Slovaki-</p><p>ans, Hungarians, Poles, Serbs, Slovenes, Croatians, Macedonians, Romanians,</p><p>12 See A.-M. Thiesse, La création des identités nationales cit., pp. 232–33: “It is difficult to es-</p><p>tablish, according to the national principle, statute of limitations for the occupation of</p><p>ancient soil […]. An extreme case would be the Serbian reclamation of Kosovo, declared</p><p>the sanctuary of the nation because in 1389 the great battle against the Ottoman Empire</p><p>was fought there, marking the end of an independent Serbian reign.” See also P.J. Geary,</p><p>The Myth of Nations cit., p. 13, for the concept of the “moment of primary acquisition.”</p><p>13 F. Cardini, L’invenzione del nemico cit.; G. Ricci, Il nemico ufficiale. Discorsi di crociata</p><p>nell’Italia moderna, in F. Cantù, G. Di Febo and R. Moro (eds.), L’immagine del nemico.</p><p>Storia, ideologia e rappresentazione tra età moderna e contemporanea, Viella, Roma 2009,</p><p>pp. 41–55.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 360</p><p><UN></p><p>Bulgarians—in short, those within the Austrian and Ottoman Empires—or</p><p>Scotsmen, Welshmen, Irishmen, Bretons, Occitans, Basques, Catalans—the</p><p>independentists active in the British, French, and Spanish Empires. Each</p><p>movement discovers its own medieval battles, with songs and heroes; each</p><p>possesses the full (albeit imagined) knowledge that the Middle Ages were the</p><p>origin of its own nation.14</p><p>It is this strict contiguity between the historical sense and the sense of</p><p>wonder, the result of precise cultural operations that have selected and re-</p><p>interpreted certain medieval elements while omitting many others, that</p><p>forms the bedrock of nineteenth-century, and with it contemporary, political</p><p>medievalism— above all because of the perfect alignment of a belief in the</p><p>primordial formation of identities with foundation myths. Local and national</p><p>identity, tradition, heroism and a sense of wonder, empirical history and leg-</p><p>end: all can converge in the same word, “medieval,” today as in the nineteenth</p><p>century. The historically documented knight , the national symbol, and the leg-</p><p>endary or indeed fairy-tale hero come to be represented, and thus received, in</p><p>the same way. The Battle of Legnano and Joan of Arc have spatiotemporal loca-</p><p>tions as precise as they are discrete, but they produce emotion because they</p><p>are perceived as myth, simultaneously “here” and “elsewhere.”</p><p>They are myths, but they are quite different from those of mythology as</p><p>generally understood. Unlike in classical mythology, the mythic time of the</p><p>Middle Ages</p><p>is presented as a real time that actually happened, that is de-</p><p>scribable in historical and thus credible terms, and that contains proven</p><p>(though not always tested) facts. All the clichés about the Middle Ages, many</p><p>of which we will encounter in the following chapters, have been at times ac-</p><p>cepted historiographical interpretations.15 The Middle Ages’ real mythogra-</p><p>phers are the historians and the archaeologists, even when they made judi-</p><p>cious use of critical methods and applied philological rigor to written sources</p><p>and material remains. While substantial doubts around the admissibility of</p><p>certain interpretations already flourished among nineteenth-century authors</p><p>14 Cf. infra, Chapter 11.</p><p>15 Overviews in K. Biddick, The Shock of Medievalism, Duke University Press, Durham (NC)</p><p>1998; N. Cantor, Inventing the Middle Ages cit.; Studi medievali e immagine del medioevo fra</p><p>Ottocento e Novecento cit.; E. Artifoni, Il medioevo nel Romanticismo. Forme della storiogra-</p><p>fia fra Sette e Ottocento, in G. Cavallo [et al.] (eds.), Lo spazio letterario del medioevo, 1, vol.</p><p>iv, L’attualizzazione del testo cit., pp. 175–221; E. Occhipinti, Gli storici e il medioevo. Da</p><p>Muratori a Duby, in E. Castelnuovo and G. Sergi (eds.), Arti e storia nel medioevo, vol. iv</p><p>cit., pp. 207–228; G. Sergi, Antidoti all’abuso della storia cit., pp. 237–338; R. Utz, Medieval-</p><p>ism. A Manifesto, Arc Humanities Press, Kalamazoo and Bradford 2017, pp. 19 ff., 39 ff.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>61Once upon a Time in the Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>(and not only professional historians),16 in actuality the history, archaeology,</p><p>and museology of the Middle Ages “precisely reconstructed” greatly reinforced</p><p>the mythopoetic interpretation of the period, because they were simply su-</p><p>perimposed on this interpretation without eliminating it. Indeed, they have</p><p>even legitimized it scientifically inasmuch as they share its “mission” of laying</p><p>the foundations of the “history of the fatherland” in a true political program.17</p><p>Born in the same environment, medievalism and medieval studies have</p><p>necessarily drifted apart over time. The writing of medieval history acquires its</p><p>characteristic physiognomy from continual reinterpretation, in the present, of</p><p>historical facts gleaned from the study of the Middle Ages, from new acquisi-</p><p>tions in research, and from the questions that historians are called to answer.</p><p>Hence the fact that the study of history is always a process of becoming: the</p><p>certainties of one generation can be contested by a following generation, and a</p><p>scholar has every right to change his/her mind in the course of his/her research,</p><p>16 For example, on the high degree of awareness and understanding of historical dynamics</p><p>on the part of some authors, including of the implausibility of a simplistic understanding</p><p>of the history of the communes as that of the Italian nation, see R. Bordone, Il medioevo</p><p>nell’immaginario cit., pp. 111 ff.; O. Capitani, Carducci e la storia d’Italia medievale. Controri-</p><p>flessioni inattuali, in A. Mazzon (ed.), Scritti per Isa. Raccolta di studi offerti a Isa Lori San-</p><p>filippo, Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo, Roma 2008, pp. 101–114; F. Roversi Mona-</p><p>co, “O falsar la storia…”: Massimo D’Azeglio e la Lega Lombarda, in A. Malfitano, A. Preti,</p><p>F. Tarozzi (eds.), Per continuare il dialogo. Gli amici ad Angelo Varni, Bononia University</p><p>Press, Bologna 2014, pp. 131–140; Id., “Il gran fatto che dovrà commemorarsi”: l’Alma Mater</p><p>Studiorum e l’Ottavo Centenario della sua fondazione. Medioevo, memoria e identità a Bolo-</p><p>gna dopo l’Unità d’Italia in T. di Carpegna Falconieri, R. Facchini (eds.), Medievalismi ita-</p><p>liani cit., pp. 149–162.</p><p>17 See Cl. Fawcett e P.L. Kohl (eds.), Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archaeology,</p><p>Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996; T. Champion and M. Diaz-Andreu (eds.),</p><p>Nationalism and Archaeology in Europe, Westview Press, Boulder (CO) 1996; S. Jones, The</p><p>Archaeology of Ethnicity: Constructing Identities in the Past and Present, Routledge, Lon-</p><p>don-New York 1997; A.-M. Thiesse, La création des identités nationales cit., pp. 204–210 and</p><p>passim; G. Iggers, The Uses and Abuses of History and the Responsibility of the Historians:</p><p>Past and Present, in 19th International Congress of Historical Sciences, 6–13 August 2000.</p><p>Proceeding Acts: Reports, Abstracts and Round Table Introductions, University of Oslo, Oslo</p><p>2000, pp. 83–100; A.D. Smith, The Nation in History. Historiographical Debates about Eth-</p><p>nicity and Nationalism, Brandeis-Historical Society of Israel, Jerusalem 2000; Antiquités,</p><p>archéologie et construction nationale au xixe siècle, monograph issue of “Mélanges de</p><p>l’École française de Rome. Italie et Mediterranée,” cxiii (2001), n. 2; Cl. A. Simmons (ed.),</p><p>Medievalism and the Quest for the “Real” Middle Ages, Routledge, London 2001; G. Klanic-</p><p>zay and E. Marosi (eds.), The Nineteenth-Century Process of “Musealization” in Hungary</p><p>and Europe, Collegium Budapest for Advanced Study, Budapest 2006; B. Effros, The Ger-</p><p>manic Invasions and the Academic Politics of National Identity in Late Nineteenth-Century</p><p>France, in J.M. Bak [et al.] (eds.), Gebrauch und Missbrauch cit., pp. 81–94; M. Baár, Histo-</p><p>rians and Nationalism. East-Central Europe in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford University</p><p>Press, Oxford 2010.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 362</p><p><UN></p><p>for relativism and methodical doubt, against which many voices are raised to-</p><p>day, are and remain the cornerstones of the discipline.18 Even if the word “revi-</p><p>sionism” seems negative (as often happens to “isms”), in reality historical writ-</p><p>ing is unimaginable except as a continual self-correction—always, however</p><p>(and this is how it differs from revisionism per se), tending to the most exact</p><p>and intellectually honest reconstruction of the dynamics of the past. Medieval</p><p>studies, then, is a discipline of constant evolution, which discusses itself and</p><p>has transformed many times in the course of the last two hundred years. The</p><p>ways that a nineteenth-century historian studied and understood the Middle</p><p>Ages do not correspond to ours, and not all the questions that our colleague of</p><p>two centuries ago had to address interest us anymore.</p><p>Twentieth-century history writing, filled with opposing tensions, did not of-</p><p>fer a unitary and teleological vision of historical processes; on the contrary, it</p><p>expressed ever more critical and nebulous concepts. Not just that: it found it-</p><p>self competing with other sciences born in the second half of the nineteenth</p><p>century that quickly rose to the rank of co-star if not leading actor in the inter-</p><p>pretation of the world of men: psychology, ethnography, anthropology, sociol-</p><p>ogy. What a century earlier could be theorized in historical terms and present-</p><p>ed according to narrative models has become the investigative territory of</p><p>disciplines that have developmental epistemologies distinct from that of his-</p><p>tory, seen at times as an elderly aunt. It is not at all by chance that the most il-</p><p>lustrious historians of the mid-twentieth century, like Marc Bloch, Henri Brau-</p><p>del, and Lucien Febvre, are those who sought (and found) a compromise in</p><p>making history a social science comparable to the others: in other words, a</p><p>sociology particularly attuned to diachronic development.</p><p>The enrichment and specialization of the human sciences has had a posi-</p><p>tive effect in the incredible increase in the possibilities of posing and resolving</p><p>problems, but the trade-off has been the impossibility of following develop-</p><p>ments outside one’s own specialty with adequate competence. As history (like</p><p>sociology and other disciplines) becomes academic, it is no longer in a posi-</p><p>tion to speak to everyone. The osmosis between fields of knowledge that</p><p>marked nineteenth-century</p><p>erudition has dwindled and at times ceased com-</p><p>pletely. Seen from a distance of over a hundred years, the architect Viollet-le-</p><p>Duc, the novelist Stevenson, the art critic Ruskin, and the historian Cattaneo</p><p>ultimately do not seem to think of the Middle Ages all too differently: they love</p><p>it, they narrate it, they relive it, and they make it modern. Even to one with full</p><p>knowledge of their different epistemological bases and methodologies, they</p><p>always point in the same direction. Not so in the twentieth century: now</p><p>18 See Chapters 7 and 10.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>63Once upon a Time in the Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>medieval studies addresses carefully delineated themes, changes its mind, cor-</p><p>rects itself, seeks new avenues, evaluates new sources, and sometimes consid-</p><p>ers its scholars’ responsiveness to the demands of modernity inappropriate, the</p><p>risk of falling into reviled anachronisms too great. But the other side of the coin</p><p>is that the results of historical analysis grow muddled and are received too late,</p><p>if at all, by those who practice her sister fields (sociologists, journalists, histori-</p><p>ans who specialize in other periods) and by those “not suited to the task.”19 The</p><p>professionalization of historiography has thus had an unexpected outcome: the</p><p>severing of academic knowledge from common understanding. The ways of</p><p>comprehending and representing the Middle Ages have split into two paths:</p><p>history as practiced in the university world (not a very influential environment</p><p>in terms of demographic impact, at least not before 1968), and popular percep-</p><p>tion. The interaction between these two modes of understanding the past (in</p><p>this case, the Middle Ages) has always remained relatively limited.20 Com-</p><p>pounding the situation, a certain kind of academia (primarily in Germany and</p><p>Italy, countries where the tradition of the essay is weak) has and often contin-</p><p>ues to favor a writing style that, while justifiably technical, can too easily lapse</p><p>into jargon and even into an intentional esotericism rooted in a real horror</p><p>at the prospect of its “vulgarization.”21 The consequences are clear: the space</p><p>of communication about the Middle Ages, which in the nineteenth century</p><p>was entirely filled with learned historians, has since been occupied by others. In</p><p>Italy, for instance, the Middle Ages are known largely thanks to the Storia</p><p>d’Italia a fumetti (History of Italy in Comics) and books by the journalists Indro</p><p>19 See G. Sergi, Preface to the Italian edition of P.J. Geary, The Myth of Nations cit. (Il mito</p><p>delle nazioni. Le origini medievali dell’Europa, Carocci, Roma 2005, pp. 9–15: 10), for the</p><p>concept of “asynchronous update.”</p><p>20 G. Sergi, L’idea di medioevo cit., especially p. 12, on the “ineffectiveness of professional re-</p><p>search on the distortion of collective memory”; B. Stock, Listening for the Text. On the Uses</p><p>of the Past, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadephia 19962, pp. 71–72, on the “gap</p><p>between academic medievalism and general culture”; J. Le Goff, À la recherche du Moyen</p><p>Âge, Audibert, Paris 2003, p. 7: “The florid French school of medieval studies, despite its</p><p>scientific successes, does not seem to have changed anything in the media or the basic</p><p>ideas that are broadcast.” See analogously S. Settis, The Future of the “Classical” cit., pp. 13</p><p>ff., which speaks of a true “divorce between the ‘science of antiquity’ and the use of antiq-</p><p>uity in contemporary culture.” On clichés, aside from Sergi’s L’idea di medioevo, see F. Ma-</p><p>rostica (ed.), Medioevo e luoghi comuni, Tecnodid, Napoli 2004; A. Brusa, Un prontuario</p><p>degli stereotipi sul medioevo, in “Cartable de Clio,” V (2004), n. 4, www.mondimedievali.</p><p>net/pre-testi/stereotipi.htm (cons. Mar. 10, 2010, the page was found to be inactive when</p><p>cons. Apr. 28, 2019); M. Bull, Thinking Medieval: An Introduction to the Study of the Middle</p><p>Ages, Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2005; G. Sergi, Antidoti all’abuso della storia cit.,</p><p>pp. 359–364.</p><p>21 R. Iorio, Medioevo e divulgazione, in “Quaderni medievali,” xiii (1988), n. 26, pp. 163–170;</p><p>S. Pivato, Vuoti di memoria cit., pp. 29–36.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.mondimedievali.net/pre-testi/stereotipi.htm</p><p>http://www.mondimedievali.net/pre-testi/stereotipi.htm</p><p>Chapter 364</p><p><UN></p><p>Montanelli and Roberto Gervaso.22 In the same way, and not by chance, the</p><p>Italian personality most directly associated with the Middle Ages is Umberto</p><p>Eco, renowned semiotician and accomplished novelist. Consequently, in the</p><p>words of Giuseppe Sergi, “The Middle Ages of non-medievalists (historians of</p><p>the Modern Era, anthropologists, literary critics) has great success precisely</p><p>because it corresponds to the common culture and to what the greater public</p><p>expects.”23</p><p>Medievalism is a cultural, social, and political phenomenon that responds</p><p>to a different set of needs and is structured in a completely different manner</p><p>from the academic study of the Middle Ages. Those who “use” the Middle Ages</p><p>usually have no intention of discussing and understanding it in its ambiguity,</p><p>nor of contextualizing it: on the contrary, if they can’t find a parallel with the</p><p>modern world, the medieval is of no use to them. This means that the beloved</p><p>or exploited Medieval Era does not exist as an object in itself, but only as the</p><p>measure by which the echoes of modernity are given substance: it is reflected</p><p>in a mirror that deforms the original image, for “nunc videmus per speculum in</p><p>aenigmate”: now we see as through a mirror, darkly.24 And all too frequently</p><p>this reflection in the mirror may have no solid object behind it, for the image</p><p>may be within the mirror, that is, within us. And above all, those who “use” the</p><p>Middle Ages have no intention of changing their minds about it. To be fully</p><p>appreciated, their Middle Ages must not be subject to change: the knight, the</p><p>pope and the emperor, the nation, the community and their identities must</p><p>wrap themselves up in a tidy bow.25 It follows that medievalism, with respect</p><p>22 I. Montanelli e R. Gervaso, L’Italia dei secoli bui: il medioevo sino al Mille, Rizzoli, Milano</p><p>1965; Id., L’Italia dei comuni: il medioevo dal 1000 al 1250, Rizzoli, Milano 1967; Id., L’Italia dei</p><p>secoli d’oro: il medioevo dal 1250 al 1492, Rizzoli, Milano 1967; E. Biagi, Storia d’Italia a fu-</p><p>metti, vol. I, Dai barbari ai capitani di ventura, Mondadori, Milano 1979. Cf. R. Iorio, Medio-</p><p>evo e giornalismo, in Il sogno del medioevo cit., pp. 119–125.</p><p>23 G. Sergi, L’idea di medioevo cit., p. 14.</p><p>24 Paul, 1 Cor, 13,12. For nineteenth-century medievalism (but the analogy with the present is</p><p>sound), see R. Bordone, Lo specchio di Shalott cit., pp. 9 e 14: “The tearful history of sorcery,</p><p>love, death, and chivalry in The Lady of Shalott […] in some ways lends itself to being seen</p><p>as a metaphor for the collective imaginary of the Middle Ages: in fact, we almost never</p><p>capture a direct image of that fabulous time, derived from contemporary sources, but al-</p><p>ways and only the reflection of that warped mirror that was nineteenth-century fantasy,</p><p>faithfully reproduced on the “canvas” of Romantic iconography […]. Certainly, we are</p><p>dealing with a mirror, this is not the Middle Ages of our sources that are instead standing</p><p>outside of that window. But we know full well and it is not here that we seek the reality of</p><p>the Middle Ages. What we seek in that mirror is another story.”</p><p>25 For analogous considerations on the “Classical”: Settis, The Future of the “Classical,” cit.,</p><p>pp. 51, 55 ff., 110 ff.; see also B. Coccia (ed.), Il mondo classico nell’immaginario contempora-</p><p>neo, Apes, Roma 2008.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>65Once upon a Time in the Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>to medieval studies, is a much less versatile thing, and has changed much less</p><p>over the years.</p><p>The Middle Ages, as should now be clear, is an age for all seasons: it is such a</p><p>vast and remote period that, at least in popular sentiment, it loses any real his-</p><p>torical connotation. Its fundamental uncertainty is its defining feature. Its lim-</p><p>inal position—suspended between history and fantasy, and therefore able to</p><p>fill itself with any ingredients—has remained its only constant, even into its</p><p>contemporary political use. The Medieval is where fable, legend, myth, and his-</p><p>tory find their point of convergence. Indeed, it is precisely this willful indeci-</p><p>sion between history and legend, between politics and fantasy, that has allowed</p><p>it such good fortune. But medievalism is mimetic: it is a myth that presents it-</p><p>self as history. And in the nineteenth century, as today, this is its trump card.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004414983_006</p><p><UN></p><p>Chapter 4</p><p>The Middle Ages of Identity</p><p>“What d’you expect to be sure of?” Torrismund interrupted. “Insignias,</p><p>ranks, titles… All mere show. Those paladins’ shields with armorial bear-</p><p>ings and mottoes are not made of iron; they’re just paper, you can put</p><p>your finger through them.”</p><p>I. calvino, The Nonexistent Knight (1959)</p><p>At the end of the nineteenth century, the West’s passion for the Middle Ages</p><p>first saw a period of lively coexistence with other forms of cultural expression,</p><p>and then fell into torpor. Medievalism’s decline began with the rise of alternate</p><p>modes to replace Romanticism. In certain cases a syncretism was achieved, as</p><p>in the transition from the Neogothic style to Eclecticism and finally to Art</p><p>Nouveau in architecture and the visual arts, or the Decadent Movement in</p><p>literature. Even these eventually yielded to an all-out rejection of medievaliz-</p><p>ing taste in deference to the search for a sobriety of form and to a tendency</p><p>towards positivism, abstraction, pragmatism, socialism, materialism, progres-</p><p>sivism, and all those -isms that Romanticism and its dreamy, languid offspring</p><p>Medievalism were temperamentally unable to reproduce. The Italian Futurist</p><p>motto, “We shall kill the light of the moon” also killed the knight Parsifal and</p><p>Giosue Carducci’s Lady Laldòmine:</p><p>O Lady Laldòmine, come to your balcony all dressed in silver, and hear</p><p>the last love song of the Italian poetry that was. Come out, come out, my</p><p>lady, before the damp night falls and enshrouds us.1</p><p>Medievalism was counted as one of the good results of very poor taste: it was</p><p>sappy, garish, ridiculous, excessively ornate and too colorful, and at the same</p><p>time too dusty, derivative, and false. Pierrefonds Castle was held up as the</p><p>1 G. Carducci, Confessioni e battaglie, Sommaruga, Roma 1884, p. 218; F.T. Marinetti, Uccidiamo</p><p>il chiaro di luna! Edizioni Futuriste di Poesia, Milano 1911; Id., Abbasso il Tango e Parsifal! Let-</p><p>tera futurista circolare ad alcune amiche cosmopolite che danno dei the-tango e si parsifalizza-</p><p>no, Milano, 14 January 1914: “Parsifal è la svalutazione sistematica della vita […]. Purulenza</p><p>polifonica di Amfortas. Sonnolenza piagnucolosa dei Cavalieri del Graal. Satanismo ridicolo</p><p>di Kundry…Passatismo! Passatismo! Basta!” (“Parsifal is the systematic devaluation of life […]</p><p>the polyphonic purulence of Amfortas. The whining indolence of the Knights of the Grail.</p><p>Kundry’s ridiculous Satanism…Pastism! Pastism! Enough!”).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>67The Middle Ages of Identity</p><p><UN></p><p>perfect example of how not to restore a monument. As with the rest of the long</p><p>nineteenth century, Medievalism was felled by the machine-gun fire of the</p><p>First World War, a fratricidal, muddy, and decidedly unchivalrous war that</p><p>crumbled all the central empires, from whose ashes many modern nation-</p><p>states were born.2 The season of the great medieval revival closed with two</p><p>resounding trumpet blasts. The first was the canonization in 1920 of Joan of</p><p>Arc, the heroine of those troops in the trenches who saw her shining through</p><p>the clouds. The second was the 1922 birth of the Irish Free State, whose inde-</p><p>pendence from the United Kingdom was obtained with arms but also with the</p><p>fundamental contributions of Lady Augusta Gregory and William Butler Yeats,</p><p>singers of the Celtic epic and of Irish patriotism: in 1923 Yeats received the No-</p><p>bel Prize for having given “expression to the spirit of a whole nation.”3 But dur-</p><p>ing the interwar and immediate postwar eras, aside from exceptional cases</p><p>(most notably Germany, which we will discuss later), the political usage of the</p><p>Middle Ages was much more limited than before.</p><p>Medievalism’s agony, however, proved long, and in the end, to paraphrase</p><p>Mark Twain, the reports of its death were greatly exaggerated. Between the</p><p>1920s and the 1960s, it fell out of fashion, surviving largely on the cultural</p><p>margins in children’s books and “sword and sorcery” films. Yet it was precisely</p><p>during this period of dormancy and general regurgitation and rejection that</p><p>we find some of the most illustrious examples of the idealization of the</p><p>Middle Ages. These served as a kind of bridge, a counter-trend even, provid-</p><p>ing philosophical and literary nourishment for the generations that since the</p><p>2 On the topic of medievalism in the First World War, see M. Girouard, The Return to Camelot:</p><p>Chivalry and the English Gentleman, Yale University Press, New Haven-London 1981, pp. 275–</p><p>293; Ch. Amalvi, Le goût du Moyen Âge cit., pp. 235 ff.; M. Domenichelli, Miti di una letteratura</p><p>medievale cit., pp. 322–325; A.J. Frantzen, Bloody Good: Chivalry, Sacrifice, and World War i,</p><p>University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2004; M. Alexander, Medievalism cit., pp. 210 ff.; St. Goe-</p><p>bel, The Great War and Medieval Memory. War, Remembrance and Medievalism in Britain and</p><p>Germany, 1914–1940, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007; V. Ortenberg, In Search of</p><p>the Holy Grail cit., p. 158; M. Passini, La fabrique de l’art national. Le nationalisme et l’origine de</p><p>l’histoire de l’art en France et en Allemagne 1870–1933, Éditions de la Maison des sciences de</p><p>l’homme, Paris 2012, pp. 191–228; T. di Carpegna Falconieri, Il medievalismo e la grande guerra,</p><p>“Studi storici,” 56/1 (2015), pp. 49–78; Id., Il medievalismo e la grande guerra in Italia, “Studi</p><p>storici,” 56/2 (2015), pp. 251–276. B. Stock, Listening for the Text cit., pp. 62, 69–70, 73, considers</p><p>the Second World War as the turning point in attitudes towards the Middle Ages as institu-</p><p>tionalized by the Romantic conception. For his analysis of medievalism, see especially pp.</p><p>63–68.</p><p>3 “For his always inspired poetry, which in a highly artistic form gives expression to the spirit of</p><p>a whole nation”: Nobel Prize, official site: https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1923/</p><p>summary/ (cons. Apr. 28, 2019). On Yeats’s medievalism, see M. Alexander, Medievalism cit.,</p><p>p. 142 and ad indicem. Cf. also infra, Ch. 9.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1923/summary/</p><p>https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1923/summary/</p><p>Chapter 468</p><p><UN></p><p>late Sixties, have reworked this material within various mass movements, in</p><p>some cases even transforming it into proper ideological structures.</p><p>We’re talking about the Catholic conservative alternative to “Modernism,”</p><p>about the “conservative revolution” in Weimar Germany, about Theodor Ador-</p><p>no and Max Horkheimer, who reported the impossibility of a positive relation-</p><p>ship between human progress and the society of machines; we’re talking about</p><p>Herbert Marcuse, philosopher of the “great refusal” of socialism and capitalism</p><p>alike. We’re talking about an extremely</p><p>or fairy tales. On the contrary, it establishes solid</p><p>ties to public action.</p><p>In the Middle Ages, either as a historical period or a sort of symbolic else-</p><p>where, contemporary politics finds its preferred source of models, explanatory</p><p>allegories, and focalizing examples. The Medieval Era is a gloomy time that</p><p>somewhat resembles our current era: how many people say or think this? The</p><p>1970s, for instance, witnessed the use of the idea of the Medieval in terms of</p><p>class warfare and conflict with the establishment, on both the right and the</p><p>left. And what immediately leaps to mind (but must be understood on its own</p><p>terms), is the fact that many Western communities today—especially since the</p><p>1980s—use the label “medieval” to attest their own particular identity, whether</p><p>in terms of laying claim to their origins, or in terms of self-representation. At</p><p>various levels, in a sort of ascending scale, this happens to civic communities/</p><p>identities; to regional communities/identities seeking an affirmation of their</p><p>autonomy; to national communities/identities reforged in Eastern Europe af-</p><p>ter the fall of the Berlin Wall; to the European community/identity; and finally</p><p>to the entire Western community/identity as seen as a counterpoint above all</p><p>to the Islamic World (and vice versa). Even in America the phenomenon is in</p><p>full swing, with New Medievalism as a legitimate interpretive category in the</p><p>study of international relations. Thus, to represent and express one’s belonging</p><p>to a group, the predetermined code of communication is, often, of a medieval</p><p>hue—a phenomenon that is neither obvious, expected, or inevitable, but its</p><p>causes can be explained. In this book I would like to offer a panoramic over-</p><p>view of how the Medieval Era has been perceived and employed in the politi-</p><p>cal realm in the West in recent decades. The concept of the Middle Ages be-</p><p>comes a possible key to reading contemporary society and the direction in</p><p>which it is headed.</p><p>It has often been said—and certainly not incorrectly—that the Middle Ages</p><p>do not exist in reality. In effect, the words represent no more than an idea</p><p>whose usage may complicate rather than simplify things.2 The day the Medi-</p><p>eval Era began to take form was the day that people decided it was over: the</p><p>time when some men enamored with antiquity became aware of the millennial</p><p>2 For example, V. Branca, Premessa in Id. (ed.), Concetto, storia, miti e immagini del medio evo,</p><p>Sansoni, Firenze 1973, p. x: “Truly that of the ‘Middle Ages’ is a definition and periodization</p><p>[ …] that should by now be abandoned”; R. Pernoud, Pour en finir avec le Moyen Âge, Seuil,</p><p>Paris 1977; J. Heers, Le Moyen Âge: une imposture, Perrin, Paris 1992; G. Sergi, L’idea di medioe-</p><p>vo. Fra storia e senso comune, Donzelli, Roma 2005. A well-known list of ten ways of repre-</p><p>senting the Middle Ages was written by Umberto Eco: Dreaming of the Middle Ages, in Travels</p><p>in Hyperreality, Picador, London 1987, pp. 61–72 (original edition: Dieci modi di sognare il me-</p><p>dioevo, in U. Eco, Sugli specchi e altri saggi, Bompiani, Milano 1985, pp. 78–89).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>3Introduction</p><p>205137</p><p>gap that separated them from the dream they were chasing. Then, for the first</p><p>time, they thought up the media tempestas, the intermediary period situated</p><p>between antiquity and its re-naissance, between the ancient world and the</p><p>modern one. A middle age, totally unknown to those who found themselves</p><p>within it and who—a detail always worth repeating—had no conception of</p><p>being medieval men, but considered themselves “modern,” testaments to a</p><p>world that is aging, awaiting its final redemption. Few were the medieval men</p><p>conscious of living in the Middle Ages: among them, the Duke of Auge. But he</p><p>was capable of time travel, and his creator, Raymond Queneau, loved to play</p><p>with words and dreams.3</p><p>“An empty between two fulls,” from the fifteenth century onward, the Middle</p><p>Ages have changed shape and meaning like no other epoch.4 While the classi-</p><p>cal has consistently represented, even through a thousand regenerations, an</p><p>ideal of universality, purity, balance, and perfection, the medieval, in a precise</p><p>dialectic with the classical, has signified, for those who imagined it, a universe of</p><p>alternative possibilities, charged with ambiguous values.5 This contrast be-</p><p>tween the medieval and the classical represents the first pair of oppositions that</p><p>must be taken into account. Every historical period, in fact, describes itself</p><p>based on the judgment it pronounces on the past and the way it represents it. It</p><p>has been written that the rebirth of the classical represents “the rhythmical</p><p>form” of European cultural history.6 The classical is born, dies, is born again, al-</p><p>ways in new forms: as was the case, to cite only the most notable examples, in the</p><p>Renaissance and in Neoclassicism. To grasp the complete sense of this rhythmic</p><p>3 R. Queneau, Between Blue and Blue, trans. B. Wright, The Bodley Head, London 1967 (original</p><p>edition: Les fleurs bleues, Gallimard, Paris 1965). A similar thing happens in the film The Lion</p><p>in Winter (1968), when Queen Eleanor of Aquitaine says to her husband Henry ii, “It’s 1183</p><p>and we’re barbarians!” The philosopher Étienne Gilson recalled in 1973, at the age of 89, a</p><p>cartoon that had made him laugh so much in his youth, an English bowman who tearfully</p><p>says to his beloved, “Adieu, ma chère femme, je pars pour la Guerre des Cent Ans” (“Goodbye,</p><p>my dear wife, I’m leaving for the Hundred Years’ War”): É. Gilson, Le Moyen Âge comme “saec-</p><p>ulum modernum,” in V. Branca (ed.), Concetto, storia, miti e immagini cit., pp. 1–10: 1.</p><p>4 M. Montanari, L’invenzione del medioevo, in Id., Storia medievale, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2002,</p><p>pp. 268–279: 269.</p><p>5 S. Settis, The Future of the “Classical,” trans. Allan Cameron, Polity Press, Cambridge-Malden</p><p>2006 (original edition: Futuro del classico, Einaudi, Torino 2004). See also Lord Acton’s remark</p><p>(1859), quoted until recently on the homepage of the journal “Studies in Medievalism”: “Two</p><p>great principles divide the world, and contend for the mastery, antiquity and the middle ages.</p><p>These are the two civilizations that have preceded us, the two elements of which ours is</p><p>composed. All political as well as religious questions reduce themselves practically to this.</p><p>This is the great dualism that runs through our society.”</p><p>6 Cf. S. Settis, The Future of the “Classical” cit., p. 76, which analyzes this definition proposed by</p><p>Ernst Howald in 1948.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Introduction4</p><p>205137</p><p>model, the Middle Ages must be placed in the middle. In the transitional phase</p><p>between the birth and rebirth of the classical, there can be found a third age</p><p>that is, indeed, the Middle Ages. The play on words helps us to better under-</p><p>stand the reasoning: our idea of the “Middle Ages” is opposed to that of the</p><p>“classical” in a number of ways: in a certain sense it is a reaction to it. One who</p><p>is in love with the classical shuns and condemns the medieval; one who, on the</p><p>other hand, was until recently fascinated by classical forms and ideals, throws</p><p>her- or himself head first into the dream of the medieval, unearthing those</p><p>values that in being seen as subversive are all the more attractive. If the classical</p><p>is the cradle of rationality, which produces philosophy and law, the medieval</p><p>serves as the symbol of a positive irrationality, which produces poetry and sen-</p><p>timent. If the classical is the foundation of the idea of universality, the medi-</p><p>eval is seen as the root of national identity, as the point of departure for the</p><p>differentiation between gentes, as the forge of myth understood as the authen-</p><p>tic expression of an entire people. If the classical is the time and place of the</p><p>sunny civilizations of the Mediterranean,</p><p>varied group of artists and authors who</p><p>otherwise have almost nothing in common, but who have found in the medi-</p><p>eval era the interpretive key to modernity: the existential longing of directors</p><p>like Carl Theodor Dreyer (The Passion of Joan of Arc, 1928), Roberto Rossellini</p><p>(The Flowers of St. Francis, 1950), Ingmar Bergman (The Seventh Seal, 1957), of</p><p>novelists, scholars of myth, jurists, philosophers, and poets like Raymond Aron,</p><p>Nikolai Berdyaev, Jorge Luis Borges, Italo Calvino, Louis-Ferdinand Céline, Mir-</p><p>cea Eliade, T.S. Eliot, Georges Friedmann, Stefan George, René Guénon,</p><p>Romano Guardini, Ernst Jünger, György Lukács, Jacques Maritain, Attilio Mor-</p><p>dini, José Ortega y Gasset, Mervyn Peake, Ezra Pound, Carl Schmitt, Georges</p><p>Sorel, Oswald Spengler, John Steinbeck, J.R.R. Tolkien, T.H. White, W.B. Yeats.</p><p>All the way up to Pier Paolo Pasolini.</p><p>Pasolini. An uncomfortable author, to be sure: hated by the right as a Marxist</p><p>and controversial with the left for some of his more reactionary opinions.4</p><p>And before him, Antonio Gramsci, with his reflections on the importance of</p><p>recovering the progressive folklore of the subaltern classes.5 Two names that are</p><p>not out of place in this list, for if many of those mentioned have been and are</p><p>still considered the bedrock of conservative and even reactionary culture, in</p><p>reality those movements that reject modernity and proclaim the necessity of</p><p>recuperating previous rhythms of life do not all have identical politics. The</p><p>evils of contemporary life have been denounced as much by the right as the</p><p>left, and the Middle Ages, as an immobile and eternal symbol par excellence of</p><p>the preindustrial and anti-modern age, have been trotted out by all parties. Just</p><p>remember that the environmentalist Green Party, born in Germany in the 1980s</p><p>and represented in various Western governments, skews clearly to the left.6</p><p>4 See A. Baldoni e G. Borgna, Una lunga incomprensione. Pasolini fra destra e sinistra, Vallecchi,</p><p>Firenze 2010.</p><p>5 A. Gramsci, Observations on Folklore, in Id., Prison Notebooks, Columbia University Press, New</p><p>York 2011, Notebook 27 (It. edition: Osservazioni sul “folclore,” in Id., Quaderni del carcere,</p><p>Einaudi, Torino 1948–51; critical ed. of Istituto Gramsci, ed. V. Gerratana, Einaudi, Torino</p><p>20082: Quaderno 27 (xi), 1935).</p><p>6 Despite that, its anti-progressive position permits Le Goff to consider the environmentalist</p><p>movement as “reactionary”: Id., Storia e memoria cit., p. 222; cf. also U. Eco, Turning Back the</p><p>Clock cit. (p. 140 of the Italian edition).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>69The Middle Ages of Identity</p><p><UN></p><p>Or consider that the founder of Greenpeace, David Taggart, “claimed to be in-</p><p>spired to his environmental duty by the struggle of the Hobbits of the Shire</p><p>against the desolate land of Mordor, the source of all pollution and industrial</p><p>horrors.”7 In fact, in English-speaking countries, Tolkien is an author beloved by</p><p>hippy culture and environmentalists.8 “Frodo lives” could be found scribbled</p><p>everywhere in the Sixties and Seventies; the Ents, the Shepherds of the Trees,</p><p>could be considered a symbol of union with nature.9 In Italy, on the other hand,</p><p>where Tolkien is seen as an author of the right, his imagination has nourished</p><p>several generations of neo- and post-fascists.10 Together with his friend Clive</p><p>Staples Lewis, Tolkien can also be read in a Christian key.11 Like the Middle Ages</p><p>that he is often called to represent, even Tolkien has far more than one</p><p>meaning.</p><p>Medievalism as a phenomenon exploded again at the end of the Sixties and</p><p>endures today, such that we can say that in the last fifty years we have been</p><p>witness to many little revivals.12 Little, compared to the near mania of the</p><p>nineteenth century, but equally significant as a mass phenomenon. The cur-</p><p>rent reappropriation of the medieval—or better, medievals, since the possible</p><p>declensions of the idea are many—must be understood in these broad terms.</p><p>7 Cit. by P. Gulisano, Tolkien. Il mito e la grazia, Ancora, Milano 2001, p. 172. See also P. Curry,</p><p>Defending Middle-Earth. Tolkien: Myth and Modernity, Mariner Books, Boston 2004, p. 44.</p><p>8 J.R.R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings, Unwin Paperbacks, London-Boston-Sidney 19833</p><p>(original edition: Allen & Unnwin, London 1954–55).</p><p>9 In the vast bibliography on the subject, two relatively recent titles are worth mentioning:</p><p>M.D.C. Drout (ed.), J. R. R. Tolkien Encyclopedia: Scholarship and Critical Assessment, Rout-</p><p>ledge, New York-Oxford 2006 (on this specific topic, the entry by A.K. Siewers, Environ-</p><p>mentalist Readings of Tolkien, pp. 166–167); K. Chance and A.K. Siewers (eds.), Tolkien’s</p><p>Modern Middle Ages, Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2009.</p><p>10 R. Arduini, Italy: Reception of Tolkien, entry in M.D.C. Drout (ed.), J. R. R. Tolkien Encyclope-</p><p>dia cit., pp. 299 ff. The topic is addressed infra, Ch. 7.</p><p>11 Br. J. Birzer, Christian Readings of Tolkien, entry in M.D.C. Drout (ed.), J.R.R. Tolkien Ency-</p><p>clopedia cit., pp. 99–101. For Italian examples: P. Gulisano, Tolkien. Il mito e la grazia cit.; G.</p><p>Spirito OFM Cap., Tra San Francesco e Tolkien. Una lettura spirituale de “Il signore degli</p><p>anelli,” Il Cerchio iniziative editoriali, Rimini 2006; A. Monda, L’anello e la croce: significato</p><p>teologico de “Il signore degli anelli,” Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli 2008. Cf. G. De Turris,</p><p>L’immaginario medievale cit., p. 107. In his Chronicles of Narnia saga (1950–56), Clive Sta-</p><p>ples Lewis deliberately depicted a Christ allegory. See in general R. Hein, Christian Myth-</p><p>makers: C.S. Lewis, Madeleine L’Engle, J.R.R. Tolkien, George MacDonald, G.K. Chesterton &</p><p>Others, Cornerstone Press, Chicago 1998.</p><p>12 On the Middle Ages, currently “dans le vent” (in fashion): P. Monnet, Introduction, p. 17, in</p><p>J.M. Bak [et al.] (eds.), Gebrauch und Missbrauch cit., pp. 15–20. On the “second great re-</p><p>turn of the Middle Ages in France” since the 1970s, though incomparable in scale with</p><p>Romanticism: Ch. Amalvi, Le goût du Moyen Âge cit., p. 261. The Society for the Study of</p><p>Popular Culture and the Middle Ages has been active for several years, https://medie</p><p>valinpopularculture.blogspot.com/ (cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>https://medievalinpopularculture.blogspot.com/</p><p>https://medievalinpopularculture.blogspot.com/</p><p>Chapter 470</p><p><UN></p><p>It can be seen as a cultural expression that, though constantly changing its ap-</p><p>pearance, has remained the same in its essential traits. These are not to be</p><p>found in the expanding and increasingly sophisticated historical analyses of</p><p>the late twentieth century, so much as in the repurposing—exaggerated to an</p><p>unimaginable degree by old and new modes of communication—of the cul-</p><p>tural sediment of the nineteenth century. Without always being aware of it,</p><p>enthusiasts of the Middle Ages still act the way Giosue Carducci described in</p><p>the distant year of 1879, in the margins of his Song of Legnano:</p><p>The poet is permitted, if he so desires and is able, to visit Persia and India,</p><p>not to mention Greece and the Middle Ages: the ignorant and the lazy</p><p>have the right not to follow him.13</p><p>The Middle Ages are a spatio-temporal elsewhere to which one may wish to</p><p>return, they are exoticism and sentiment. Contemporary scholars have grasped</p><p>the Romantic framework of the new medievalism (here with a lower-case n</p><p>and m)—which yet still lives off of nineteenth-century culture—that charac-</p><p>terizes the last decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the</p><p>twenty-first. As Franco Cardini writes:</p><p>Our medieval revival is in reality a “new romantic”; the success of Tolkien,</p><p>Rohmer’s Perceval, Boorman’s Excalibur, cannot be explained as neo-</p><p>medieval, so much as neo-neo-gothic.14</p><p>In addition to what was said in the previous chapter, to get a sense of how</p><p>much the nineteenth century has been a filter for current medievalism, one</p><p>need only think of the Dark, Gothic, or simply Goth movement, born in Great</p><p>Britain between the Sixties and the Eighties and still very much alive. Its adher-</p><p>ents distinguish themselves by their dress (metal accessories, black clothes,</p><p>white lace, black and white make-up, black nails) and by a specific musical</p><p>genre.15 The Gothic atmospheres, the gloom, the moon, death, ghosts, vam-</p><p>pires, witches, stakes, will-o’-the-wisps, eternal fog—in short the fear that lurks</p><p>behind the negative imaginary of the Middle Ages—are what most profoundly</p><p>13 G. Carducci, Della canzone di Legnano, Parte 1, Il Parlamento, in Poesie di Giosue Carducci</p><p>mdcccl-mcm, Zanichelli, Bologna 19087, pp. 1035–1046: 1046.</p><p>14 F. Cardini, Medievisti “di professione” cit., p. 45.</p><p>15 Gothica. La generazione oscura degli anni Novanta, Tunnel, Bologna 1997. For the con-</p><p>nection with Satanism: M. Introvigne, The Gothic Milieu, in J. Kaplan and H. Loow (eds.),</p><p>The Cultic Milieu. Oppositional Subcultures in an Age of Globalization, AltaMira Press-</p><p>Rowman and Littlefield, Walnut Creek (CA)-Lanham (MD) 2002, pp. 138–151.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>71The Middle Ages of Identity</p><p><UN></p><p>attract those that profess to be Goths. The Middle Ages are attractive because</p><p>they are frightening, because their light is sinister. This movement is therefore</p><p>particularly interesting precisely from the point of view of the study of medi-</p><p>evalism, since it shows, more than other cases, how the Middle Ages evoked</p><p>here could not exist if it had not received a dye job (black, naturally) from the</p><p>Romantic culture. This Medieval Era corresponds to the Gothic novel, to Wal-</p><p>pole’s Castle of Otranto and all its infinite derivatives.16 It could not exist with-</p><p>out Ossian, without Bram Stoker and his Dracula, without Victorian fashion,</p><p>and without Edgar Allan Poe. Tim Burton, perhaps the artist best known for his</p><p>capacity to evoke Gothic atmospheres (think of such films as Edward Scis-</p><p>sorhands, from 1990), is simultaneously a neomedieval and neoromantic au-</p><p>teur. Or rather, he is neomedieval inasmuch as he is neoromantic.</p><p>We are talking about reflections of a distant age, which in turn echoes an-</p><p>other age, even more distant; we will see many times over how much this</p><p>dream of a Neo-Romantic Middle Ages conditions contemporary political</p><p>events. It must, however, be firmly restated that political connotations are not</p><p>necessary elements of medievalism. Anarchist, fascist, or communist, Republi-</p><p>can or Democrat, Tory or Labour, the political hue does not take on immediate</p><p>importance. From the second half of the Sixties and across the Seventies, with</p><p>a first peak between the Seventies and Eighties and a second apex at the end of</p><p>the millennium, the Middle Ages have recurringly come into fashion among</p><p>people of very diverse political inclinations. For example, the mania over the</p><p>Holy Grail and the Templars, so typical of a right-wing usage of the Middle</p><p>Ages, is in reality shared by many, many people. The mania in itself, however, is</p><p>neutral and apolitical: indeed, it is the only reason why the vast majority of</p><p>people today show any interest at all in the Middle Ages.</p><p>Medievalism is so universal that, since the end of the Sixties, “fantasy” has</p><p>become the most diffuse literary genre in the West, a primacy it still maintains</p><p>due in no small part to the incredible success of the Harry Potter saga.17 We</p><p>16 The literature on the subject is quite vast. See G. Germann, Dal Gothic Taste al Gothic</p><p>Revival, in E. Castelnuovo and G. Sergi (eds.), Arti e storia nel medioevo, vol. iv cit., pp.</p><p>391–438; M. Aldrich, Gothic Revival, Phaidon Press, London [etc.] 1997; M. Alexander, Me-</p><p>dievalism cit., pp. 1–49; V. Ortenberg, In Search of the Holy Grail cit., especially pp. 27–87,</p><p>149 ff.; E. McEvoy and C. Spooner (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Gothic, Routledge,</p><p>Abingdon-New York 2007.</p><p>17 J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone, Bloomsbury, London 1998; Harry</p><p>Potter and the Chamber of Secrets, Bloomsbury, London 1999; Harry Potter and the Prisoner</p><p>of Azkaban, Bloomsbury, London 2000; Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire, Bloomsbury,</p><p>London 2001; Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix, Bloomsbury, London 2003; Harry</p><p>Potter and the Half-blood Prince, Bloomsbury, London 2005; Harry Potter and the Deathly</p><p>Hallows, Bloomsbury, London 2007.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 472</p><p><UN></p><p>may plausibly date the explosion of this literary genre (with all its numerous</p><p>subgenres: Dark, Heroic, Sword & Sorcery, Gothic…) to 1965 with the release of</p><p>the American paperback edition of John R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, which</p><p>sold 150,000 copies in one year.18 The main masterpieces of the genre concen-</p><p>trate around the Seventies: for instance, Ursula Le Guin’s Earthsea Cycle and</p><p>the Merlin trilogy by Mary Stewart, who has been called “the twentieth-century</p><p>Geoffrey of Monmouth.”19</p><p>Fantasy literature, especially when inserted (in best nineteenth-century tra-</p><p>dition) into a vaguely medieval landscape, evokes deep emotions on the same</p><p>level as fairy tales.20 A passion for a fantastical Middle Ages can be interpreted</p><p>as a response to a crisis of the idea of progress, in the name of escape. In this</p><p>sense, “fantasy” literature, with its perennial conflict between Good and Evil,</p><p>heroes and monsters, works marvelously—as long as its value as a consumer</p><p>product is not underestimated.21</p><p>In addition to fantasy literature, we should mention the closely entwined</p><p>“role-playing games”: the acting out of stories, almost always in a fantastical,</p><p>medieval setting, by a “party” of friends who take on the roles of characters—</p><p>knights, elves, mages, thieves, etc. Role-playing games had incredible success</p><p>in the Seventies and Eighties, starting with the celebrated Dungeons and</p><p>Dragons (1974), and that success continues to the present, through many</p><p>neo- medieval communities who live virtually on the internet and represent</p><p>the technological evolution of those now ancient dice games. We recall, among</p><p>others, the popular Society for Creative Anachronism (founded in 1966), which</p><p>proudly declares itself an “international organization dedicated to the research</p><p>and recreation of the arts and techniques of Europe prior to the seventeenth</p><p>18 J. Ripp, Middle America Meets Middle-Earth: American Discussion and Readership of J. R. R.</p><p>Tolkien’s “The Lord of the Rings,” 1965–1969, in “Book History,” 8 (2005) pp. 245–286: 256; G.</p><p>De Turris, L’immaginario medievale cit., p. 104; L. Del Corso, P. Pecere, L’anello che non</p><p>tiene. Tolkien fra letteratura e mistificazione, Minimum Fax, Roma 2003, pp. 50–64. Even</p><p>Peter Jackson’s three film adaptations of the novels (2001–2003) have had a resounding</p><p>success.</p><p>19 U.K. Le Guin, A Wizard of Earthsea, Parnassus Press, Berkeley (CA) 1968; The Tombs of</p><p>Atuan, Atheneum Books, New York 1971; The Farthest Shore, Atheneum Books, New York</p><p>1972; the series was continued later. M. Stewart, The Crystal Cave, William Morrow, New</p><p>York 1970; The Hollow Hills, Holder & Stoughton, London 1973; The Last Enchantment, G.K.</p><p>Hall, London 1981; the series was also continued later.</p><p>20 See for example S. De Mari, Il drago come realtà. I significati storici e metaforici della let-</p><p>teratura fantastica, Salani, Milano 2007.</p><p>21 D. Marshall (ed.), Mass Market Medieval: Essays on the Middle Ages in Popular Culture,</p><p>McFarland, Jefferson (NC) 2007; L. Del Corso, P. Pecere, L’anello che non tiene cit.,</p><p>pp. 132–157.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>73The Middle Ages of Identity</p><p><UN></p><p>century.” Their “known world” consists of twenty kingdoms, with over</p><p>30,000</p><p>members.22</p><p>Nor has the trajectory been different in the field of music. In the mid-Sixties</p><p>and above all across the entire next decade, the Middle Ages became a land to</p><p>discover and cultivate. During that period there were many groups dedicated</p><p>to the philological recovery of popular tradition and to experiments fusing it</p><p>with rock and pop music. “Folk medieval” became a fashionable genre, repre-</p><p>sented by such famous bands and singer-songwriters—new minstrels—as</p><p>Jethro Tull in England, Tri Yann in Britanny, the Chieftains in Ireland, Ougen-</p><p>weide in Germany, and Angelo Branduardi in Italy, who sought out the tradition</p><p>of medieval texts and melodies drawn predominantly from the repertoire of</p><p>Celtic countries. But even Pooh, in 1973, released the album Parsifal, and in the</p><p>same year Genesis released Selling England by the Pound: an album full of refer-</p><p>ences to the Middle Ages, starting with the song Dancing with the Moonlit</p><p>Knight and continuing with The Battle of Epping Forest, which describes a</p><p>brawl between rival gangs in terms of a medieval battle. Since then, music con-</p><p>taining allusions to the Middle Ages has become part of the cultural baggage</p><p>of the West as a whole, evolving into Progressive Rock, Heavy Metal, Gothic,</p><p>Electro- industrial, up to Neo-Medieval Music, especially common in the coun-</p><p>tries of Northern Europe, and pseudo-Gregorian and/or Satanist musical lines.</p><p>And now we come to the political implications. Since 1968, this passion for</p><p>the medieval has gone on to color movements across the political spectrum,</p><p>often youth movements, which, with dreams of power, raged against the mo-</p><p>notony of daily life and attacked the system, from right and left, from anarchy</p><p>and libertarianism. One significant reason for the rebirth of medievalism since</p><p>the end of the Sixties is political. And there’s no surprise there, seeing as how</p><p>anything, anything at all, could be considered political back then. As Mario</p><p>Capanna wrote:</p><p>The central element that emerges is the non-neutrality of culture, sci-</p><p>ence, or technology. It is the political objective (and its management)</p><p>that decides the nature of knowledge, the character of science, the effi-</p><p>cacy of technology, at the service of the proletariat and its emancipation,</p><p>or against them.23</p><p>22 Society for Creative Anachronism: www.sca.org (cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>23 M. Capanna, Formidabili quegli anni, Garzanti, Milano 2002, pp. 80 ff. See also p. 268:</p><p>“Nulla è neutro. Dall’arte alla scienza, alla cultura, alla religione: nulla, nemmeno il con-</p><p>cetto secondo cui nulla è neutro: questa è stata una delle maggiori ‘scoperte’ del Sessan-</p><p>totto.” (“Nothing is neutral. From art to science, culture, religion: nothing, not even the</p><p>very principle that nothing is neutral: this was one of the greatest ‘discoveries’ of ‘68.”).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.sca.org</p><p>Chapter 474</p><p><UN></p><p>The political medievalism that was reborn at the end of the Sixties has since</p><p>undergone many re-elaborations and has three principal manifestations. The</p><p>first, characteristic of the Seventies, is linked to the desire to recover popular</p><p>traditions that have been lost. Expressed principally through music and dra-</p><p>ma, it is the time of ballads, troubadours, and public theater (cf. Chapter 6).</p><p>The second form is, if you will, a sort of specialization of the medieval land-</p><p>scape as a renewed fascination with chivalry, the Great North, and the Celtic</p><p>world. Even if this is obviously a Romantic tradition common throughout the</p><p>nineteenth century, it too seems reinvigorated in recent times: it is the “recov-</p><p>ery” of Tradition, in other words of medieval spirituality and Christian mystics,</p><p>as well as myths and beliefs that are non-Christian, but equally connected to</p><p>the medieval period. It is the Middle Ages of Ireland, Scandinavia, and Ger-</p><p>many, the time of pubs now scattered to every corner of Europe, of Celtic</p><p>crosses, the Holy Grail, Knights Templar, and Druidic and Viking neo-paganism</p><p>(cf. Chapters 7, 8, and 9). As the first form is strongly linked to the culture of the</p><p>left, the second appears to be predominantly an expression of the right—</p><p>although since the Eighties the distinction between right and left seems, in</p><p>reality, ever more hazy and uncertain. It is precisely this second form of medi-</p><p>evalism that seems to constitute, in the Nineties and the first decade of the</p><p>new millennium, the standard modality of representing the Middle Ages, now</p><p>borne for the most part on the shoulders of the Knights Templar and the seek-</p><p>ers of the Grail.</p><p>The third form of political medievalism with which we have to reckon is the</p><p>one perfectly described by the concept of an “identitarian Middle Ages.” As</p><p>early as the Seventies, but with an exponential growth already visible in the</p><p>early Nineties, political movements of an identitarian inclination (referring to</p><p>sentiment for a singular locality, a region, a nation, or even all of Europe) have</p><p>molded the Middle Ages into a master key for expressing the perception of</p><p>primordial belonging to their own cultural, linguistic, religious, or even ethnic</p><p>communities (cf. Chapters 5, 10, 11, and 12). This process too proceeds from the</p><p>early nineteenth century—when the Medieval Era was reimagined, through-</p><p>out Europe, as the historical place where citizens and nations were formed—</p><p>and has never truly halted, such that even today the link between the Middle</p><p>Ages and the origins of local and/or national identities is a widely (and blindly)</p><p>accepted historical interpretation. In the last two decades, the word “identity”</p><p>has become a veritable skeleton key, able to be used everywhere to justify one’s</p><p>own political intentions and supporting the conviction that the community in</p><p>question has always been distinct from all the others, imbued with unique</p><p>traits, original and ancient. Traits that must be safeguarded and defended,</p><p>through the official definition of a true politics of memory that nourishes a</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>75The Middle Ages of Identity</p><p><UN></p><p>canon in which one may recognize oneself. In May 2007 France notably insti-</p><p>tuted the Ministère de l’immigration, de l’integration, de l’identité nationale et</p><p>du développement solidaire (Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National</p><p>Identity, and Developmental Solidarity).24 In the same year Spain passed the</p><p>Ley de memoria histórica for those who suffered persecution during the civil</p><p>war and dictatorship: although in spirit opposed to the constitution of the</p><p>French ministry of national identity, this law expresses the same intent to</p><p>regulate memory according to a juridical format.25 Finally, in Italy political</p><p>actors have several times incited the burning of books written by left-leaning</p><p>historians.26</p><p>Political Medievalism represents the majority, if not in some cases the en-</p><p>tirety, of the “cultural heritage cult,” a little play on words. Originating with</p><p>elitist preoccupations—for example, it is the founding fathers of the new</p><p>Europe who have refreshed the myth of Charlemagne—the cult of cultural</p><p>heritage has expanded into what has been called a “popular crusade” involving</p><p>all social groups.27</p><p>24 The official site read: “Telle est l’ambition de ce nouveau ministère: lutter contre</p><p>l’immigration irrégulière, organiser l’immigration légale en favorisant le developpement</p><p>des pays d’origine afin de réussir l’intégration et de conforter l’identité de notre Nation”</p><p>(“This is the mission of the new ministry: to combat unregulated immigration, to oversee</p><p>legal immigration in favor of the development of the countries of origin, with the goal of</p><p>achieving integration and consolidating the identity of our Nation”): www.immigration</p><p>.gouv.fr/spip.php?page=dossiers_them_org&numrubrique=311 (cons. Oct. 20, 2009, the</p><p>page was</p><p>found to be inactive when cons. Apr. 28, 2019). See, on that subject, the harsh</p><p>judgment of T. Todorov, La peur des barbares cit., pp. 136–142. The ministry was abolished</p><p>following the election of François Hollande in May 2012.</p><p>25 See: R. Escudero Alday and J.A. Martin Pallin (eds.), Derecho y memoria historica, Trotta</p><p>Editorial, Madrid 2008. On the social and political significance of the past—even</p><p>medieval— in contemporary Spain, see G. Tremlett, Ghosts of Spain: Travels through Spain</p><p>and Its Silent Past, Walker & Company, New York 2007; D. Coleman and S.R. Doubleday</p><p>(eds.), In the Light of Medieval Spain. Islam, the West, and the Relevance of the Past, pref. of</p><p>G. Tremlett, Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2008. After three years of parliamentary back</p><p>and forth, in 2016 Italy attached legal penalties to denial of the Holocaust, acts of geno-</p><p>cide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. This means that such claims are consid-</p><p>ered aggravating factors in the crimes of racist speech, instigation and incitement of acts</p><p>of discrimination committed for racial, ethnic, national, or religious motives: cf. the law</p><p>of June 16, 2016, published in the “Gazzetta Ufficiale,” n. 149, June 28, 2016.</p><p>26 See for example A. Berardinelli and R. Chiaberge, Università. La sinistra dei baroni, in</p><p>“Corriere della Sera,” May 5, 1997, p. 27. Cf. also M. Caffiero, Libertà di ricerca, responsabi-</p><p>lità dello storico e funzione dei media, in Id. and M. Procaccia (ed.), Vero e falso. L’uso politico</p><p>della storia cit., pp. 3–26: 11.</p><p>27 D. Lowenthal, Possessed by the Past cit.; W. Frijhoff, Cultural Heritage in the Making: Eu-</p><p>rope’s Past and Its Future Identity, in “Annual of Medieval Studies at ceu,” xiv (2008), n. 14,</p><p>pp. 233–246: 233 ff. On the myth of Charlemagne, see infra, Ch. 12.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/spip.php?page=dossiers_them_org&numrubrique=311</p><p>http://www.immigration.gouv.fr/spip.php?page=dossiers_them_org&numrubrique=311</p><p>Chapter 476</p><p><UN></p><p>The forms of medievalism that in some way exalt the Middle Ages as a Gold-</p><p>en Age and a “Morning Light,” though very diverse among themselves and thus</p><p>demanding discrete investigations, are similar for two reasons: the first is that</p><p>in them we can see the implementation of a politics of memory; the second is</p><p>that such a politics does not usually correspond to a historical vision of the</p><p>Medieval period, but to an ahistorical and mythic reading of a fundamentally</p><p>nineteenth-century framework.28</p><p>28 B. Stock, Listening for the Text cit., p. 63.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004414983_007</p><p><UN></p><p>Chapter 5</p><p>Merchants and Bowmen: Middle Ages of the City</p><p>Once past, dreams and memories are the same thing.</p><p>U. piersanti, L’uomo delle Cesane (1994)</p><p>It’s a beautiful day in May. We find ourselves in Assisi, the city of saints Francis</p><p>and Clare. The “Nobilissima parte de sopra” and the “Magnifica parte de sotto”</p><p>(the Most Noble Upper Part and the Magnificent Lower Part), which represent</p><p>the districts of the city’s theoretical medieval subdivision, challenge each oth-</p><p>er to a series of competitions: solemn processions, feats of dexterity, songs,</p><p>challenges launched in rhyme, stage shows. In this way, it renews the medieval</p><p>tradition of canti del maggio (May songs), performed in the piazzas and under</p><p>girls’ balconies by bands of youths wandering the city. A young woman is elect-</p><p>ed Madonna Primavera (Lady Spring). We celebrate the end of winter, the</p><p>return of the sun, flowers, and love. This medieval festival, resplendent with</p><p>parades, flag bearers, ladies, knights, bowmen, and citizen magistrates, re-</p><p>sounding with songs, tambourines, and trumpets, lasts three days and involves</p><p>the entire population of Assisi, which finds itself, together with tourists and</p><p>visitors, immersed in the atmosphere of a time that was. At night, when the</p><p>fires and darkness move the shadows and the natural odors are strongest, the</p><p>magic of the illusion of the past reaches its highest pitch:</p><p>Three nights of May leave their mark on our hearts</p><p>Fantasy blends with truth among sweet songs</p><p>And ancient history returns to life once again</p><p>The mad, ecstatic magic of our feast.1</p><p>Attested in the Middle Ages, the Assisan Calendimaggio (First of May) reap-</p><p>peared in 1927 and was interrupted by the Second World War, only to resume in</p><p>1947. Since 1954 it has assumed a more or less fixed configuration.2 If, starting</p><p>1 “Tre notti di maggio segnan nostro core | tra preziose note fabula se mischia a veritate | et</p><p>historia antica se rinnova ancora una volta | folle gaudiosa magia de nostra festa.” As on the</p><p>cover of the magazine, “Calendimaggio di Assisi,” i (April-May 2010), n. 1, p. 1.</p><p>2 Calendimaggio di Assisi, https://www.calendimaggiodiassisi.com/la-storia (cons. Apr. 28,</p><p>2019). On this festival see: T. di Carpegna Falconieri, L.E. Yawn, Forging “Medieval” Identities:</p><p>Fortini’s Calendimaggio and Pasolini’s Trilogy of Life, in B. Bildhauer, Ch. Jones (eds.), The</p><p>Middle Ages in the Modern World cit., pp. 186–215.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>https://www.calendimaggiodiassisi.com/la-storia</p><p>Chapter 578</p><p><UN></p><p>from Assisi, we begin to wander through Umbria, we’ll find Terni’s Cantamag-</p><p>gio, Foligno’s Giostra della Quintana (Joust of Quintana), the Palio dei Terzieri</p><p>(Palio of the Thirds) of both Città della Pieve and Trevi, the Palio dei Colombi</p><p>(Palio of Doves) of Amelia, the Festa dei Ceri (Festival of Candles) and the Palio</p><p>della Balestra (Palio of the Crossbow) of Gubbio, the Giochi de le Porte (Games</p><p>of the Gates) in Gualdo Tadino, the Mercato delle Gaite (Market of the Quar-</p><p>ters) in Bevagna, the Giostra del Velo (Joust of the Veil) in Giove, the Corsa</p><p>dell’Anello (Race of the Ring) in Narni, the Giostra del Giglio (Joust of the Lily)</p><p>in Monteleone di Orvieto, the Palio di San Rufino in Assisi, the Palio di Valfab-</p><p>brica… But the decision to start in Umbria is arbitrary. We could start our voy-</p><p>age in Siena, home of the most famous palio in the world; from there we might</p><p>wind up in Arezzo, where they celebrate the Joust of the Saracen, and then</p><p>continue through Tuscany. Or, we could run through the Marches, attending</p><p>the Quintana of Ascoli Piceno, and then maybe taking a jaunt to the Palio of</p><p>Asti and the Sagra del Carroccio (Carroccio Festival) in Legnano, just to name</p><p>a few notable festivals among the hundreds of imitators. Not to mention, natu-</p><p>rally, the Medieval Days in San Marino, the city-state in the center of the pen-</p><p>insula that has uniquely preserved the independence of a medieval commune,</p><p>and is quite proud of it: here, medieval reconstructions may be false and con-</p><p>trived, but liberty is real.3 Even in the south of Italy “medieval festivals” are</p><p>common, if less densely concentrated and often combined with the memory</p><p>of the Turks or the exaltation of sovereign dynasties: as in the Sfilata dei Turchi</p><p>(Turks’ Parade) in Potenza and the Palio dell’Anguria (Palio of the Melon) of</p><p>Altavilla Irpina. The festivals that involve the memory of Frederick ii of Swabia</p><p>in particular are numerous.4</p><p>To make a long story short: throughout Italy, hundreds of cities and villages</p><p>celebrate their own medieval festivals, especially during the spring and sum-</p><p>mer. The same is true in many other European countries, with a density per</p><p>square kilometer that sometimes, as in parts of France, for instance, rivals that</p><p>of central and northern Italy. In the regions of Celtic inheritance, the delight in</p><p>celebrations is especially evident: first and perhaps most importantly, the Fes-</p><p>tival interceltique of Lorient in Britanny (est. 1971). In Champagne, Provins pub-</p><p>licizes its fête médiévale by</p><p>reminding you that the city is “The Middle Ages an</p><p>3 T. di Carpegna Falconieri, Liberty Dreamt in Stone: The (Neo)Medieval City of San Marino, in</p><p>“Práticas da História,” 9 (2019), http://www.praticasdahistoria.pt/pt/.</p><p>4 R. Iorio, Medioevo turistico, in “Quaderni medievali,” xxvii (2002), n. 53, pp. 157–166; M. In-</p><p>terino, Medioevo “reale” e medioevo “immaginario” nelle rievocazioni storiche contemporanee:</p><p>Campania e Basilicata, graduate thesis, Università degli studi di Urbino, AY 2004–2005;</p><p>M. Brando, Lo strano caso di Federico ii cit.; Id., L’imperatore nel suo labirinto cit.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.praticasdahistoria.pt/pt/</p><p>79Merchants and Bowmen: Middle Ages of the City</p><p><UN></p><p>hour from Paris,” while in Aigues-Mortes in Camargue the Feast of Saint Louis</p><p>is celebrated by reconstructing the ship that carried him overseas and then</p><p>setting fire to the fortifications. In England, they even recreate the Battle of</p><p>Hastings, along with a hundred similar festivities. Spain hosts a long series of</p><p>Fiestas de Interés Turístico Nacional. In the Scandinavian countries and in Po-</p><p>land we find gatherings of neo-Viking communities, in other Eastern European</p><p>countries the most famous medieval sites (think, for instance, of the Visegrád</p><p>Castle and the Ópusztaszer National Heritage Park in Hungary, or the Bohe-</p><p>mian town of Český Krumlov) host historical demonstrations with performers</p><p>in costume, and every year in Croatia they celebrate the naval battle between</p><p>the Genoans and Venetians in which Marco Polo was captured.5</p><p>The use of medieval settings for festivals and for community cultural dem-</p><p>onstrations in general is clearly a phenomenon in full swing. As Ilaria Porciani</p><p>has written, even today we see the:</p><p>revival of local traditions, many of which, it has been noted, were invent-</p><p>ed in the last two decades. These are widespread and flourishing, and</p><p>ever more visible throughout the peninsula, giving life to popular festi-</p><p>vals that bring into play divisions into districts and neighborhoods, ban-</p><p>ners, symbols, and affiliations that do not seem solely geared towards the</p><p>tourism industry.6</p><p>This kind of medievalism is found almost exclusively in small and medium-</p><p>sized communities. It never seems to gain a foothold in the maelstrom of larg-</p><p>er cities, where shared identities are weaker and more diverse—except when</p><p>it comes to sports teams. This medievalism can attract a political meaning</p><p>when it affirms a partisan affiliation, as is the case in Italy with the historical</p><p>recreations organized on behalf of the Northern League. Through such festi-</p><p>vals participants testify to their living together, their belonging to a communi-</p><p>ty, that is, to a polis: these are political events in the original sense of the term,</p><p>a sense not inherently related to either conservative or progressive positions,</p><p>but able to encompass them both. Even the contests between factions within</p><p>the city, which in Italy rigorously emulates the historically authentic competi-</p><p>tion between the quarters of Siena, has the function of exorcising war and</p><p>5 N. Budak, Using the Middle Ages in Modern-day Croatia, in J.M. Bak [et al.] (eds.), Gebrauch</p><p>und Missbrauch cit., pp. 241–262: 258.</p><p>6 I. Porciani, Identità locale-identità nazionale: la costruzione di una doppia appartenenza, in</p><p>O. Janz, P. Schiera and H. Siegrist (eds.), Centralismo e federalismo tra Ottocento e Novecento.</p><p>Italia e Germania a confronto, il Mulino, Bologna 1997, pp. 141–182: 142.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 580</p><p><UN></p><p>conflict, ritualizing animosity, and leading urban factions back to a conclusive</p><p>peace.</p><p>These demonstrations play a significant role in our societies, leading to the</p><p>discovery of a social amalgam that otherwise is not easily recognizable amid</p><p>our daily routine. They create social cohesion in the name of the feast, inver-</p><p>sion, the masquerade, and renewal: they approximate the festivals of Carnival,</p><p>a liminal time of joy and mockery, and the feasts that celebrate the coming of</p><p>Spring, graced with smiling, little May Queens. In various cases, these local</p><p>festivals can carry religious sentiment, reinventing ancient traditions, feasts of</p><p>patron saints, and ritual processions. Finally, they also fill a fiscal function, as</p><p>they prove a consistent source of revenue for the communities that organize</p><p>them and stimulate additional economic activity in the region.7 This aspect,</p><p>connected to mass markets and the Middle Ages of entertainment, is one of</p><p>which local administrators are well aware, as they generally make it one of</p><p>their community’s top priorities. Each of these festivals is thus simultaneously</p><p>“a public, touristic spectacle, and a secret event, that only [the citizens] can</p><p>fully comprehend.”8</p><p>But are we really dealing with medieval festivals, in which we might recog-</p><p>nize a continuous tradition dating back centuries? Seen through the lens of an</p><p>ideal and symbolic relationship, they may be considered in some way inheri-</p><p>tors of the civilization that preceded them. In fact, during the Middle Ages</p><p>(and not only) the public festival was an important event in a person’s life. The</p><p>joyous climate, the feats of skill, the tourneys, the tricks, the grease poles, the</p><p>wild songs, the costumes, the Carnival, are all not only part of our imagination</p><p>regarding the Ancien Régime, but a constitutive component of contemporary</p><p>culture. Similarly, the important role that food plays in these feasts is part of a</p><p>symbolic universe that belongs not only to the Middle Ages but also to much</p><p>more recent generations, who in the massive feasting concentrated in a few</p><p>short days (for example, at harvest time or over the winter holidays) find the</p><p>same satisfaction and happiness that we find wandering the pubs, served</p><p>by waiters in costume, drinking wine out of earthenware pitchers, eating</p><p>bean and grain soups with grilled meat. And even this sense of belonging re-</p><p>lated to the jubilant celebrations—whether religious or secular—was already</p><p>7 S. Cavazza, La tradizione inventata. Utilità sociali (ed economiche) della festa e del folklore, in</p><p>“Golem L’indispensabile,” vii (August 2002), n. 8, www.golemindispensabile.it/articolo</p><p>.asp?id=952&num=19&sez=269 (cons. Apr. 10, 2009, the page was found to be inactive when</p><p>cons. Apr. 28, 2019). On the commercial uses of contemporary medievalism see Ch. Amalvi,</p><p>Le goût du Moyen Âge cit., pp. 256–260, 318 ff.; D. Marshall (ed.), Mass Market Medieval cit.,</p><p>and V. Ortenberg, In Search of the Holy Grail cit., pp. 225–235.</p><p>8 E. Voltmer, Il carroccio cit., p. 22, with reference to the Palio of Siena.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.golemindispensabile.it/articolo.asp?id=952&num=19&sez=269</p><p>http://www.golemindispensabile.it/articolo.asp?id=952&num=19&sez=269</p><p>81Merchants and Bowmen: Middle Ages of the City</p><p><UN></p><p>a fundamental element of society in the Middle Ages: one may recall, to take</p><p>an example at random, the Games of Agone and Testaccio that were held in</p><p>medieval Rome and that likewise served the purpose of reaffirming civic iden-</p><p>tity. Nevertheless, from a historical perspective, the modern demonstrations</p><p>have no direct connection with the Middle Ages. They rather represent, as</p><p>Giosuè Mu sca wrote regarding the Calendimaggio of Assisi, “a Middle Ages</p><p>dreamt-up, imagined, and reconstructed with the extraordinary attendance</p><p>and mutual identification of a good two thousand people, who transform their</p><p>city into a living museum of the historical imaginary.”9</p><p>Even if some palios are truly ancient (for example, the horse races attested</p><p>in Asti and Ferrara in the thirteenth century), in reality insurmountable gaps</p><p>lie between the Middle Ages and modernity.</p><p>And even the celebrations that</p><p>truly date back, uninterrupted, to the Early Modern Era—such as, the best ex-</p><p>ample of all, the Palio of Siena—assumed a Medieval hue only much later.</p><p>Certainly, they also ran the palio in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,</p><p>but those courts and banners did not represent the Middle Ages so much as</p><p>the proud city of Siena in its modernity.</p><p>So since when have civic festivals and even some religious feasts been dyed</p><p>with Medieval colors? And when did we start to invent these new traditions?</p><p>In Italy, the first phase can be traced between the last decades of the nine-</p><p>teenth century and the Second World War. During that period, some still ex-</p><p>tant traditions were reclothed in medieval or Renaissance garb, while others—</p><p>either dormant for centuries or simply non-existent—were restored, often on</p><p>pseudo- philological grounds, to the form that they supposedly had in the Mid-</p><p>dle Ages. The most acute phase of this “recovery” of civic traditions occurred in</p><p>the Fascist Ventennio. Among the festivals dating to this period are the Assisan</p><p>Calendimaggio (1927), the Cantamaggio (Festival of May) in Terni (1928), the</p><p>Giostra del Saracino (Joust of the Saracen) in Arezzo (1931), Pisa’s Giuoco del</p><p>Ponte (Game of the Bridge, 1935), the Sagra del Carroccio (Feast of the Carroc-</p><p>cio) in Legnano (, 1935), and the Palio of Ferrara (1937). While Fascism may be</p><p>best known for having taken the recovery of the myth of Imperial Rome to the</p><p>highest possible degree, it did not ignore the Middle Ages after all.10</p><p>9 G. Musca, Profumo di medioevo. Il Calendimaggio ad Assisi, in “Quaderni medievali,” xx</p><p>(1995), n. 40, pp. 133–152: 150.</p><p>10 The ideological parallel between medieval civilization and the formation of Italian iden-</p><p>tity was actually amplified under Fascism, sustained mostly by intellectuals and members</p><p>of the local ruling classes. The political significance of this historical epoch was, however,</p><p>relegated to a level of participation more civic than national, as if to say: the national pa-</p><p>tria will be represented by Rome while the civic patria will be represented by the Middle</p><p>Ages. This allows for the coexistence of otherwise irreconcilable architectural modes: the</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 582</p><p><UN></p><p>In the second phase, which began in the Sixties and continues to the pres-</p><p>ent day, neo-medieval traditions expanded to encompass ever smaller com-</p><p>munities. With every year that passes, another village invents a brand-new me-</p><p>dieval festival for itself. Even these new traditions, however, are constructed so</p><p>as to figuratively represent the peculiar Middle Ages of the nineteenth century,</p><p>when the canonical forms of the epoch were established: this is precisely why</p><p>we often see knights and ladies in late-medieval or Renaissance costumes in</p><p>these historical recreations.</p><p>Nowadays, cities across all of Europe celebrate the glories of their history,</p><p>concentrated on the Medieval Era. What are the motives for this choice, which</p><p>by necessity excludes or absorbs other possibilities? Why is the setting almost</p><p>invariably medieval, or at the latest Renaissance? The reasons are, naturally,</p><p>intertwined. The first is simple: typically, the city’s most ancient monuments,</p><p>its walls, castle, or cathedral, date back to that era, representing an illustrious</p><p>and tangible testament to the past (even if these monuments have been heav-</p><p>ily restored, usually in the nineteenth century). Furthermore, many cities,</p><p>above all those of Germany and Eastern Europe, are essentially medieval foun-</p><p>dations. But what happens in cities of Roman, or indeed older, origins? In Italy,</p><p>Spain, or Provençal France we should see the flourishing of celebrations</p><p>exalting the ancient Romans. This, however, is not what happens: even here</p><p>the symbols that express the identity of the community are almost always</p><p>medieval. Etruscan, Roman, Hunnic, or Sarmatian festivals do not exist, or are</p><p>construction of the eur on the one hand, on the other the coeval Gothic restorations of</p><p>cities like Arezzo and San Gimignano. The regime adopted civic medievalism while con-</p><p>trolling its representation from on high. It did so for economic reasons—the revival of</p><p>tourism—but also to educate the populace, to the extent that one may still speak of a</p><p>fully-fledged “folklorism of the state.” Cf. S. Cavazza, Piccole patrie. Feste popolari tra re-</p><p>gione e nazione durante il Fascismo, il Mulino, Bologna 20032; especially pp. 183 ff., 198 ff.,</p><p>207 ff.; A.-M. Thiesse, La création des identités nationales cit., pp. 267 ff.; M.D. Lasansky, The</p><p>Renaissance Perfected: Architecture, Spectacle, and Tourism in Fascist Italy, The Pennsylva-</p><p>nia State University Press, University Park 2004; F. Vollmer, Die politische Kultur des Fas-</p><p>chismus: Stätten totalitärer Diktatur in Italien, Böhlau, Köln 2007; T. di Carpegna Falco-</p><p>nieri, “Medieval” Identities in Italy: National, Regional, Local, in P.J. Geary, G. Klaniczay</p><p>(eds.), Manufacturing Middle Ages. Entangled History of Medievalism in Nineteenth-Century</p><p>Europe, Brill, Amsterdam 2013 (National Cultivation of Culture, 6), pp. 319–345; T. di Car-</p><p>pegna Falconieri, L.E. Yawn, Forging “Medieval” Identities cit.; T. di Carpegna Falconieri,</p><p>Roma antica e il Medioevo: due mitomotori per costruire la storia della nazione e delle ‘pic-</p><p>cole patrie’ tra Risorgimento e Fascismo, in R.P. Uguccioni (ed.), Storia e piccole patrie. Rifles-</p><p>sioni sulla storia locale, Società di studi pesaresi-Il Lavoro editoriale, Pesaro-Ancona 2017,</p><p>pp. 78–101; D. Iacono, Condottieri in camicia nera: l’uso dei capitani di ventura</p><p>nell’immaginario medievale fascista, in T. di Carpegna Falconieri, R. Facchini (eds.), Medi-</p><p>evalismi italiani cit., pp. 53–66.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>83Merchants and Bowmen: Middle Ages of the City</p><p><UN></p><p>extremely rare. Apart from the little warrior Asterix, even the Gauls are not</p><p>much appreciated—except in their Celtic guise, which is still substantially me-</p><p>dievalized. In general, wherever we go, we almost always run into noble ladies</p><p>and valiant knights. The motive for this choice in the name (and the dream) of</p><p>the Middle Ages can essentially be ascribed to the medievalism of the Roman-</p><p>tic era, which established a perfect equivalence between the Middle Ages and</p><p>affiliation with a specific community: this is the true heart of the problem. The</p><p>same analogy can be applied to all political scales, from the village to the na-</p><p>tion (indeed we will see this in Chapters 11 and 12), but the Middle Ages are</p><p>particularly meaningful with respect to the city. Medieval cities, in fact, were</p><p>thought of as foundation stones not so much because of their buildings, but</p><p>rather because of their inhabitants’ sense of civic identity, cohesive and strong</p><p>in their unity. “The city air makes you free,” goes the saying, referring to the fact</p><p>that peasants who moved to the city were delivered from servitude. In the</p><p>nineteenth-century interpretation, medieval cities represented, above all, the</p><p>home of those industrious men who, through hard work and intelligence, had</p><p>overcome their “feudal barbarism”: they were the cradle of the free bourgeois</p><p>and the forge that tempered them. It doesn’t matter, then, that the city of stone,</p><p>the urbs, could be Roman or even Etruscan: what matters is that its citizenry,</p><p>the civitas, first gained its communal self-awareness in the Middle Ages, that it</p><p>founded corporations, wrote its own statutes, fought for its freedom. Thus, at</p><p>one of his famous lectures, François Guizot took Walter Scott to task for hav-</p><p>ing, in one of his novels, improperly described a burgher from Liège:</p><p>He [sc. Scott] created a real joke bourgeoisie: fat, soft, with no experience,</p><p>no courage, concerned only with leading a comfortable life. The bour-</p><p>geoisie</p><p>of that time, the gentlemen, always wore chainmail on their chest,</p><p>pike in hand; their life was tempestuous, warlike, hard, almost as much as</p><p>that of the lords they battled.11</p><p>This interpretation of medieval history applies to a large swath of Europe, but</p><p>it was thought up specifically to describe those countries in which the urban</p><p>11 “Il en a fait un vrai bourgeois de comédie, gras, mou, sans expérience, sans audace,</p><p>uniquement occupé de mener sa vie commodément. Les bourgeois de ce temps, Mes-</p><p>sieurs, avaient toujours la cotte de mailles sur la poitrine, la pique à la main ; leur vie était</p><p>presque aussi orageuse, aussi guerrière, aussi dure que celle des seigneurs qu’ils combat-</p><p>taient”: F. Guizot, Histoire de la civilisation en Europe depuis la chute de l’Empire romain</p><p>jusqu’à la Révolution française, Didier et C.e, Paris 18566, pp. 213 ff. On the same subject see</p><p>today: J.-M. Moeglin, La bourgeoisie et la nation française d’après les historiens français du</p><p>xixe siècle, in J.M. Bak [et al.] (eds.), Gebrauch und Missbrauch cit., pp. 121–133.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 584</p><p><UN></p><p>network was densest. In this discourse Central and Northern Italy loom par-</p><p>ticularly large. Since the mid-eighteenth century, the belief that the communal</p><p>period had represented the most majestic moment in the history of medieval</p><p>Italy had become increasingly widespread. Powerless to connect a theory of</p><p>the nation to the existence of a medieval state—as was happening in other</p><p>parts of Europe—Italian intellectuals of the nineteenth century exalted to the</p><p>highest degree the identitarian values of the “piccole patrie,” “little fatherlands,”</p><p>communal cities that were rich, free, proud, industrious, and resplendent with</p><p>works of art. In a cultural universe that at every turn found in the Middle Ages</p><p>a new alternative to classical myths of origins, Italy took the course of a dialec-</p><p>tical encounter between local identity and national identity, underlining how</p><p>the nation was formed primarily on the basis of its cities. Medieval, therefore,</p><p>as in the medieval city: civic identity as the basis and myth-engine of the sense</p><p>of local belonging as well as the foundation of Italianness. This is the point of</p><p>departure, in the nineteenth century, for the famous commemorations of the</p><p>Oath of Pontida and the Battle of Legnano.12</p><p>This way of imagining the Middle Ages supports, even today, the idea that a</p><p>sense of civic identity acquires greater force when it is depicted through recre-</p><p>ations of a medieval hue. The Middle Ages remain indispensible to the origin</p><p>story and the glory days of one’s community. We are dealing with a cinemato-</p><p>graphic Middle Ages, the ideal backdrop for historical recreations, and with an</p><p>identitarian Middle Ages, a perfect symbol for communal identity: despite the</p><p>intervening five hundred years, things aren’t really all that different. Though all</p><p>references to the birth and maturation of the bourgeois class, which was the</p><p>battle standard of the nineteenth-century interpretation consecrated by Henri</p><p>Pirenne, may have long since disappeared, the broader concept remains intact:</p><p>12 Among the numerous studies on the subject see, in particular: I. Porciani, Il medioevo</p><p>nella costruzione dell’Italia unita: la proposta di un mito, in R. Elze and P. Schiera (eds.), Il</p><p>medioevo nell’Ottocento in Italia e in Germania, il Mulino, Bologna 1988, pp. 163–191; Id.,</p><p>Identità locale-identità nazionale cit.; J. Petersen, L’Italia e la sua varietà. Il principio della</p><p>città come modello esplicativo della storia nazionale, in O. Janz [et al.] (eds. ), Centralismo</p><p>e federalismo cit., pp. 327–346; C. Sorba, Il mito dei comuni e le patrie cittadine, in M. Ridolfi</p><p>(ed.), Almanacco della Repubblica. Storia d’Italia attraverso le tradizioni le istituzioni e le</p><p>simbologie repubblicane, B. Mondadori, Milano 2003, pp. 119–130; S. Soldani, Il medioevo</p><p>del Risorgimento nello specchio della Nazione, in E. Castelnuovo and G. Sergi (eds.), Arti e</p><p>storia nel medioevo, vol. iv cit., pp. 163–173; M. Vallerani, Il comune come mito politico. Im-</p><p>magini e modelli tra Otto e Novecento, ibid., pp. 187–206; T. di Carpegna Falconieri, “Medi-</p><p>eval” Identities in Italy cit.; D. Balestracci, Medioevo e Risorgimento. L’invenzione dell’identità</p><p>italiana nell’Ottocento, il Mulino, Bologna 2015; T. di Carpegna Falconieri, Roma antica e il</p><p>Medioevo cit.; F. Pirani, Le repubbliche marinare: archeologia di un’idea, in T. di Carpegna</p><p>Falconieri, R. Facchini (eds.), Medievalismi italiani cit., pp. 131–148.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>85Merchants and Bowmen: Middle Ages of the City</p><p><UN></p><p>a community of inhabitants, perhaps less clearly defined, but still united in the</p><p>symbol of the Middle Ages.</p><p>But why is it that since the Seventies—and even more so since the Nineties—</p><p>we have witnessed a massive renewal and recovery of these themes? There</p><p>is one primary reason: a response to a sense of the loss of traditions by seeking</p><p>to recover their memory. Hobsbawm writes:</p><p>For eighty percent of humanity, the Middle Ages ended suddenly in the</p><p>1950s, or, perhaps still, they were felt to end in the 1960s.13</p><p>These words of the illustrious scholar refer inherently to a negative idea of</p><p>the Middle Ages, but they can also be read another way: certainly, the world</p><p>welcomed the end of that dark age with relief, but only a few years later a pro-</p><p>found sense of nostalgia set in. This cultural attitude, characteristically post-</p><p>modern, is exactly the same one that we will encounter in the following chapter</p><p>as we examine the search for popular traditions by left-wing movements, art-</p><p>ists, and intellectuals. In the case of palios and medievalized festivals, however,</p><p>this combination of relief followed by loss and longing has a different result, as</p><p>it retraces an already beaten path, so deeply permeated by political idealism in</p><p>the civic/identitarian sense that it appears clearly neo-Romantic.</p><p>No sooner did we realize that blacksmiths, farriers, and basket-weavers no</p><p>longer existed, than we wished to recreate their open-air shops, like museums</p><p>preserving traditions and trades that have disappeared. Workshops that exist</p><p>for just one day, of course, without the stench of poverty. In fact, these selective</p><p>recreations of the past allow us to skip over its less pleasant aspects, keeping</p><p>only what we like, providing a new memory to share. Whether this memory is</p><p>founded on historical facts or entirely fictional is not very important: in order</p><p>to look backwards, to rewrite or dream of a past that does not exist, one must</p><p>be powerfully aware of the sense of separation. We must struggle to remember</p><p>and convince ourselves that the world we left behind, the world that no longer</p><p>exists, had many positive aspects. This not only brings us the recreations of</p><p>medieval fairs, but also the advertisements for Mulino Bianco—a place of in-</p><p>nocent, ancient, and delicious beauty—not to mention the ads for Nutella, as</p><p>13 E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991, Michael</p><p>Joseph- Vintage Books, London-New York 1994, p. 340. Cf. P.P. Pasolini, Scritti corsari, Gar-</p><p>zanti, Milano 1975 (ed. consulted: Mondadori, Milano 1988, published in “Epoca,”</p><p>xxxix, June 20, 1988, n. 1968), p. 31: “Il mondo contadino, dopo circa quattordicimila anni</p><p>di vita, è finito praticamente di colpo” (“The peasant world, after about fourteen thousand</p><p>years of life, was finished with almost with a single blow”).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 586</p><p><UN></p><p>good as your mamma used to eat, all inserted into “a fairy-tale past that runs</p><p>through commercial spots with a series of call-backs to rural tradition.”14</p><p>The colorful</p><p>Middle Ages work wonders because they are severed from the</p><p>memory of our forefathers’ lives. They are magical, full of jugglers and fire-</p><p>eaters, jesters and maybe even dragons. It’s quite New Age, the opposite of that</p><p>poor and often rural environment abandoned by the generations of migrants</p><p>from the countryside between the Fifties and Seventies, the memory of which</p><p>was not passed on to their children.15 Or perhaps it is the dream told in fables</p><p>around the fire, which was not history but fantasy in its purest state. Here,</p><p>however, we are dealing with history. Without the bond of memory between</p><p>grandparents, parents, and children, the past can easily be reinvented. Since</p><p>the beginning of time, those who at long last achieve prosperity equip them-</p><p>selves with a new past, more suitable to their new status. The ennobled mer-</p><p>chants who bought their ancestors’ portraits by the yard did it, the nobles who</p><p>invented “incredible genealogies” did it, and others continue to do it today.16</p><p>Ultimately, the use of the Middle Ages in a markedly identitarian key may even</p><p>constitute, in certain cases, both the involuntary declaration of a collective loss</p><p>of memory and the simultaneous attempt to deny this loss—not by resorting</p><p>to history, but to its metamorphosis into myth. In the Canterville Ghost, Oscar</p><p>Wilde has the rich American who bought a castle in England say, “I know a lot</p><p>of people who would give a hundred thousand dollars to have a grandfather,</p><p>and much more than that to have a family ghost.”17</p><p>Medievalism has been (and still is) this, too: a picturesque ghost, an ecto-</p><p>plasmic recreation of the past by of those who no longer know the names and</p><p>trades of their grandfathers. But we do need to be careful not to paint with too</p><p>broad a brush. Not all historical recreations are completely invented, and some,</p><p>particularly more recently, even boast an admirable philological accuracy in</p><p>their reconstruction of the Middle Ages. There are associations that promote</p><p>specialized historical research and oversee the accuracy of reenactments: for</p><p>instance, the Italian Federation of Historic Games (Federazione italiana giochi</p><p>storici).18 The Assisan Calendimaggio itself is characterized by an element that</p><p>we may almost call esoteric, not open to the public but intended to be rigor-</p><p>ously evaluated, in terms of historical accuracy, by the judges (often eminent</p><p>historians) who determine the winning party. The Assisans and the Sienese</p><p>14 S. Pivato, Vuoti di memoria cit., pp. 61–74: 61 ff. TN: Mulino Bianco is a very popular brand</p><p>of cookie in Italy.</p><p>15 Ibid., especially pp. 38–41.</p><p>16 R. Bizzocchi, Genealogie incredibili. Scritti di storia nell’Europa moderna, il Mulino, Bolo-</p><p>gna 1995.</p><p>17 O. Wilde, The Canterville Ghost, The Electric Book Company, London 2001, p. 30.</p><p>18 Cf. www.feditgiochistorici.it/ (cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.feditgiochistorici.it/</p><p>87Merchants and Bowmen: Middle Ages of the City</p><p><UN></p><p>celebrate their feast days with such emotional investment and such a strong</p><p>sense of identity that they consider the countless tourists almost a nuisance,</p><p>living as if suspended between the need and the refusal to welcome those who,</p><p>coming from the outside world, cannot fully comprehend the totalizing nature</p><p>of the experience.</p><p>Nevertheless, when the institution of the festival is recent and unstructured,</p><p>and when the operative desire is fundamentally economic and touristic, the</p><p>force majeure of identitarian medievalism finds itself in a formidable contra-</p><p>diction, for such medievalism should function as a counterpoint to globaliza-</p><p>tion, not derive benefit from it. The return to more or less imagined origins is a</p><p>response “to the loss of the ‘sense of home’ that one feels in great markets.”19</p><p>Faced with the alienation caused by malls, fast food, and huge chains of goods</p><p>and service, the Middle Ages, along with the “slow food” that accompanies it,</p><p>should facilitate this return. But the contradiction is that even the rebuttal in</p><p>the name of the Middle Ages is homologizing and globalized. This is nothing</p><p>new: even the rebellion of rock and roll is a product of the market, and we have</p><p>all known for a while that “Native American” art boutiques all sell identical</p><p>products. The model of the medieval marketplace is widely standardized, as</p><p>much in costume as in cultural content (fantasy literature and cinema), as</p><p>much in the demonstrations (races that quite often imitate the Palio of Siena,</p><p>jugglers, acrobats, taverns, and boutiques), as, more than ever, in the objects</p><p>put up for sale, for instance, fairy and troll dolls. Indeed, since Celticism is one</p><p>of the keys to reading the Middle Ages in modernity, we frequently encounter</p><p>strange cases of medieval fairs, palios, and tournaments that, in Italy as in</p><p>Spain or any other European country, display characters in fifteenth-century</p><p>costumes like something out of an opera against a backdrop of Celtic music: a</p><p>sort of “Celtic fusion” that certainly has nothing to do with the Middle Ages,</p><p>but is performed with melodies, rhythms, and instruments that, in the popular</p><p>perception, are indelibly associated with that era.20</p><p>So we’re talking about a Medieval Era that claims to define a unique identity,</p><p>but in reality is modular, repetitive, exportable, and precisely for this reason—</p><p>insofar as it is immediately recognizable—cherished by those who come to</p><p>visit. At times it so happens that the neo-medieval framework transforms a</p><p>place that on its own would be characterized by its elements of originality, its</p><p>monuments, and its works of art, into a non-place identical to so many others.</p><p>Ultimately, even the medieval village is often a global village. With at least one</p><p>difference: at least here the people get together to have fun.</p><p>19 I. Porciani, Identità locale-identità nazionale cit., p. 141.</p><p>20 Cf. Chapter 9.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004414983_008</p><p><UN></p><p>Chapter 6</p><p>Folk and Jesters: Anarchist and Leftist Middle Ages</p><p>It depends, depends on what?</p><p>It all depends on where you see the world from.</p><p>jarabe de palo, Depende (1998)</p><p>It’s a beautiful day in May. The year is 1968. Between red flags and tear gas,</p><p>flower power and protests some might say that the Middle Ages are not exactly</p><p>at home. But in reality—as we anticipated—the Middle Ages were there, too.</p><p>In May of 1968, French students marched to the verses of Verlaine:</p><p>It’s toward the tremendous and delicate Middle Ages</p><p>That my broken heart should sail</p><p>So far from our days of fleshly spirit and sad flesh.1</p><p>Onward Middle Ages! Yet nevertheless, we remain surprised. If we look around</p><p>us, the Middle Ages’ role in politics these days comes almost exclusively from</p><p>right-wing movements. Even in the Seventies and Eighties the political usage</p><p>of the Middle Ages was primarily a phenomenon of the right, as we shall see in</p><p>the next three chapters. Another cause for our surprise is of a philosophical</p><p>nature: unless grafted to proud nationalisms, progressive culture does not</p><p>judge the Medieval Era in a kind light, for the simple reason that it belongs to</p><p>the past. The revolution looks forward: as the lines of the Internationale go, Du</p><p>passé faisons table rase, “let us make the past a clean slate.”</p><p>The betterment of the human condition is gradual, and accomplished</p><p>through processes—class struggle, according to Marxism—that lead us to a</p><p>perfect society. From this perspective the periods of Western history that come</p><p>one after the other—Antiquity, the Middle Ages, the Modern Era, all the way</p><p>to today—are arranged in an evolutionary progression. Medieval, or rather</p><p>feudal, society is better than the ancient one of slavery, but worse than the</p><p>1 “C’est vers le Moyen Âge énorme et délicat</p><p>| qu’il faudrait que mon coeur en panne naviguât.</p><p>| Loin de nos jours d’esprit charnel et de chair triste”: P. Verlaine, Non. Il fut gallican, ce siècle,</p><p>et janséniste!, in Sagesse, Goemaere-Librairie Catholique, Bruxelles-Paris 1881, vol. x,</p><p>vv. 2–4; cit. by R. Iorio, Medioevo e giornalismo cit., p. 125.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>89Folk and Jesters: Anarchist and Leftist Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>modern one, bourgeois and capitalist (even if the latter may be much more</p><p>cynical and brutal, its operations no longer veiled by “religious and political</p><p>illusions”),2 and much worse than contemporary society, in which the prole-</p><p>tariat has acquired class consciousness. In the same way, anarchist thought</p><p>cannot but reject the Middle Ages, the time of kings, priests, castes and an or-</p><p>der as immobile as it was unjust. And thus, what use could we ever make of</p><p>this Medieval Era, which by convention is a time of shadows?</p><p>If things were exactly so, this chapter would be out of order: it would have</p><p>made more sense to place it among the discussion in the first few chapters of</p><p>the “dark” Middle Ages. And that certainly would have been appropriate if we</p><p>were referring only to the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–69), or to Pol</p><p>Pot’s Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, which, from 1975 to 1979, led to the systematic</p><p>destruction and massacre “of whoever knew how to read and write, and thus</p><p>were bearers of that terrible affliction called the past.”3</p><p>But things are not exactly thus, because, as we have already said in reference</p><p>to Gramsci and Pasolini, thinking about the past and finding value in it is not</p><p>an exclusively reactionary attitude—the “paper tigers” of Maoist thought—</p><p>and tradition is not necessarily counter-revolutionary. From the mid-Sixties to</p><p>the end of the next decade, many left-leaning intellectuals and artists made</p><p>use of the Middle Ages, attributing positive connotations to it. In fact, Marxism</p><p>has discussed in depth the relationship between tradition and modernity. In</p><p>Italy this concept, already mature in the collection of popular Italian fairy tales</p><p>edited by Italo Calvino (1956), is seen most of all in conjunction with the mete-</p><p>oric economic boom of the Sixties and thus can be considered an effect of the</p><p>so-called “second industrial revolution.”4</p><p>So writes Anne-Marie Thiesse, discussing folklore in the postwar period:</p><p>The heights achieved by industrialization in the West in the Sixties, at the</p><p>dawn of a new phase of modernity, and the drastic decline in importance</p><p>of the rural world as a social category, give rise to a new movement pro-</p><p>moting traditional culture, which is presented as oppositional, youthful</p><p>and leftist. In Italy, ethnologists and militant artists who employ Grams-</p><p>cian analyses seek to give life to a modern, revolutionary folklore, primar-</p><p>ily musical, that reclaims the rhythms and melodies of traditional popular</p><p>2 K. Marx and Fr. Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Pluto Press, London 2017. jstor, www</p><p>.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1k85dmc., p. 53 (cons. May 5, 2019).</p><p>3 T. Terzani, Fantasmi. Dispacci dalla Cambogia, Longanesi, Milano 2008, p. 246.</p><p>4 I. Calvino, Italian Folktales, Penguin Books, London 2000 (original edition: Fiabe italiane: rac-</p><p>colte dalla tradizione popolare durante gli ultimi cento anni e trascritte in lingua dai vari di-</p><p>aletti da Italo Calvino, Einaudi, Torino 1956).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1k85dmc</p><p>http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1k85dmc</p><p>Chapter 690</p><p><UN></p><p>music yet endows the lyrics with political commentary. In France, during</p><p>the decade that follows after May of ’68, the rural world and its traditions</p><p>become a cornerstone of the anticapitalist struggle. The progressive-</p><p>regressive utopia strives to overcome the contradictions of contemporary</p><p>society by proposing, through the return to a pre-capitalist world, to re-</p><p>place productive values with those of conviviality, communal brother-</p><p>hood, and respect for nature.5</p><p>This same tool of reclaiming popular culture through music is a workhorse of</p><p>the English and American folk movements, with the revival of lays like the</p><p>Green Forest Ballads that retrace the ancient motifs of game poaching and the</p><p>domination of lords, and the better part of Joan Baez’s repertoire.6 The songs</p><p>are not always of openly political content and only rarely truly medieval, but</p><p>nonetheless lie in the vein of popular tradition, of the common people whose</p><p>choral voice must be restored. During the Seventies, “medieval pop” was quite</p><p>common even in the countries of Eastern Europe (bands like Sfinx and Trans-</p><p>sylvania Phoenix in Romania), although such cases may be interpreted not as</p><p>an alternative but as a nationalist artform—albeit one allied with the Com-</p><p>munist regimes that, after the Prague Spring, began to distance themselves</p><p>from the Soviet Union.7</p><p>An analogous discussion pertains to the great diffusion of theater. In Italy,</p><p>in accordance with the tradition of commedia dell’arte, many folk and collec-</p><p>tivist theater groups in the Seventies sought to revive popular theater, bringing</p><p>expressive— often dialectal—candor back into the spotlight, while also recog-</p><p>nizing its protest value, like the glorification of peasant tradition in the face of</p><p>the lie of bourgeois civilization’s machines, factories, and history written by</p><p>the victors. Even if the lyrical content could be variable, the performance in</p><p>itself came to constitute an eminently political act.</p><p>Aside from a few exceptions, the ballads and plays reproduced in Italy and</p><p>France, as in Romania and the United States, were not genuinely medieval. On</p><p>5 A.-M. Thiesse, La création des identités nationales cit., p. 276.</p><p>6 See R. Leydi, Il folk music revival, Flaccovio, Palermo 1972; Id., La canzone popolare, in Storia</p><p>d’Italia, Einaudi, Torino 1973, vol. v, pp. 1181–1249; on this particular subject: P. Moliterni,</p><p>Medioevo, musica popolare e “folk music revival,” in “Quaderni medievali,” ii (1977), n. 3,</p><p>pp. 175–187.</p><p>7 F. Curta, Pavel Chinezul, Negru Voda, and “Imagined Communities”: Medievalism in Romanian</p><p>Rock Music, in “Studies in Medievalism,” XIII (2005) pp. 3–16, with reference also to other</p><p>Eastern European countries; Id., The Reinvention of the Middle Ages in Romanian Rock Music,</p><p>in What, in the World, is Medievalism? Global Reinvention of the Middle Ages (A Panel Discus-</p><p>sion), session of the 44th International Congress of Medieval Studies cit.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>91Folk and Jesters: Anarchist and Leftist Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>the contrary, they usually dated back no further than the sixteenth or seven-</p><p>teenth century, as was the case, to name some of the more celebrated ballads,</p><p>for Greensleeves, Geordie, Scarborough Fair, and Barbara Allen.8 The revival of</p><p>popular traditions, in fact, has no need to go all the way back to the Middle</p><p>Ages, but only to the folklore of the rural societies that modern civilization is</p><p>sweeping away. In this sense, we can grasp the idea of the Middle Ages only in</p><p>its broadest contours as an extra-long Middle Ages, even more extended than</p><p>the long Middle Ages of the Annales School (which ends with the French and</p><p>Industrial Revolutions). This is what Franco Cardini was speaking of when he</p><p>wrote:</p><p>There’s no more fooling ourselves: by now, we men of the nuclear and</p><p>computer age are much further from our predecessors of two or three</p><p>generations, from our grandfathers, than they were (in terms of mentality</p><p>and rhythms of existence) from the people of the thirteenth or fourteenth</p><p>century.9</p><p>In the ahistorical reconstructed past, the ballad can be considered medieval</p><p>even if it is not. This is because it belongs to another time, one that is unknown</p><p>and</p><p>in need of reclamation: a time when people kept their animals on the</p><p>ground floor of their house, dresses were hand-sewn, and people spent their</p><p>nights around the fire. We are dealing with the same mental and sentimental</p><p>process that led to the “rediscovery” of thousands and thousands of country</p><p>fairs, knightly courts, and urban jousts.</p><p>But a Middle Ages of the people is even more than that. Popular culture</p><p>rethinks its own past, which for anarchist and leftist thought is one of tears</p><p>and blood: completely contrary, then, to the glittering past of urban palios.</p><p>The people, that is, the proletariat, must preserve their memory precisely in</p><p>order to reappropriate the tradition that they are losing and to reach the re-</p><p>newed class consciousness that would allow society to be reborn. Anarchists</p><p>and Marxists do not celebrate knights, they do not raise hymns to the sacred</p><p>order of the Middle Ages. Quite the contrary. They denounce its horrors, at the</p><p>same time exalting social solidarity and the rebellion of the sub-altern classes.</p><p>Their Middle Ages are made of revolts. Within a fundamentally negative judg-</p><p>ment, under the oppression of “little lords,” the poisoned gold of merchants,</p><p>and the horrors of monarchy and theocracy, one’s attention focuses on that</p><p>8 Fr. J. Child (ed.), The English and Scottish Popular Ballads, The Folklore Press, New York 1957</p><p>(original edition: 1882–1898), nn. 2, 84, 209, 271.</p><p>9 F. Cardini, Medievisti “di professione” cit., p. 50.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 692</p><p><UN></p><p>social subject, pervaded by an innate positivity, that is the people: the peas-</p><p>ants, the miserable, the landless, precursors of the proletariat. A people that</p><p>suffers, but already strives for its future redemption, not yet in terms of a</p><p>true revolution but a prefiguration of it: the class struggle that, according to</p><p>Marxist historiography, would be waged between the serfs and lords in the</p><p>Early and High Middle Ages, between commoners and elites and between</p><p>workers and masters in the Late Middle Ages. Ultimately, among oratores,</p><p>bellatores and laboratores—the three orders of the medieval imaginary—the</p><p>Marxists prefer the latter by a long shot, equipped as they are with hammer</p><p>and sickle.10</p><p>These are not new ideas. In fact, they are firmly anchored in the Enlighten-</p><p>ment construction of the idea of the medieval and above all in its nineteenth-</p><p>century reworking in a revolutionary key. The people have their history and it</p><p>will be told! The positive aspects of the Middle Ages, entrusted to the subaltern</p><p>classes and not to the dominant elites, emerge in two characteristics attributed</p><p>to the medieval commons: solidarity and rebellion.</p><p>The course of the nineteenth century saw the emergence of utopian socio-</p><p>historical reconstructions that attributed to certain peoples, namely the Slavs</p><p>and Germans, the existence of a primordial and natural proto-Communism,</p><p>a veritable class solidarity that had no knowledge of private property and pre-</p><p>figured égalité and fraternité. This social solidarity expressed itself in the Com-</p><p>munes that, according to an interpretation common in the nineteenth century,</p><p>defeated feudalism, and then in the medieval corporations, presented by some</p><p>historians as forebearers of the democratic armies of workers. The medieval</p><p>worker still lived better than the modern one: feudalism certainly represents a</p><p>more backwards economic system with respect to bourgeois capitalism, but</p><p>also a less alienating and more human social system, because it was construct-</p><p>ed around a vast web of bonds of solidarity that capitalism itself has discard-</p><p>ed.11 Social solidarity therefore came to be reproduced in a neo-medieval</p><p>sense, for instance in William Morris and Walter Crane’s late nineteenth-</p><p>century “Arts and Crafts” movement, with its anti-industrial system of artisanal</p><p>10 G. Duby, The Three Orders. Feudal Society Imagined, University of Chicago Press, Chicago</p><p>1980 (original edition: Les trois ordres ou l’imaginaire du féodalisme, Gallimard, Paris 1978).</p><p>11 See for instance L. Mumford, Technics and Civilization, Harcourt Brace and Company,</p><p>New York 1934, pp. 153–155, on the subject of the “new barbarism” represented by the</p><p>“paleotechnic phase,” namely the early, inhumane industrialization of the nineteenth</p><p>century, which led to “the lowest point in social development Europe had known since</p><p>the Dark Ages” (p. 154).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>93Folk and Jesters: Anarchist and Leftist Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>production that took its model from medieval corporations.12 The powerful</p><p>impact of the nineteenth-century “social medievalism” of Morris, but also of</p><p>Cobbett, Pugin, Disraeli, Ruskin, Hopkins, etc., united in the grand myth of re-</p><p>demption represented by Robin Hood and the social pact sanctioned by the</p><p>Magna Carta, probably constitutes the fundamental reason why still today, po-</p><p>litical references to the Middle Ages can assume progressive connotations</p><p>much more often in Anglo-Saxon countries than in continental Europe, where</p><p>the key is predominantly conservative, or even reactionary. Thinking more re-</p><p>cently, medievalism helps us understand the long gestation of the protest</p><p>movements of the 1960s: in this sense one might claim that Tolkien represent-</p><p>ed for the flower children what William Morris, his spiritual ancestor, once rep-</p><p>resented for the fin de siècle English progressives.</p><p>The political imaginary connected to social solidarity and to the idea of the</p><p>collective realization of a vast popular project is a quite prominent motif in the</p><p>film Andrej Rublev (1966) by the Russian dissident Andrej Tarkovskij13 and is</p><p>the political theme at the heart of the novel The Pillars of the Earth (1989) by</p><p>Ken Follett, renowned author and English Labour activist.14 We can even see it</p><p>in the economic battles and endless strikes that inflamed England under the</p><p>leadership of Margaret Thatcher, recently compared to the peasant revolts of</p><p>the fourteenth century.15</p><p>Now, all this making use of popular traditions and of the identity of the poor</p><p>perhaps would not have had a long life and especially would not have been</p><p>anchored so firmly in the Middle Ages if, in addition to marrying itself to the</p><p>neo-medieval style, it had not found a solid foothold—even in terms of philo-</p><p>logical accuracy—in historiography. The link between the Middle Ages and</p><p>the left becomes more evident and politically relevant when we talk about a</p><p>characteristic feature of the period between the end of the Sixties and the</p><p>12 M.R. Grennan, William Morris: Medievalist and Revolutionary, King’s Crown Press, New</p><p>York 1945; J. Banham and J. Harris (eds.), William Morris and the Middle Ages, Manchester</p><p>University Press, Manchester 1984; M. Alexander, Medievalism cit., pp. 67–72, 176–180,</p><p>219 ff.; V. Ortenberg, In Search of the Holy Grail cit., pp. 75–81 and ad indices; E. Sasso, Wil-</p><p>liam Morris tra utopia e medievalismo, Aracne, Roma 2007. On the concept of “feudal</p><p>socialism,” opposed by Marx and Engels who considered it totally reactionary, The Com-</p><p>munist Manifesto cit., p. 85 ff.</p><p>13 V. Attolini, Andrej Roublev, l’artista e la storia, in “Quaderni medievali,” I (1976), n. 2,</p><p>pp. 193–202.</p><p>14 K. Follett, The Pillars of the Earth, MacMillan-William Morrow, London-New York 1989. In</p><p>2010 the novel was adapted into a TV miniseries.</p><p>15 D. Horspool, The English Rebel: One Thousand Years of Trouble-Making from the Normans</p><p>to the Nineties, Viking, London 2009.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 694</p><p><UN></p><p>mid-Eighties: the expansion of a vast audience for historical culture.16 Al-</p><p>though this interest was at the time turned primarily toward social history and</p><p>contemporary politics</p><p>the medieval becomes the time and</p><p>place of the Northern civilizations, of the night and the moon. Finally, if the</p><p>classical is the time of slavery, the medieval will be the time of individual lib-</p><p>erty, of barbarian vitality. Thus, the anti-classical medieval becomes, itself, a</p><p>classical canon, and the Nibelungenlied, the medieval epic considered to be the</p><p>origin of a nation, is transformed into the “Teutonic Iliad” of Romantic</p><p>Germany.7</p><p>Just as a community’s sense of identity often starts by inventing an enemy,</p><p>so the very idea of the Middle Ages has acquired its meaning in opposition to</p><p>another. The one epoch and the other can exist only in contrast: there is no</p><p>medieval without Renaissance, but the reverse is also true. This reasoning is</p><p>central, because it shows that the Middle Ages as a concept (and above all as</p><p>a political concept) is born under the sign of opposition. Our idea of the Mid-</p><p>dle Ages acquires, however, an extra connotation, of contrast not only with</p><p>“antiquity,” but also with “modernity.” This latter, due to its equivalence with</p><p>the concept of “change,” is considered to be generally positive from a progres-</p><p>sive perspective and generally negative from a reactionary one. Opposition in</p><p>the name of medievalism can assume a reactionary character when it turns</p><p>to the Middle Ages to recover or create a tradition, or it can have a revolu-</p><p>tionary character, when it permeates a movement of protest that has a need</p><p>for medieval symbols in which to find an example of social solidarity and</p><p>7 H. De Boor and K. Bartsch (eds.), Das Nibelungenlied, Brockhaus, Wiesbaden 1956; L. Manci-</p><p>nelli (ed.), I Nibelunghi, Einaudi, Torino 20062. On the classical-medieval opposition, see also</p><p>Ch. Amalvi, Le goût du Moyen Âge, Boutique de l’Histoire, Paris 20022, pp. 19–22.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>5Introduction</p><p>205137</p><p>rebellion against the establishment. From a historical perspective, the medi-</p><p>eval as a metaphor and mirror of the reaction or revolution constitutes the</p><p>keystone of an interpretative framework that continues all the way up to our</p><p>day and age.8</p><p>The uses of the idea of the Middle Ages as a golden age to dream of and pos-</p><p>sibly reproduce in the current day are many and radically different among</p><p>themselves, even as they shade one into another: anarchist, progressive, reac-</p><p>tionary, conservative, nationalist, secessionist, Europeanist, racist, ecological,</p><p>existentialist, religious…The vessel is so vast that one might ask oneself if it</p><p>even makes sense to seek out an internal logic, or if instead this attempt at</p><p>conceptual reordering belongs only to the specific intellectual habits of those</p><p>who who find themselves reimagining the Middle Ages daily and seek to ren-</p><p>der it comprehensible. The object that we struggle to capture with our woe-</p><p>fully blurry gaze could be compared to a constellation. Stars separated by un-</p><p>fathomable stellar distances acquire a shape only thanks to the observer’s</p><p>point of view. The stars don’t know each other. They have no conception of the</p><p>logic that unites them. The nocturnal navigator seeks a route across the sea us-</p><p>ing the sky and from there he begins to tell stories of gods. As so happens now:</p><p>outside of metaphor, the subject we are preparing to introduce is, to all appear-</p><p>ances, free of connections. But the point of view of this book is that of a curi-</p><p>ous medievalist, who seeks to make sense of the word Medieval. It is precisely</p><p>this word, a fixed reference point, that allows us to propose a unifying interpre-</p><p>tation. The medieval necessarily presents a broad frame of reference, as it is</p><p>seen as the other elsewhere that contrasts with modernity and exceeds it by</p><p>way of the nostos, the return voyage that, for three millennia now, has accom-</p><p>panied our Western existence to bring us back home. The idea of the Middle</p><p>Ages is an essential and inextricable part of the discourse of the idea of the</p><p>8 The concept of the Medieval Era as a metaphor, allegory, or “mirror” of modernity appears</p><p>often. See e.g. B. Tuchman, A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century, Alfred</p><p>A. Knopf, New York 1978; F. Cardini, Medievisti “di professione” e revival neomedievale, in Il</p><p>sogno del medioevo cit., pp. 33–52: 41; R. Bordone, Il medioevo nell’immaginario dell’Ottocento</p><p>italiano, in Studi medievali e immagine del medioevo fra Ottocento e Novecento, monograph</p><p>issue of “Bullettino dell’Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo,” 100 (1995–1996), pp.</p><p>109–149: 115; E. Menestò (ed.), Il medioevo: specchio ed alibi. Proceedings of the conference</p><p>held on the occasion of the second edition of the International Ascoli Piceno Prize (Ascoli</p><p>Piceno, May 13–14, 1988), CISAM, Spoleto 19972; G.M. Spiegel, The Changing Faces of American</p><p>Medievalism, in J.M. Bak [et al.] (eds.), Gebrauch und Missbrauch des Mittelalters, 19.-21. Jahr-</p><p>hundert/Uses and Abuses of the Middle Ages: 19th-21st Century/Usages et Mesusages du Moyen</p><p>Âge du xixe au xxie siecle, Wilhelm Fink, München 2009, pp. 45–53: 45; K.P. Fazioli, The Mir-</p><p>ror of the Medieval. An Anthropology of the Western Historical Imagination, Berghahn Books,</p><p>New York 2017.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Introduction6</p><p>205137</p><p>modern.9 Which is obvious, if we think about it for even a moment, in so far as</p><p>the concept of the medieval was forged precisely to perform this dialectical</p><p>function: first, in the Renaissance era, then in the Romantic era, invoking it as</p><p>a brother in arms to represent the renewal of the spirit.</p><p>Two general interpretations have emerged from the ternary opposition</p><p>Classical/Medieval/Modern, ones to which we still turn when we need to as-</p><p>sign a value judgment to the Middle Ages. The legacies of the Renaissance,</p><p>onto which was grafted the culture of the Protestant Reformation, then the</p><p>Enlightenment, and finally Marxism, have forged the negative idea of the Mid-</p><p>dle Ages. An age of barbarians, who destroyed the greatest civilization of all</p><p>time, the negative Medieval Era is an opaque, irrational, and malignant place,</p><p>degenerate to the highest degree in its inability to permit development, lacking</p><p>the capacity to produce true art, profoundly unjust in its social systems found-</p><p>ed on harassment and oppression, devoid of any state entity worthy of the</p><p>name, brutal and violent, pounded by the wrath of rival factions, stunted by</p><p>a superstitious religiosity that burned hordes of innocent people at the stake.</p><p>It is, in short, the Middle Ages of the ius primae noctis, of serfdom, corrupt</p><p>popes, witches, massacres, famine, and pestilence.</p><p>On the other hand, the cultural legacy that originates mainly from the Cath-</p><p>olic Counter-Reformation, followed by French and Italian erudition of the</p><p>modern age and by English literature, and finally culminating in the Romantic</p><p>movement, has molded the positive idea of the Middle Ages. This one is a uni-</p><p>verse of symbols: it is the time of castles and fairy tales, of magic and knights,</p><p>of damsels with pointed hats, of troubadours, bards, and jesters, of industrious</p><p>merchants, of the regeneration of a civilization founded on the “eternal values”</p><p>of country, faith, and heroism.10</p><p>In the same way, and for partially overlapping reasons, the partition be-</p><p>tween the negative and positive Middle Ages is partly attributable to distinct</p><p>political and historiographical positions, definable respectively as progressive</p><p>9 In general, see J. Le Goff, Storia e memoria, Einaudi, Torino 1977, partially reproduced in</p><p>Id., History and Memory, Columbia University Press, New York 1996, a comprehensive</p><p>study on the idea of time, and particularly on the opposing pairs of progressive/</p><p>reactionary, past/present, ancient/modern. See especially pp. 144–149, 204–211, 321–328 of</p><p>the Italian edition.</p><p>10 The contemporary bibliography on the developments</p><p>(thus to history as the study of the present), even the</p><p>Middle Ages played its part. In a relatively limited time, perhaps twenty years,</p><p>a handful of historians succeeded in transforming medieval studies into a dis-</p><p>cipline capable of speaking to everyone and strongly oriented toward the so-</p><p>cial. While most of the Western world was occupied with fantasy novels based</p><p>on medievalizing stereotypes taken primarily from the chansons de geste, in</p><p>France they studied the imaginary produced in the Middle Ages, analyzing a</p><p>theme, the history of mentalities, which simultaneously could be undertaken</p><p>through refined research into sources and would be an appropriate response to</p><p>the interests of non-specialists.17 The solidification of university attendance as</p><p>a mass phenomenon occurred in parallel with the general diffusion of the An-</p><p>nales school’s historiography, which though fundamentally structuralist and</p><p>thus Marxist in its initial presuppositions, finds a compelling expression in the</p><p>return to the historical tale of the Nouvelle Histoire. History is no longer just</p><p>tables and graphs, but stories. Capable of storytelling, the protagonists of the</p><p>so-called “revival of narrative” were now able to satisfy the public taste, finding</p><p>the key that was lost.18 Among the texts that may be considered this way are</p><p>The Legend of Bouvines by George Duby (1973) or Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s</p><p>Montaillou (1975), which sold 250,000 copies in Italy alone.19 The channels of</p><p>communication between universities and the broader public are thus re-</p><p>opened in the Seventies, turning some history books into actual best sellers—</p><p>medieval ones above all.</p><p>16 A. Caracciolo, Il mercato dei libri di storia. 1968–1978, in “Quaderni storici,” xiv (1979), n. 41,</p><p>pp. 765–777. The popularity of history books peaked, in Italy, in 1975. See also L. Blandini,</p><p>Dopo il ‘68. Editoria e problemi del passato, ibid., n. 42, pp. 1152–1164. On the complex rela-</p><p>tionship between Italian medievalism and Marxism in the 1970s: O. Capitani, Medioevo</p><p>passato prossimo cit., pp. 286 ff.</p><p>17 Cf. Ch. Amalvi, Le goût du Moyen Âge cit., pp. 249–253.</p><p>18 On this topic: L. Stone, The Revival of Narrative. Reflections on a New Old History, in “Past</p><p>and Present,” xxviii, 1979, n. 85, pp. 3–24; P. Burke, History of Events and the Revival of</p><p>Narrative, in Id. (ed.), New Perspectives on Historical Writing, Polity, Cambridge 1991,</p><p>pp. 283–300; M. Mustè, La storia. Teoria e metodi, Carocci, Roma 2005, pp. 70–72.</p><p>19 G. Duby, The Legend of Bouvines: War, Religion, and Culture in the Middle Ages, University</p><p>of California Press, Oakland 1990 (original edition: Le dimanche de Bouvines: 27 juillet 1241,</p><p>Gallimard, Paris 1973); E. Le Roy Ladurie, Montaillou. Cathars and Catholics in a French</p><p>Village, Penguin Books, London 1980 (original edition: Montaillou, village occitan: de 1294</p><p>à 1324, Gallimard, Paris 1975). Cf. S. Gensini, Presentazione, in Il sogno del medioevo cit.,</p><p>pp. 11–17: 13. In France the circulation has exceeded 300,000 copies: Ch. Amalvi, Le goût du</p><p>Moyen Âge cit., pp. 178 ff., 252.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>95Folk and Jesters: Anarchist and Leftist Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>The common people are “without history,” because history is always written</p><p>by the victors. As we hear at the beginning of the film Braveheart, “History is</p><p>written by those who have hanged heroes.” And the common people, the work-</p><p>ing peasants, left no trace, such that the Duke of Auge, while he considers his</p><p>historical situation standing atop his castle, almost doesn’t notice them: “A few</p><p>vileyns, here and there, were scratching the miserable soil, but they counted</p><p>for little in the landscape, being scarcely perceptible.”20</p><p>But in this medieval world dominated by social injustice and the tyranny of</p><p>whoever is in power, voices of disobedience are raised (and from time to time,</p><p>even the Duke of Auge paid the price). In reality the people have never been</p><p>silent: the myth of Robin Hood, the bandit that steals from the rich to give to</p><p>the poor, is this truth’s greatest metaphor.21 Bringing back to consciousness the</p><p>history of the poor, the marginalized, and the so-called Other, who are so only</p><p>because they are condemned by a distorted perspective defined by an unjust</p><p>order, is the task of the intellectuals. Or at least, it is in an environment that</p><p>saw the creation of works like Nathan Wachtel’s The Vision of the Vanquished</p><p>(1971), which recounts the invasion of South America from the point of view of</p><p>the native peoples; like The Cheese and the Worms by Carlo Ginzburg (1971),</p><p>which relates the worldview of a miller and an entire culture behind him on</p><p>the verge of collapse; like the books on the wretched by Bronisław Geremek,</p><p>starting from his study of the marginalized groups of Paris (1971–72), which</p><p>describe and explain the Middle Ages of the slums and ghettos; like the numer-</p><p>ous studies on heretical movements of the Late Middle Ages, understood in a</p><p>social key as the struggle against the normalization imposed by the Roman</p><p>Church; and like the analogous studies on witchcraft, understood as a popular</p><p>and feminine spirit, an alternative and ancestral culture condemned as devi-</p><p>ant: well, in this extremely vast cultural environment, even politically oriented</p><p>20 R. Queneau, Between Blue and Blue cit., p. 52 (“Quelques manants, çà et là, grattaient le sol</p><p>misérable, mais il comptaient peu dans le paysage, à peine perceptibles”: Id., Les fleurs</p><p>bleues cit., p. 67).</p><p>21 See St. Knight, Robin Hood. A Complete Study of the English Outlaw, Blackwell, Oxford-</p><p>Cambridge (MA) 1994; Id., Robin Hood: A Mythic Biography, Cornell University Press,</p><p>Ithaca 2003; in Italian: M. Sanfilippo, Camelot, Sherwood, Hollywood cit., which offers a</p><p>broad perspective. Between 1958 and 1961 the periodical “Past and Present” hosted a de-</p><p>bate on the significance of Robin Hood as a symbol of peasant rebellion or, vice versa, of</p><p>the redemption of rural petty nobility, the “gentry”: see Id., Camelot cit., Part 2, Ch. 9, Il</p><p>dibattito storico, with bibliography. Since 1977 Veneto has been home to the Radio Sher-</p><p>wood station, founded by a workers’ rights collective and still today an extra- parliamentary</p><p>voice for the left. Cf. Radio Sherwood, Wikipedia entry, http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ra</p><p>dio_Sherwood (cons. May 5, 2019).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_Sherwood</p><p>http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_Sherwood</p><p>Chapter 696</p><p><UN></p><p>artists have reproduced, described, and loved the history of the “victims of this</p><p>world,” tracing a long allegorical arc.22</p><p>If these are some of our historiographical premises, getting into the specifics</p><p>of texts by authors who are not historians by profession becomes a serious</p><p>problem. In no case more so than this one, we need to propose effective dis-</p><p>tinctions within a nebula that is anything but clear. We are dealing with au-</p><p>thors who have been lumped into camps or called propagators of ideas they do</p><p>not share, as is the case with De André, a libertarian anarchist attributed ex</p><p>officio to the left but dear also to the right, and with Tolkien, who has been clas-</p><p>sified, but only in Italy, as a right-wing author. Nor should this surprise us, since</p><p>any work of creativity, as soon as it is made public, lives in the interpretations</p><p>of its consumers.23</p><p>We can point to any number of cases in which anarchist or left-leaning intel-</p><p>lectuals have written, sung, produced, or portrayed on the big screen themes</p><p>and scenarios that are medieval in various ways necessary for expressing artis-</p><p>tic sentiment or exploring existential dimensions, but that do not display—in</p><p>those contexts—openly politically messages: as, for instance, some songs by</p><p>Francesco Guccini (Ophelia, 1968), Bob Dylan (All Along the Watchtower, 1968),</p><p>Joan Baez (Sweet Sir Galahad, sung for the first time at Woodstock in 1969).</p><p>These examples are interesting, for they reinforce the notion that a fantastical</p><p>Middle Ages was not a taboo for the left, even though it was far removed from</p><p>the class struggle and political engagement. Also quite representative are the</p><p>writings of John Steinbeck, author of, among others, the “Arthurian” novels Tor-</p><p>tilla Flat (1937) and The Acts of King Arthur and His Noble Knights (published</p><p>posthumously in 1976), Italo Calvino, who wrote his celebrated Trilogy of Our</p><p>22 N. Wachtel, The Vision of the Vanquished. The Spanish Conquest of Peru Through Indian</p><p>Eyes, 1530–1570, Barnes & Noble, New York 1971 (original edition: La vision des vaincus: les</p><p>Indiens du Pérou devant la conquête espagnole 1530–1570, Gallimard, Paris 1971); C. Ginz-</p><p>burg, The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth-Century Miller, Johns Hopkins</p><p>University Press, Baltimore 19922 (original edition: Il formaggio e i vermi: il cosmo di un</p><p>mugnaio del ‘500, Einaudi, Torino 1976); B. Geremek, The Margins of Society in Late Medi-</p><p>eval Paris, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006 (orginal edition: Ludzie margine-</p><p>su w średniowiecznym Paryżu xiv–xv wiek, Wrocław-Warszawa 1971; French ed. Les mar-</p><p>ginaux parisiens aux xive et xve siècles, Flammarion, Paris 1976); Id., I bassifondi di Parigi</p><p>nel medioevo: il mondo di François Villon, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1972 (original edition: Życie</p><p>codzienne w Paryżu Franciszka Villona, Warszawa 1972).</p><p>23 Cf. J.R.R. Tolkien, Foreword to the Second Edition, 1966, 11: “I think that many confuse ‘ap-</p><p>plicability’ with ‘allegory’; but the one resides in the freedom of the reader, and the other</p><p>in the purposed domination of the author.” Cf. T. Shippey, J.R.R. Tolkien: Author of the</p><p>Century, HarperCollins, New York 2001: pp. 190–196.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>97Folk and Jesters: Anarchist and Leftist Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>Ancestors in the Fifties, causing much dissent among his fellow members of</p><p>the Italian Communist Party, and Umberto Eco, who in The Name of the Rose</p><p>(1980) gestured toward the similarity between the peasant struggles of the</p><p>fourteenth century and the turbulent Years of Lead of Italian terrorism.24</p><p>So who used the Middle Ages politically in the Seventies? There’s no point</p><p>searching in the factories, unions, picket lines, demonstrations, rallies, and</p><p>strikes: no traces will be found. The Medieval Era is felt in music and theater, but</p><p>usually not to such an extent that it is recognized as having a concrete signifi-</p><p>cance that might distinguish it from a more general popular tradition. Only</p><p>rarely was it strictly and explicitly connected to political conflict; more typically</p><p>it represented one of many possible fonts of artistic inspiration. This compre-</p><p>hensive picture is complicated by one relevant exception, which constitutes</p><p>the deepest level of political discourse centered around the Middle Ages. In the</p><p>Sixties and Seventies, the theme that truly characterizes its usage on the left is</p><p>rebellion under the sign of inversion. The watchword is “flip your point of view”</p><p>towards the low and towards the margins, towards the grotesque, the satirical,</p><p>the irreverent, the sarcastic, even towards a taste for the trivial, licentious, and</p><p>24 J. Steinbeck, Tortilla Flat, Covici-Friede, New York 1935; Id., Ch. Horton (ed.), The Acts of</p><p>King Arthur and His Noble Knights, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 1976. On Steinbeck</p><p>and his refashioning of Malory’s work, see V. Ortenberg, In Search of the Holy Grail cit.,</p><p>pp. 167 ff. and the collected bibliography of L.F. Hodges, John Steinbeck’s The Acts of King</p><p>Arthur and His Noble Knights, in An Arthuriana/Camelot Project Bibliography, www.lib</p><p>.rochester.edu/camelot/acpbibs/hodges.htm (cons. May 5, 2019). Calvino’s The Nonexis-</p><p>tent Knight was considered an allegory of the Communist Party as an empty bureaucratic</p><p>machine, and the novel contains many references to the class consciousness of the work-</p><p>ing classes (cf. I. Calvino, Romanzi e racconti, under the direction of C. Milanini, eds. M.</p><p>Barenghi and B. Falcetto, Mondadori, Milano 20007, vol. i, p. 1062). Calvino himself wrote</p><p>of the sociopolitical significance of his book (ibid., p. 1362): “In the Knight [we can see] the</p><p>critique of the ‘organization man’ in mass society. I would say that the Knight itself, where</p><p>references to the present seem more distant, says something that hits closer to home.”</p><p>Umberto Eco in 2003 expanded on some political analogies contained in The Name of the</p><p>Rose (Harcourt, San Diego 1983, original edition: Il nome della rosa, Bompiani, Milano</p><p>1980): “In the course of the writing I realized that—through these medieval phenomena</p><p>of unorganized revolt—some parallels were emerging relating to that terrorism we were</p><p>living through at the time I was writing, more or less towards the end of the 1970s. Cer-</p><p>tainly, even if I had no precise intentions, all that led me to underline these similarities, so</p><p>much so that when I discovered that the wife of Fra Dolcino’s was called Margherita, like</p><p>Curcio’s wife Margherita Cagol, who died in more or less analogous conditions, I explicitly</p><p>cited it in the text. Maybe if she’d had a different name it wouldn’t have occurred to me to</p><p>mention it, but I couldn’t resist this kind of wink to the reader”: A. Fagioli, Il romanziere e</p><p>lo storico. Intervista a Umberto Eco, in “Lettera internazionale,” www.letterainternazio</p><p>nale.it/testi_htm/eco_75.htm (cons. May 5, 2019).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.lib.rochester.edu/camelot/acpbibs/hodges.htm</p><p>http://www.lib.rochester.edu/camelot/acpbibs/hodges.htm</p><p>http://www.letterainternazionale.it/testi_htm/eco_75.htm</p><p>http://www.letterainternazionale.it/testi_htm/eco_75.htm</p><p>Chapter 698</p><p><UN></p><p>pornographic: “A man may seye ful sooth in game and pley,” says Chaucer and,</p><p>after him, Pasolini of the Canterbury Tales (1972).25</p><p>So many films and novels come to mind that breathe this irreverent air,</p><p>this retelling of a Medieval Era of the marginalized, the poor, the ridiculous</p><p>knights.26 They are works that participate in the biting satire of the Seventies,</p><p>which in Italy translates to the bitter laughter of the Commedia all’italiana.</p><p>Works that may not flaunt a political message, but that were created by authors</p><p>who openly expressed their belonging to the left, such as Mario Monicelli’s two</p><p>films, L’Armata Brancaleone (“The Incredible Army of Brancaleone,” 1966) and</p><p>Brancaleone alle Crociate (“Brancaleone at the Crusades,” 1970), renowned in</p><p>Italy, or the novel Il pataffio by Luigi Malerba, a “cruel farce” of a popular stamp,</p><p>and the cycle of seven children’s stories by the same Malerba and Tonino Guer-</p><p>ra called Millemosche (1969–73; the knight’s name means “Thousand Flies”),</p><p>which narrate the adventures of three characters obsessed with hunger.27 In</p><p>those same years, the film Monty Python and the Holy Grail by Monty Python</p><p>(1974) took aim at everyone: from the self-governing peasants’ “anarco-</p><p>syndicalist commune,” to the valiant knights of Camelot, who trot about on</p><p>foot while their servants follow behind, using coconuts to imitate the hoof-</p><p>beats of their absent steeds.</p><p>But above all Pier Paolo Pasolini’s Decameron (1971) is the film in which the</p><p>Middle Ages and political engagement (albeit still implicit) are joined with the</p><p>greatest force in the carnal magic of bodies and food and the carefree attitude</p><p>of people who speak and sing in Neapolitan in dark alleys where time stands</p><p>still, mocking the bourgeois, clerical world. At the time he was directing the</p><p>film, Pasolini intended to write an essay he would have called, “How to reclaim</p><p>some reactionary affirmations for the revolution?” The essay was never written,</p><p>25 The line is spoken by the Cook,</p><p>who addresses himself directly to Pasolini/Chaucer in the</p><p>film, The Canterbury Tales, and recalls the line spoken by the host in the “Prologue to the</p><p>Cook’s Tale” in Chaucer., v. 31.</p><p>26 L. D’Arcens, Comic Medievalism. Laughing at the Middle Ages cit:, T. Pugh, Queer Medieval-</p><p>isms: A Case Study of Monty Python and the Holy Grail, in L. D’Arcens (ed.), The Cambridge</p><p>Companion to Medievalism cit., pp. 210–223.</p><p>27 L. Malerba, Il pataffio, Bompiani, Milano 1978; T. Guerra, L. Malerba, Millemosche merce-</p><p>nario, Bompiani, Milano 1969; Id., Millemosche senza cavallo, Bompiani, Milano 1969; Id.,</p><p>Millemosche fuoco e fiamme, Bompiani, Milano 1970; Id., Millemosche innamorato, Bom-</p><p>piani, Milano 1971; Id., Millemosche e il leone, Bompiani, Milano 1973; Id., Millemosche e la</p><p>fine del mondo, Bompiani, Milano 1973; Id., Millemosche alla ventura, Bompiani, Milano</p><p>1974; also: Id., Storie dell’anno Mille, Bompiani, Milano 1972 e Nuove storie dell’anno Mille,</p><p>Bompiani, Milano 1981, with the same characters Millemosche, Carestia and Pannocchia.</p><p>Cf. G. Musca, Il medioevo di Luigi Malerba, in “Quaderni medievali,” iv (1979), n. 8,</p><p>pp. 182–194.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>99Folk and Jesters: Anarchist and Leftist Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>but the film is the cinematographic translation of these ideas of his, already</p><p>expressed elsewhere. Looking to the past is not reactionary, but a form of</p><p>revolution:</p><p>I am a force from the Past.</p><p>Only in tradition is my love.</p><p>I come from the ruins, the churches,</p><p>From the altarpieces, the villages</p><p>Forgotten in the Apennines or Prealps,</p><p>Where our brothers lived.28</p><p>The Medieval Era is a poetic place beyond time and antithetical to the present.</p><p>It is real life, archaic, corporeal, so much so that Pasolini named his films set in</p><p>the carefree and existential, colorful and ragged Middle Ages the “Trilogy of</p><p>Life”: The Decameron, of course, along with The Canterbury Tales (1972), and</p><p>Arabian Nights (1974).29 Death is somewhere else, a place much closer to us, in</p><p>the bleakness of Salò, or 120 Days of Sodom (1975), the first film of a “Trilogy of</p><p>Death” that Pasolini never brought to fruition because he was murdered.</p><p>Along with Pier Paolo Pasolini, the main protagonists of the political use of</p><p>the Middle Ages, reread in an obstinately human key, were perhaps Georges</p><p>Brassens, Jacques Brel, Fabrizio De André and Dario Fo.30 Different amongst</p><p>28 P.P. Pasolini, Io sono una forza del passato, in Id., Poesia in forma di rosa, Garzanti, Milano</p><p>1964.</p><p>29 See R. Escobar, Pasolini: il passato e il futuro, in “Quaderni medievali,” ii (1977), n. 3,</p><p>pp. 155–174; A. Blandeau, Pasolini, Chaucer and Boccaccio, McFarland, Jefferson (NC) 2006;</p><p>V. Marinelli, Pasolini e il medioevo: fuga nell’utopia tra sacro e profano, graduate thesis,</p><p>Università degli studi di Urbino, AY 2005–2006; T. di Carpegna Falconieri, L.E. Yawn, Forg-</p><p>ing “Medieval” Identities cit.</p><p>30 Ch. Tinker, Georges Brassens and Jacques Brel. Personal and Social Narratives in Post-war</p><p>Chanson, Liverpool University Press, Liverpool 2005; C. Cecchetto, Médiévalismes d’une</p><p>sémiose: le Moyen Âge en chanson, in V. Ferré (ed.), Médiévalisme: modernité du Moyen Âge</p><p>cit., pp. 177–188; Id., Passages de Villon dans la chanson contemporaine, in D. Bohler, G.</p><p>Peylet (eds.), Le temps de la mémoire ii: soi et les autres, Presses Universitaires de Bor-</p><p>deaux, Bordeaux 2007, pp. 305–322; C. Cecchetto, M. Prat (eds.), La chanson politique en</p><p>Europe, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, Bordeaux 2008; G. Gua stella, P. Pirillo (eds.),</p><p>Menestrelli e giullari: il Medioevo di Fabrizio De André e l’immaginario medievale nel</p><p>Novecento italiano, Edifir, Firenze 2012. A comparative reading of De André and Pasolini is</p><p>proposed by R. Giuffrida, In direzione ostinata e contraria, in F. De André, Parole. I testi di</p><p>tutte le canzoni, Ricordi-la Repubblica-L’Espresso, Roma 2009, pp. 3–11: 5 ff. A reading of</p><p>the reception by the right (among other reasons, because of its “medievalizing reper-</p><p>toire”) in L. Lanna and F. Rossi, Fascisti immaginari cit., pp. 136–139. On Dario Fo: L. Binni,</p><p>Attento te… Il teatro politico di Dario Fo, Bertani, Verona 1975; Id., Dario Fo, La Nuova Italia,</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 6100</p><p><UN></p><p>themselves—only Dario Fo can be called a communist consistent with the po-</p><p>litical movement, while the others were antidogmatic and libertarian—all</p><p>these authors reclaim the immortal themes of the world upside-down, Carni-</p><p>val, the charivari, folly, the tradition of anti-bourgeois satire, the world of the</p><p>humble, the marginalized, the exploited, the vagabonds, the prostitutes, the</p><p>slaughtered, who in modernity also include alcoholics and addicts. Their Mid-</p><p>dle Ages, like modernity, is made of the beggars, hanged men, peasants—</p><p>genetically inferior beings born from a donkey’s fart—and even friars, whose</p><p>place in Hell is up the Devil’s asshole.</p><p>The jester, the child of the people, is for Dario Fo the one who “took the</p><p>people’s rage from them and gave it back tempered by the grotesque, by ‘rea-</p><p>son,’ so that the people could become mindful of their own condition.”31 The</p><p>jester is a revolutionary with a social mission. He is like the peasant Bertoldo,</p><p>the joker from a deck of cards, the mad saint of Russian tradition, or Erasmus</p><p>of Rotterdam’s Folly, who in the absurdity of his scurrilous jokes is the only one</p><p>to be sincere and the only one to whom the powerful concede the right to</p><p>taunt and tell the truth.32 As, naturally, does Dario Fo, himself a mad and buf-</p><p>foonish jester who denounces the horrors of the modern world. As early as</p><p>1968 he wrote a song together with Enzo Jannacci, called Ho visto un re (“I saw</p><p>a king”), which in its simple verses and melody is a powerful assault on the</p><p>“Overlords.” Some years later, recalling the political uproar over the death of</p><p>Giuseppe Pinelli, who fell out of a window of the Police Headquarters of Milan,</p><p>Dario Fo compares police chiefs to knights: “To the milites belonged those pro-</p><p>fessionals of the established order that we call commissioners, chiefs of</p><p>police.”33</p><p>In short, Dario Fo, along with his collaborators and the theater groups that</p><p>followed him, is the one who most consciously employed the popular medi-</p><p>eval as a political weapon. In his rereading of the renowned allegorical poem,</p><p>Rosa fresca aulentissima (Fresh and fragrant rose) by Cielo d’Alcamo,34 and</p><p>some of his other reinterpretations of late medieval literature as the work of</p><p>the people rather than a product of the intellectual elite (which in reality it</p><p>Firenze 1977. On his medieval themes: G. Musca, Il medioevo di Dario Fo, in “Quaderni</p><p>medievali,” ii (1977), n. 4, pp. 164–178; S. Soriani, Mistero buffo di Dario Fo e la cultura popo-</p><p>lare tra medioevo e rinascimento, ibid., xxviii (2003), n. 56, pp. 102–137.</p><p>31 D. Fo, Mistero Buffo, trans. Ed Emery, Methuen Books, London 1998 (original edition: Mi-</p><p>stero Buffo. Giullarata popolare in lingua padana, Tip. Lombarda, Cremona 1968; n. ed.</p><p>Mistero Buffo. Giullarata popolare, ed. F. Rame, Einaudi, Torino 1997, p. 12).</p><p>32 Erasmus of Rotterdam, The Praise of Folly cit., 35–36.</p><p>33 D. Fo, Mistero Buffo (It. edition 1997) cit., p. 16.</p><p>34 In G. Contini (ed.), Poeti del Duecento, Ricciardi, Milano-Napoli 1960, vol. i, pp. 177–185.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>101Folk and Jesters: Anarchist and Leftist Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>almost always was), he was imitated by the philologist Mara Amara who, alter-</p><p>ing only two letters of two words in the first tercet of Dante’s Comedy, restored,</p><p>in her words, the original meaning of a “feminine masturbation in the absence</p><p>of an erect penis,” also claiming to have found that adulterated text in a fif-</p><p>teenth-century</p><p>collection of proto-feminist popular songs:</p><p>Midway through the journey of our finger</p><p>I found myself amid a dark forest,</p><p>For the straight path had been lost.35</p><p>On the other hand, the Medieval Era of the chansonniers is a place of the soul.</p><p>Georges Brassens takes up the celebrated Ballade des dames du temps jadis</p><p>(“Ballade of the Ladies of Time Past”) by François Villon, while Jacques Brel</p><p>describes his Belgium with the famous, melancholically Gothic verses:</p><p>With cathedrals for its only mountains</p><p>And black belltowers like maypoles</p><p>Where stone devils clutch at clouds.36</p><p>But these authors are ablaze with the political medieval metaphor: Brassens</p><p>sings Le verger du roi Louis (“King Louis’ orchard,” 1960), in which the king’s</p><p>lovely garden is in reality the hangman’s field; Brel sings the famous Les bour-</p><p>geois (1962): “Les bourgeois, c’est comme les cochons…” (The bourgeois, they’re</p><p>like pigs); in 1967 Fabrizio De André recorded, with Paolo Villaggio, the song</p><p>Carlo Martello ritorna dalla battaglia di Poitiers (“Charles Martel returns from</p><p>the Battle of Poitiers”)—which cost him a trial—in which the brave victor over</p><p>the Arabs in 732 is reduced to a womanizer who flees from prostitutes so as not</p><p>to pay their fee.</p><p>Brassens and De André sing again the thundering verses of The Ballad of the</p><p>Hanged by Villon;37 De André cries, with Cecco Angiolieri, S’i fossi foco (“If</p><p>I were fire”; 1968) and along with Brassens sympathizes with those cursed poets</p><p>35 M. Amara, Per una lettura femminista della “Commedia” di Dante, in “Quaderni di contro-</p><p>cultura,” 5 (1974), pp. 3–15. (TN: The play on words revolves around vita (life) in the origi-</p><p>nal and dita (fingers) in the adaptation.).</p><p>36 “Avec des cathédrales comme uniques montagnes / et des noirs clochers comme mâts de</p><p>cocagne / où des diables en pierre décrochent les nuages”: J. Brel, Le plat pays, 1962.</p><p>37 In F. Villon, Poesie, pref. by F. De André, trans., intr., and ed. L. de Nardis, Feltrinelli, Milano</p><p>20082, pp. 108–111. La ballade des pendus was also sung by Serge Reggiani in 1961 and was</p><p>reproduced in the a scene of the film Brancaleone alle Crociate called La Ballata</p><p>dell’intolleranza.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 6102</p><p><UN></p><p>from a Medieval Era of strong passions, living feelings, and scoundrels with</p><p>hearts of gold. So much so that, writing a preface to the works of Villon, of</p><p>whom he declared himself a student, De André addresses him directly,38 while</p><p>Brassens writes a song, Le Moyenâgeux (“The Middle-Ager,” 1966), in which he</p><p>laments not having lived in the Middle Ages, where he could have retraced Vil-</p><p>lon’s steps:</p><p>Forgive me, prince, if I am hopelessly medieval. Damn! Why wasn’t I born</p><p>in the fourteen or fifteen hundreds? Then I would have been among</p><p>friends!39</p><p>In a world that has been overturned and thus restored to its rightful order, the</p><p>people are true. The heroes are the great cursed poets of the fourteenth and</p><p>fifteenth centuries. They are the ladies who await their husbands in vain (De</p><p>André, Fila la lana [“Spin the wool”], 1974) or who beg for salvation from merci-</p><p>less judges (the ballad of Geordie, in the repertoires of De André and Joan Baez),</p><p>or who burn at the stake, tired of war (Joan of Arc by Leonard Cohen, 1971, trans-</p><p>lated by De André in 1974). They are the heroic and powerful women in the</p><p>“feminist fantasy” of Marion Zimmer Bradley.40 They are those who fight for a</p><p>better world, like the Ciompi, Étienne Marcel, and the characters of the</p><p>Jacqueries. They are those who protest against the Church: Joachim of Fiore,</p><p>Jacopone da Todi, Wyclif, the Fraticelli and Lollards, often cited by Dario Fo, and</p><p>naturally St. Francis of Assisi, who becomes a protester in the eponymous film</p><p>by Liliana Cavani (1966).41 And even Jan Huss, remembered in Francesco Guc-</p><p>cini’s song Primavera di Praga (“Prague Spring,” 1970), which sees Huss’s death</p><p>at the stake recreated in the sacrifice of Jan Palach, who set himself on fire in</p><p>front of Soviet tanks. Vice versa, the enemies are the lords and hierarchies.</p><p>Above all, Boniface viii, to whom Dario Fo dedicates a devastating satire.42</p><p>“A laughter that will bury you all”: one of the most fashionable slogans of ’78</p><p>was perhaps the principal key to reading political medievalism during those</p><p>years. Even when the laughter left a bitter taste in one’s mouth.</p><p>Today this mode of representing the Middle Ages is hard to find. One might</p><p>believe that some fundamental opposition had gotten the upper hand and</p><p>38 F. De André, Prefazione a F. Villon, Poesie cit., pp. i–iv.</p><p>39 “Pardonnez-moi, Prince, si je suis foutrement moyenâgeux. Ah! que n’ai-je vécu, bon sang!</p><p>entre quatorze et quinze cent. J’aurais retrouvé mes copains!”</p><p>40 M. Zimmer Bradley, The Mists of Avalon, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1983. Cf. V. Ortenberg,</p><p>In Search of the Holy Grail cit., p. 132.</p><p>41 V. Attolini, Francesco d’Assisi e tre registi, in “Quaderni medievali,” I (1976), n. 1,</p><p>pp. 165–170.</p><p>42 D. Fo, Mistero Buffo (ed. 1997) cit., pp. 105–119.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>103Folk and Jesters: Anarchist and Leftist Middle Ages</p><p><UN></p><p>impeded the construction of a political thought coherent with the model. In</p><p>fact, the Middle Ages remain an obscure period: the revolts of peasants, her-</p><p>etics, and workers were suppressed in blood and thus represent an immature</p><p>phase of the revolution.43 The Medieval Era works if we look at it upside-</p><p>down, like a world inverted; but if we turn it right-side up again, suddenly it no</p><p>longer works. If we then refer to medieval sources and try to reread the spirit</p><p>of the people there, we quickly realize that the documentation available to us</p><p>transmits the memory of a world pervaded by a sense of the sacred. No pro-</p><p>fane pictorial art existed in the Middle Ages, and we know it almost intui-</p><p>tively, nor did a theatrical expression that was not sacra rappresentazione.44</p><p>To connect Christianity with one’s own profound secular vision of the world,</p><p>one must become heretical even in atheism: we need authors of the caliber of</p><p>Fabrizio De André, who rereads the apocryphal gospels, Pier Paolo Pasolini,</p><p>with his Gospel According to Matthew, and Dario Fo, who humanizes Jesus to</p><p>the point that even he becomes “a poor Christ.” But we are dealing precisely</p><p>with Authors with a capital “A,” who have moved “in an obstinate and contrary</p><p>direction.”</p><p>More than that, and perhaps most of all, the competition from the right for</p><p>the political use of the Middle Ages, which is more organic although in no way</p><p>more accurate, has led to its degradation: how can one use the same symbols</p><p>without running the risk of being, at the very least, misunderstood? Only Dario</p><p>Fo continues to set his works in the Middle Ages.45 In 1997 he was granted the</p><p>Nobel Prize for Literature for the following reason: “[He] emulates the jesters</p><p>of the Middle Ages in scourging authority and upholding the dignity of the</p><p>downtrodden.”46</p><p>Apart from civic festivals, the film Les visiteurs (“The Visitors,” 1993), and a</p><p>few other cases that are largely apolitical, today the Middle Ages no longer</p><p>make us laugh: other medieval imaginaries have come forward. The gram-</p><p>melot, the linguistic koiné of Dario Fo obtained through a reinvention of</p><p>some medieval Padanian dialects, had a totally unpredictable outcome in the</p><p>43 Cf. K. Marx and Fr. Engels, The Communist Manifesto cit., pp. 349 ff.: “The earliest attempts</p><p>by the proletariat to assert its interests in a period of general unrest, in the period of the</p><p>downfall of feudal society, were bound to fail, both because the figure of the proletarian</p><p>was not yet fully developed, and because the general conditions of his emancipation did</p><p>not exist, which are indeed the product of the bourgeois age.”</p><p>44 TN: An Italian form of popular theater similar to</p><p>morality and mystery plays.</p><p>45 See for instance his L’amore e lo sghignazzo, Guanda, Parma 2007, in which the two tales</p><p>Eloisa, pp. 11–51, and Storia di Mainfreda eretica di Milano, pp. 55–67, take place in a medi-</p><p>eval setting. Dario Fo passed away on October 13, 2016.</p><p>46 Nobel Prize, official website: https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1997/summa</p><p>ry/ (cons. May 5, 2019).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1997/summary/</p><p>https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/1997/summary/</p><p>Chapter 6104</p><p><UN></p><p>creation of the Padania leghista, which also uses the Middle Ages as an identi-</p><p>tarian binder, but in a very different way. Yet perhaps some traces of this medi-</p><p>evalism, which allowed us to revel in the jugglers of the recreational centers</p><p>and the “medieval fairs” of the hippies and wiccans, may still be found.47 Only</p><p>in the last few years has a new progressive use of the Middle Ages come to the</p><p>fore, in so far as it is considered the time of a historical opening to multicultur-</p><p>alism on the European continent: but to this aspect we will dedicate other</p><p>pages.48</p><p>In June 2008, in the midst of an economic crisis, Italy’s Economic Minister</p><p>Giulio Tremonti came up with the “Robin Hood Tax,” announcing that the Ital-</p><p>ian government would tax those who profited from the high oil prices. Trem-</p><p>onti provoked a chorus of disapproval on the left for this appropriation of a</p><p>hero of the people on the part of a center-right minister. And naturally on the</p><p>web it is easy to find cartoons in which Barack Obama is the new Robin Hood,</p><p>or rather, “Obama Hood.” Establishing whether Robin Hood is a champion of</p><p>the people (taking from the rich to give to the poor) or the crown (liege of the</p><p>legitimate sovereign who will return) is a question perfectly within the scope</p><p>of medievalism and common even in the historiographical debate.49 However,</p><p>like so many other topics adressed in this book, labeling Robin Hood as a hero</p><p>of the right or left, from the point of view of medieval history, makes no sense</p><p>at all.</p><p>47 Cf. infra, Ch. 9.</p><p>48 Cf. infra, Ch. 12.</p><p>49 M. Sanfilippo, Camelot cit., Part 2, Ch. 9.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004414983_009</p><p><UN></p><p>Chapter 7</p><p>Templars and Holy Grail: Middle Ages of Tradition</p><p>“I’m talking to you, paladin!” insisted Charlemagne. “Why don’t you show</p><p>your face to your king?”</p><p>A voice came clearly through the gorge piece. “Sire, because I do not</p><p>exist!”</p><p>I. calvino, The Non-existent Knight (1959)</p><p>Left and right, progressive and reactionary, craft different relationships with</p><p>medievalism. Many political movements on the right make it imposing and</p><p>eulogistic, betraying an affinity for the Medieval Era, while, as I have been say-</p><p>ing, the culture of the left sees it in an ambivalent light. Right and left seem</p><p>relatively similar in the way they use the Middle Ages when they use it to try to</p><p>construct a counterculture. A certain kind of Marxism sought it in popular tra-</p><p>ditions, struck silent and now called upon to speak anew. A certain Right has</p><p>instead sought from the Middle Ages examples and models with which to de-</p><p>fend an alternative to modern culture, to capitalism, liberalism, democracy,</p><p>egalitarianism, and socialism, finding them in the concept of “Tradition,” in the</p><p>idea of the survival and defense of values perceived as non-transient. In both</p><p>cases, we’re talking about a Medieval Era imagined as a place of antithesis,</p><p>contraposed to the official and orthodox models established by those who</p><p>hold the economic and intellectual power in modernity. The people in search</p><p>of redemption and the minor protest movement, “Revolutionary by tradition,”</p><p>which finds its guide and code of conduct in values attributed to a subversive</p><p>Middle Ages, are, with respect to medievalism, two sides of the same coin. The</p><p>jester who speaks truth through nonsense is not all too different from Parsifal,</p><p>an innocent knight and “pure fool.” And Pier Paolo Pasolini hoped to achieve a</p><p>revolution through tradition: despite the gulf between them, it is quite under-</p><p>standable that some of Julius Evola’s readers, in time, could appreciate that.</p><p>The similarities may end there, but they are not insignificant.</p><p>The main element underpinning the construction of the medieval imagi-</p><p>nary in the minds of the Right is chivalry. And thus, having already spoken</p><p>of peoples and jesters, we come to the time of knights: no longer the storytell-</p><p>ers who turn the world upside down, but faithful warriors. The figure of the</p><p>knight encompasses the entire Middle Ages: along with the castle, he is its</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 7106</p><p><UN></p><p>most concise synthesis, recognized as such by any person asked to define that</p><p>era using only two words. Gianfranco De Turris writes on the subject, “I don’t</p><p>believe there can be any doubt that in the common, popular imagination, the</p><p>Middle Ages is chivalry.”1</p><p>Immediately after the release of the film Excalibur (1981), a right-wing youth</p><p>publication read:</p><p>We wish that this return to the Middle Ages was not a passing fashion just</p><p>waiting for others to come after, an escape from reality that comes from</p><p>disgust with modernity, but a vision of the world, a style of life, where so-</p><p>to-speak heroic characters from the Middle Ages are seen as role models</p><p>and interiorized to resist the squalor of today.2</p><p>The topos of the spotless and fearless knight, invested with a mission of salva-</p><p>tion for himself and others—who sets out knowing he must seek truth else-</p><p>where and, along with his small band of brothers in arms, is alone against the</p><p>world, who is valiant and brave and endowed with a tremendous sense of</p><p>honor— derives from a complex stratification of myths.3 Chivalry was a social</p><p>system and a system of values; projected onto the medieval imaginary already</p><p>during the Medieval Era through literary channels, it had its own perduring,</p><p>mutable career in the early modern age and was substantially reforged in the</p><p>1800s, when the chivalric imaginary of the Medieval and Early Modern Eras</p><p>came to be considered not a projection of social systems, but a fact corre-</p><p>sponding to reality. The quête of the knight became a historical truth in which</p><p>imagination and everyday life coincided.</p><p>1 G. De Turris, L’immaginario medievale cit., p. 101. On the relationship between the Right and</p><p>the Middle Ages (also addressed in the two following chapters) see M. Revelli, Il medioevo</p><p>della Destra: pluralità di immagini strumentali, in “Quaderni medievali,” viii (1983), n. 16,</p><p>pp. 109–136. On the subject of chivalry, see ibid., p. 131: “La cavalleria medievale è, in effetti, il</p><p>vero ‘luogo deputato’ in cui il neofascismo tradizionalista individua e rielabora il proprio tipo</p><p>ideale antropologico culturale” (“Medieval chivalry is, in effect, the true ‘designated space’</p><p>where traditionalist neo-fascism identifies and reelaborates its own ideal, cultural, and an-</p><p>thropological model.”). See also Id., Panorama editoriale e temi culturali della destra militante,</p><p>in Nuova destra e cultura reazionaria negli anni Ottanta, Istituto storico della Resistenza, Cu-</p><p>neo 1983, pp. 49–74; R. Facchini, Sognando la “Christianitas”: l’idea di Medioevo nel tradizio-</p><p>nalismo cattolico cit.</p><p>2 F. Pellegrino, Excalibur: il film!, in “La Mosca Bianca,” 5 (1981), cit. in L. Lanna, F. Rossi, Fascisti</p><p>immaginari cit., p. 163.</p><p>3 A vast bibliography on the subject can be found in A. Barbero, La cavalleria medievale, Jou-</p><p>vence, Roma 2000. For general works, see ibid., Ch. ii, pp. 40–44; for its “reuse” see Ch. x,</p><p>pp. 120–122.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020</p><p>08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>107Templars and Holy Grail: Middle Ages of Tradition</p><p><UN></p><p>Historicized, as many medieval myths have been, and thus made out to be</p><p>the heroic paladin of the people, of the nation and its innate spirituality, not</p><p>to mention its warlike capacity, the medieval knight has nourished the imagi-</p><p>nations of the entire West and, contextually, has represented one of the myth-</p><p>engines of nationalism. This has happened in nearly every Western nation,</p><p>but with particular force in France, the Celtic countries, England, Spain, and</p><p>Germany— that is, in the nations that, directly or in a mediated way, claim the</p><p>principal medieval sources on chivalry: Geoffrey of Monmouth’s History of</p><p>the Kings of Britain, the Welsh tales of the Mabinogion, the Irish legends of the</p><p>Tuatha Dé Danann and Cuchulain, the Song of El Cid, Wolfram von Eschen-</p><p>bach’s Parzival, the countless chansons de geste in langue d’oc and langue d’oïl,</p><p>and many other literary testimonies.4 With all his proclamations of France</p><p>Libre, General De Gaulle—himself seen by his contemporaries as a grand me-</p><p>dieval knight—was still citing Joan of Arc.5</p><p>The identitarian-nationalistic component of nineteenth- and twentieth-</p><p>century myths about knights is indissolubly linked with their religious inter-</p><p>pretations, as the knight figures both fatherland and faith to the highest, heroic</p><p>degree. In many cases—as in the Spanish El Cid the Champion, the French</p><p>Joan of Arc, the Crusades and the warrior saints (Martin, George, Michael,</p><p>James Matamoros, Louis ix…) and, in part, the myth of Templars and the Holy</p><p>Grail—this Christian literature of chivalry has been experienced as a return to</p><p>the Middle Ages, according to a tradition that has come down to us through</p><p>the texts of René Guénon, through its Francoist political usage in Spain, and</p><p>later through the ultra-catholic nationalists in some parties of the extreme</p><p>right like Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Front National and the revival of Traditionalist</p><p>4 Some English editions: Geoffrey of Monmouth, The History of the Kings of Britain, ed. L. Thor-</p><p>pe, Penguin Books, London 1977; S. Davies (ed.), The Mabinogion, Oxford University Press,</p><p>Oxford 2009; Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival with Titurel and The Love-lyrics, ed. Cyril Ed-</p><p>wards, D.S. Brewer, Woodbridge 2002; A. Gregory, Gods and Fighting Men, John Murray, Lon-</p><p>don 1904; R. Selden Rose and L. Bacon (eds.), The Lay of El Cid, University of California Press,</p><p>Berkeley (CA) 1997.</p><p>5 He cited her, however, along with Danton and Clemenceau: J. Touchard, Le Gaullisme, 1940–</p><p>1969, Seuil, Paris 1978, p. 41 (cit. by S. Romano, Storia di Francia dalla Comune a Sarkozy, Lon-</p><p>ganesi, Milano 2009, p. 140) On the interpretations and utilizations of Joan of Arc for the</p><p>purposes of propaganda up to World War ii, the book to read is G. Krumeich, Jeanne d’Arc in</p><p>der Geschichte: Historiographie, Politik, Kultur, Jan Thorbecke Verlag, Sigmaringen 1989. On</p><p>works that have the French heroine as their subject, see Ch. Amalvi, Le goût du Moyen Âge</p><p>cit., pp. 96–114 (pp. 107 ff. for the most recent political uses) and P. Dalla Torre, Giovanna</p><p>d’Arco sullo schermo cit. On General De Gaulle’s “medievalization” as the “constable of</p><p>France” and “majestic as a Gothic cathedral” in the imagination of his contemporaries (and</p><p>even reproached by Roosevelt and Churchill for thinking himself to be Joan of Arc), see Ch.</p><p>Amalvi, Le goût du Moyen Âge cit., pp. 140–142.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 7108</p><p><UN></p><p>Catholicism in recent years (see Chapter 10).6 In still other cases, like that of</p><p>the Ku Klux Klan in the Southern United States, the myth of Arthur and his</p><p>medieval knights, now ghostly knights, has provided a symbolic framework to</p><p>assert the superiority of the white race and the Protestant religion over inferior</p><p>religions and races—black, Jewish, Catholic.7 Even the Teutonic Knights have</p><p>suffered a similar fate: to the Germans, they were the guardians of civilization</p><p>in the primitive and subhuman world of the Slavs. To the Russians, on the oth-</p><p>er hand, they represent the “forebears of modern fascists,” as we know from the</p><p>famous film Aleksander Nevsky by Sergei M. Eisenstein (1938).8 The proud and</p><p>loyal Russian people of the thirteenth century stand opposed to the ferocity of</p><p>the Teutonic Knights, waging their battle for liberty the year before the signing</p><p>of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and three years before the start of Russo-</p><p>German hostilities (June 1941). The Teutonic Knights are demonic beings and</p><p>wear the infamous black crosses; the infantry helmets explicitly recall those of</p><p>the German army. The sinister bishop who blesses the troops, simultaneously</p><p>a symbol of an evil Roman Church and the Reich, has little swastikas on his</p><p>6 A. Frigerio, Francisco Franco e la Pietra Filosofale, in “Storia in Network,” ii (September 2002),</p><p>n. 71: http://win.storiain.net/arret/num195/artic7.asp (cons. May 6, 2019), with bibliography,</p><p>focuses on the identification of Franco with the caudillos, the Catholic Asturian kings. In</p><p>1939, having conquered Madrid, the Generalissimo wanted “the choreography and ceremony</p><p>to be directly inspired by arrival of Alfonso vi and El Cid in Toledo after the defeat of the</p><p>Arabs” (1085). On the relationship between Francoism and the Crusades: H.R. Southwork, El</p><p>mito de la cruzada de Franco [1963], Debolsillo, Barcelona 2008; J. Andrés-Gallego, L. De Llera,</p><p>¿Cruzada o guerra civil? El primer gran debate del regimen de Franco, in M. Tedeschi (ed.),</p><p>Chiesa cattolica e guerra civile in Spagna nel 1936, Guida, Napoli 1989, pp. 103–128. For Le Pen</p><p>(who is well known for his veneration of Joan of Arc and the identification of France with</p><p>Catholicism, starting from the Baptism of Clovis in the early sixth century, along with Vercin-</p><p>getorix, Saint Louis ix, Roland, the soldiers of the First World War, the Indochina Wars, and</p><p>the Algerian War): J.-M. Le Pen, Les Français d’abord, Carrère-Lafon, Paris 1984. On medieval-</p><p>ism in the current French far right, see W. Blanc, Ch. Naudin, Charles Martel cit.</p><p>7 L. Finke, Knights in White Robes: Chivalry and the Klan, in Uses, Abuses and Misuses of the</p><p>Arthuriad, session of the 44th International Congress of Medieval Studies cit. On the relation-</p><p>ship between medievalism and white supremacy in the American far right, see the next</p><p>chapter. See also the publications found in the special series “Race, Racism and the Middle</p><p>Ages” on the website The Public Medievalist (https://www.publicmedievalist.com/race-rac</p><p>ism-middle-ages-toc/, cons. May 6, 2019); A.B.R. Elliott, Internet Medievalism and the White</p><p>Middle Ages, in “History Compass,” 16/3 (March 2018), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/</p><p>toc/14780542/2018/16/3 (cons. May 6, 2019); J. Schuessler, Medieval Scholars Joust With White</p><p>Nationalists. And One Another, in “The New York Times,” May 5, 2019, https://www.nytimes</p><p>.com/2019/05/05/arts/the-battle-for-medieval-studies-white-supremacy.html (cons. May 6,</p><p>2019).</p><p>8 Cit. by G. Gandino, Il cinema cit., p. 738. See V. Ortenberg, In Search of the Holy Grail cit.,</p><p>pp. 114 ff.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://win.storiain.net/arret/num195/artic7.asp</p><p>https://www.publicmedievalist.com/race-racism-middle-ages-toc/</p><p>https://www.publicmedievalist.com/race-racism-middle-ages-toc/</p><p>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/14780542/2018/16/3</p><p>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/14780542/2018/16/3</p><p>https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/arts/the-battle-for-medieval-studies-white-supremacy.html</p><p>https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/05/arts/the-battle-for-medieval-studies-white-supremacy.html</p><p>109Templars and Holy Grail: Middle Ages of Tradition</p><p><UN></p><p>mitre. Yet even the hero who defeats them is a knight, the holy knight Alexan-</p><p>der Nevsky, whom we find again in the 1990s on</p><p>Russia’s thousand- ruble</p><p>banknote.</p><p>The myth of medieval chivalry has also had outcomes and interpretations</p><p>of the esoteric variety, be they Christian, non-Christian, or explicitly anti-</p><p>Christian. Seen from this perspective, they seem characteristic of those move-</p><p>ments that—precisely in the use they make of the Middle Ages—recall Na-</p><p>tional Socialism. The starting point always consists in the conviction that the</p><p>present is a time of crisis, while the medieval past holds treasures of wisdom</p><p>and truth. To rediscover, transmit, and utilize this patrimony of Tradition is a</p><p>duty for those who have been enlightened by such knowledge.9 Many of these</p><p>spiritual legacies date back to a remote antiquity, were preserved during the</p><p>Middle Ages when they were made known to a select group of enlightened—</p><p>Cathars, Templars, witches, alchemists, Love’s Faithful—and then during the</p><p>following age remained secretly alive, through an uninterrupted sequence of</p><p>initiations that have ensured the continuance of a philosophia perennis, of an</p><p>authentic and original wisdom. The Middle Ages, the time when this wisdom</p><p>was reified, is therefore the era one must visit in order to come back pure. In it</p><p>are the archetypes of all things: truth, the sacrality of power, and the identity of</p><p>peoples. It is the time of heroes, knights, true believers, priestly regality, and</p><p>the Empire.</p><p>The esoteric currents that adopt the Middle Ages as a symbol of return to a</p><p>perfect age follow a long and winding road, originating between the end of the</p><p>nineteenth century and the First World War, in a phase of Western cultural</p><p>history when, alongside the positivism that explains everything rationally, we</p><p>find its opposite, a pull towards occultism and magic that translates into the</p><p>birth of secret societies, such as the Golden Dawn, the Thule Society, and the</p><p>New Order of Knights Templar. These last two are also the first organizations to</p><p>9 A synthetic definition of the “world of Tradition” can be found in Sein und Werden (originally</p><p>published in “Die Literatur,” 3, 1935), Gottfried Benn’s review of the 1935 German edition of J.</p><p>Evola, Revolt Against the Modern World cit., republished on pp. 438–444 of the 2007 Italian</p><p>edition, p. 440: “What is the world of Tradition? We are talking about, first of all, a new evoca-</p><p>tive image, not a naturalistic, historical concept, but a vision, a position, a magic. Something</p><p>universal, other-worldly, and superhuman is evoked, in an evocation that is made possible</p><p>and survives where the remains of that universality subsist, as approximations of it, to the</p><p>point of being exceptions and signs of an elitism, a dignity. In the name of Tradition, various</p><p>civilizations free themselves from what is human and historical, the principles of their gen-</p><p>esis lead back to a metaphysical plane where they can be perceived in their purest state and</p><p>where they provide the image of the primal, superior, and transcendent man, the man of</p><p>Tradition.” See also R. Facchini, Sognando la “Christianitas”: l’idea di Medioevo nel tradiziona-</p><p>lismo cattolico cit.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 7110</p><p><UN></p><p>reintroduce the swastika to the West as a symbol proper to it. Primarily during</p><p>the Inter-War period, these initiation societies provided nourishment to politi-</p><p>cal movements that declaimed the urgency of recovering ancestral Celtic and</p><p>Germanic traditions, in order to renew society, the nation, or the whole world,</p><p>ultimately leading to what Giorgio Galli has called “magical Nazism.”10 Knowl-</p><p>edge of the existence of this Nazism concerned with pagan cults, Eastern mys-</p><p>ticism, and powerful sacred objects of the past has reached the broader public</p><p>almost exclusively through the films of Indiana Jones (Raiders of the Lost Ark</p><p>and The Last Crusade), but in reality the esoteric and occultist component of</p><p>the National-Socialist movement contributes to a more complete understand-</p><p>ing of its entire ideology, starting precisely from its adoption of the swastika,</p><p>an “Aryan” solar symbol, and continuing to its eschatological vision of the cre-</p><p>ation of a new Empire: the Third Reich.11</p><p>The desire to refound the venerable, medieval Germanic Empire is one of</p><p>the keys to understanding this leap towards the Middle Ages and its esoteric</p><p>symbols. In Germany, as opposed to other states, the Middle Ages continued to</p><p>be presented as the nation’s primary distinctive and identifying element from</p><p>the nineteenth century until the end of the Second World War. The model of</p><p>renovatio Imperii was at the center of German politics in the time of the</p><p>emperors of the House of Hohenzollern (1871–1918). Just think of the Kyff-</p><p>häuserdenkmal, or Kyffhaüser Monument, erected between 1890 and 1896. On</p><p>a mountaintop, Emperor William I straddles his horse; beneath him is Freder-</p><p>ick Barbarossa on the throne, almost fused with the rock, in the act of reawak-</p><p>ening from a long sleep. The former is the renovatio of the latter.12 After the</p><p>10 G. Galli, Hitler e il Nazismo magico [1989], Rizzoli, Milano 20074; Id., La magia e il potere.</p><p>L’esoterismo nella politica occidentale, Lindau, Torino 2004; N. Goodrick-Clarke, The Occult</p><p>Roots of Nazism: Secret Aryan Cults and Their Influence on Nazi Ideology, nyu Press, New</p><p>York 1993; S. Lionello, R. Menarini, La nascita di una religione pagana. Psicoanalisi del Na-</p><p>zismo e della propaganda, Borla, Roma 2008. On its Italian manifestation: G. De Turris</p><p>(ed.), Esoterismo e fascismo, Edizioni Mediterranee, Roma 2006; F. De Giorgi, Millenaris-</p><p>mo educatore. Mito gioachimita e pedagogia civile in Italia dal Risorgimento al fascismo,</p><p>Viella, Roma 2010.</p><p>11 M. Stolleis, Le Saint Empire Romain de Nation Allemande, le Reich allemand et le Troisième</p><p>Reich: Transformation et destruction d’une idee politique, in “Francia. Forschungen zur</p><p>westeuropaischen Geschichte,” xxxiv (2007), n. 3, pp. 19–37.</p><p>12 On the monument: G. Mai, Das Kyffhäuser-Denkmal 1896–1996. Ein nationales Monument</p><p>im europäischen Kontext, Bohlau Verlag, Wien-Köln-Weimar 1997. On the Romantic prem-</p><p>ises: O. Dann, Die Tradition des Reiches in der frühen deutschen Nationalbewegung, in R.</p><p>Elze and P. Schiera (eds.), Italia e Germania. Immagini, modelli, miti fra due popoli</p><p>dell’Ottocento, il Mulino-Duncker & Humblot, Bologna-Berlin 1988, pp. 65–82; P. Raedts,</p><p>The Once and Future Reich. German Medieval History between Retrospection and Resent-</p><p>ment, in J.M. Bak [et al.] (ed.), Gebrauch und Missbrauch cit., pp. 193–204.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>111Templars and Holy Grail: Middle Ages of Tradition</p><p><UN></p><p>First World War and the constitution of the fragile Weimar Republic, although</p><p>not overt, nostalgia for the Reich was nevertheless present and representative</p><p>of a nationalist sentiment frustrated by defeat, as revealed in the principal his-</p><p>toriographical works of the time (Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio by Percy Ernst</p><p>Schramm; Emperor Frederick ii by Ernst Kantorowicz), and the poetic works of</p><p>Stefan George with his Secret Germany movement.13 These, along with the</p><p>founding of Oskar Ernst Bernard’s Grail Movement (1929) were the preludes.</p><p>The outcome was the Third Reich: a result that was not obvious—indeed, that</p><p>the phenomena were in any way linked was firmly rejected by Kantorowicz</p><p>himself—yet that, in our discussion, must be considered historically conse-</p><p>quential, as above all Nazism made the exaltation of the imperial idea its own.14</p><p>The new Reich, as revealed by its very name, intended to be the historical</p><p>continuation of the medieval German Empire, but from a perspective of radi-</p><p>cal renewal that drew part of its own eschatological tension from a rereading</p><p>of late medieval mysticism.15 The Germans continued to be the chosen race,</p><p>on a level of hegemony and conquest that remained prevalently European in</p><p>dimension</p><p>and thus could be readily understood through the preferred meta-</p><p>phor of medieval reclamation: Great Germany, Eastern expansion, submission</p><p>or annihilation of the inferior races, just as the Teutonic Knights had done be-</p><p>fore. The Swabian emperors were exalted and, in 1943, shortly before the Allied</p><p>13 P.E. Schramm, Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio: Studien und Texte zur Geschichte des römischen</p><p>Erneuerungsgedankens vom Ende des karolingischen Reiches bis zum Investiturstreit, Wis-</p><p>senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1929; E. Kantorowicz, Frederick the Second,</p><p>Constable, London 1931 (original edition: Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite, G. Bondi, Berlin</p><p>1927); St. George, Geheimes Deutschland, in Das Neue Reich [1928], now in Id., Werke, Klett-</p><p>Cotta, Stuttgart 1984, vol. i, pp. 425–428.</p><p>14 On the relationship between academia and Nazism, see O.G. Oexle (ed.), Nationalsozial-</p><p>ismus in den Kulturwissenschaften, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2004. While Nor-</p><p>man Cantor, Inventing the Middle Ages cit., pp. 79–117, considers Kantorowicz very close to</p><p>Nazism, Roberto Delle Donne reaches the opposite conclusion, denouncing the incorrect</p><p>“analogical reasoning” that emphasizes real or presumed common elements among posi-</p><p>tions that are in reality quite diverse, recalling how Stefan George’s “Secret Germany” (Ge-</p><p>heimes Deutschland) was condemned in 1937 during the xix Historikertag: R. Delle Don-</p><p>ne, Kantorowicz e la sua opera su Federico ii nella ricerca moderna, in A. Esch and N. Kamp</p><p>(eds.), Federico ii. Convegno dell’Istituto storico germanico di Roma nell’viii centenario</p><p>della nascita, Max Niemayer, Tübingen 1996, pp. 67–86, especially pp. 68 ff., 72–76. One</p><p>intention of this chapter is to remind the reader that nostalgia for the Empire (as a histori-</p><p>cal or mythical place) and its hoped-for return have represented, in Germany, an element</p><p>in the construction of national identity for a very long period. In this sense one sees an</p><p>interpretive continuum that reaches to the end of National Socialism and that, without</p><p>direct points of contact, also involves Kantorowicz (who referred to the medieval Empire)</p><p>and George (who conflated the Classical with the South).</p><p>15 N. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, Secker & Warburg, London 1957.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 7112</p><p><UN></p><p>landing in Sicily, a plan was drawn up to securely return to Germany the bodies</p><p>of Henry vi, Frederick ii, and their family interred in the Duomo of Palermo.16</p><p>The principal Medieval symbols dear to Nazi mysticism—the Grail and the</p><p>Holy Lance—were sought as material objects, with a view to celebrating and</p><p>reifying pagan Germany and the Ghibelline Empire, that of Frederick Bar-</p><p>barossa and Frederick ii. The Grail in particular, considered a magic object of</p><p>the greatest power, was sought by SS officer Otto Rahn at the site of Rennes-le-</p><p>Château, where it was supposedly hidden by the Cathars. The same Crusade</p><p>launched by the papacy against them in the early thirteenth century would</p><p>have been a “Crusade on the Grail,” and the Cathar castle of Montségur would</p><p>have been the historic location of Montsalvat, the castle of the Grail.17 The</p><p>knight Parsifal, made famous by the Wagner opera, is at the precise center of</p><p>this complicated “quest for the Grail” which, once undertaken anew, would</p><p>have led to the reflowering of the “wasteland.”</p><p>From a conceptually rigorous point of view, the valorization of the Middle</p><p>Ages constitutes one of the principles behind the texts of René Guénon, an</p><p>influential author in the school of thought still called Traditionalist and com-</p><p>mon in many right-wing movements.18 According to Guénon, the current</p><p>world finds itself in the final phase of the Hindu kali-yuga, the dark age corre-</p><p>sponding to the last cycle—the negative—of earthly humanity and precedes</p><p>an epochal renewal. In the course of kali-yuga, which lasts six thousand years</p><p>and can be understood as a progressive obscuring of true knowledge, there</p><p>16 M. Brando, Lo strano caso di Federico ii cit., pp. 77–82.</p><p>17 O. Rahn, Crusade against the Grail: The Struggle between the Cathars, the Templars, and the</p><p>Church of Rome, Inner Traditions, Rochester (VT) 2006 (original edition: Kreuzzug gegen</p><p>den Graal, Urban Verlag, Freiburg 1933). On the question of Rennes-le-Château and the</p><p>strange character of the abbot Saunière, who at the end of the nineteenth century discov-</p><p>ered the Templar treasure, that is to say the Grail (which would have been in turn an effigy</p><p>of Mary Magdalene), as well as on the later counterfeits up to the most recent reflexes of</p><p>this story in the novel The Da Vinci Code by Dan Brown (Doubleday, New York [etc.] 2003),</p><p>see F. Cardini, M. Introvigne and M. Montesano, Il Santo Graal, Giunti, Firenze 20062,</p><p>pp. 191–212; F. Cardini, Templari e templarismo cit., pp. 147 ff., with bibliography; M. Intro-</p><p>vigne, Il “Codice Da Vinci”: ma la storia è un’altra cosa, 2003, www.cesnur.org/2003/mi_da</p><p>vinci.htm (cons. May 6, 2019); U. Eco, Turning Back the Clock cit. (pp. 270–272 of the Italian</p><p>edition); Id., The Book of Legendary Lands, Rizzoli International Publications, New York</p><p>2013 (original edition: Storia delle terre e dei luoghi leggendari, Bompiani, Milano 2013).</p><p>18 See especially R. Guénon, The Crisis of the Modern World, Sophia Perennis, s.l. 2004 (origi-</p><p>nal edition: La crise du monde moderne, Bossard, Paris 1927). On Guénon: A. Iacovella</p><p>(ed.), Esoterismo e religione nel pensiero di René Guénon, proceedings of the Roman con-</p><p>ference, 10 November 2001, Accademia di Romania, postf. by L. Arcella, Arktos, Carma-</p><p>gnola (TO) 2009.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.cesnur.org/2003/mi_davinci.htm</p><p>http://www.cesnur.org/2003/mi_davinci.htm</p><p>113Templars and Holy Grail: Middle Ages of Tradition</p><p><UN></p><p>have been some phases of obvious worsening and decadence and other phases</p><p>of “rectification”—that is, returns to Tradition. The Middle Ages (which for</p><p>Guénon lasts from Charlemagne to the fourteenth century) represents the</p><p>most recent age in which, thanks to Christianity, such rectification occurred.</p><p>Classical Antiquity is inferior with respect to the Middle Ages, because it was</p><p>more rational and less traditional. During the Middle Ages, Christianity (better</p><p>yet, Catholicism) restored a “normal order,” in which the first position was oc-</p><p>cupied by the sacred, not by the material. During the Middle Ages, power does</p><p>not come from below, but from on high; contemplation and action are in bal-</p><p>ance; the forefront is always reserved for contemplation, spirituality, and intu-</p><p>ition as a super-rational mental process; medieval science is not the mere</p><p>profane calculation of data that excludes the transcendent, but (thinking of</p><p>alchemy) a sacred approach that leads to an authentic and complete knowl-</p><p>edge. The later Renaissance and Reformation have caused the free-fall of Tradi-</p><p>tion in the West. The current materialist, individualist, and pragmatic age con-</p><p>stitutes the final and most terrible stage of human history during this phase of</p><p>the cycle.</p><p>Guénon believed that a rectification of the modern world was possible by</p><p>returning to something approximating medieval Catholicism, as Catholicism</p><p>is the only Western religion in which he recognized the residue of a “traditional</p><p>spirit.” Since Eastern cultures, however, are in large part still depositories of an</p><p>authentic, living tradition uncontaminated by the West, this function of recti-</p><p>fication would have had to come through the knowledge of the Eastern spirit,</p><p>above all that of Muslim civilization, which for Guénon was very close to that</p><p>of the medieval West. The task of carrying out this rectification, in the sense of</p><p>a return to an integral Tradition, was entrusted to an intellectual elite, a small</p><p>group of people with the capacity to understand</p><p>and act.</p><p>The vision of Guénon and other authors near to him stands in contrast to</p><p>other theories, both the progressive and the many iterations of anti-modernism,</p><p>because it doesn’t recognize the validity of the conception of time as linear</p><p>development but rather rehabilitates the notion, common in many traditional</p><p>cultures, of cyclical time, of “eternal return.” The use of this temporal structure</p><p>permits one to think of the recovery of traditional values not as reactionary, as</p><p>an actual turning back, but as revolutionary: in looking forward one traverses</p><p>the cycle and thus returns to a better version of the pre-existing condition,</p><p>which no longers reside in the past, but in the future. From this comes the ap-</p><p>parent paradox in the establishment of a “traditional revolution.”</p><p>Guénon’s conception, which has influenced many aspects of anti-modern</p><p>thought, is still quite present in some “Traditionalist” movements, as can be</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 7114</p><p><UN></p><p>easily observed by perusing those movements’ websites, blogs, and discussion</p><p>forums.19 After all, if one reads the preface to his Crisis of the Modern World</p><p>today without knowing the publication date (1927), one might easily consider</p><p>it a text of the last twenty years. Guénon’s proposal still resonates with Catholic</p><p>anti-modernism, which we will say more on later, though it evidently diverges</p><p>in its complete heterodoxy and openness towards Eastern religions and phi-</p><p>losophies.20 Indeed, in 1930 Guénon converted to Sufism, which he judged the</p><p>religious practice most faithful to Tradition.</p><p>A similar proposition gave rise to some of the philosophical positions of</p><p>France’s so-called Nouvelle Droite (New Right), an extremist ideological move-</p><p>ment (whose principal exponent was Alain de Benoist) that developed during</p><p>the Sixties and Seventies. Through the studies conducted by the Groupement</p><p>de Recherches et Études pour la Civilisation Européenne (its acronym GRECE is</p><p>French for “Greece”), the Nouvelle Droite proposed a resurrection of European</p><p>cultural heritage, a rediscovery of itself in its pre-Christian and non-Christian</p><p>origins, that is, in Greco-Latin and Celto-Germanic cultures. In Italy, the world-</p><p>view promoted by Guénon and the influence exercised by the Nouvelle Droite</p><p>seem important above all in light of the rereading of their autonomous reimag-</p><p>inings by Julius Evola, commonly considered by Italian Traditionalist move-</p><p>ments to be without doubt the most authoritative and influential thinker.21 In</p><p>the writings of Evola, who seems the principal architect of the refashioning of</p><p>Guénon’s message into a political and ideological tool, we find all the medieval</p><p>myths dear to the “Traditionalist” Right described and explained symbolically.</p><p>Medieval chivalry itself constitutes one of the fulcrums of this discourse.</p><p>While Julius Evola adopted Tradition as conceived of by Guénon, he dis-</p><p>agreed fundamentally with his master on the Christian interpretation of the</p><p>19 For instance the Centro Studi La Runa (Study Center “The Rune”), www.centrostudilaru -</p><p>na.it (cons. May 6, 2019). A well-known book by R. Guènon, The King of the World, Sophia</p><p>Perennis, s.l. 2004. (original edition: Le roi du monde, Ch. Bosse, Paris 1927), takes its title</p><p>from the song Il re del mondo by Franco Battiato.</p><p>20 On Catholic readings of the medieval Empire, especially in Germany and Austria be-</p><p>tween the two wars, see Kl. Breuning, Die Vision des Reiches. Deutscher Katholizismus</p><p>zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur (1929–1934), Hueber, München 1969. See also P. Tom-</p><p>missen, Carl Schmitt e il renouveau cattolico degli anni Venti, 16 December 2006, http://</p><p>carl-schmitt-studien.blogspot.com/2006/12/piet-tommissen-carl-schmitt-e-il.html (cons.</p><p>May 7, 2019).</p><p>21 J. Evola, Revolt Against the Modern World cit. (book completed between 1931 and 1932); Id.,</p><p>The Mystery of the Grail: Initiation and Magic in the Quest for the Spirit, Inner Traditions,</p><p>Rochester (VT) 1996 (original edition: Il Mistero del Graal e la tradizione ghibellina</p><p>dell’Impero, Laterza, Bari 1937; n. ed. Il Mistero del Graal, with an introductory essay by</p><p>F. Cardini, Edizioni Mediterranee, Roma 19975).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.centrostudilaruna.it</p><p>http://www.centrostudilaruna.it</p><p>http://carl-schmitt-studien.blogspot.com/2006/12/piet-tommissen-carl-schmitt-e-il.html</p><p>http://carl-schmitt-studien.blogspot.com/2006/12/piet-tommissen-carl-schmitt-e-il.html</p><p>115Templars and Holy Grail: Middle Ages of Tradition</p><p><UN></p><p>medieval West. According to Evola, the rebirth of Traditional civilization over</p><p>the course of the Middle Ages was due not to Christianity (a product of Juda-</p><p>ism, which, grafted onto an already decadent civilization, destroyed Rome),</p><p>but to Nordic-Aryan civilization, to the feudal, chivalric, and imperial—or</p><p>rather, Ghibelline, in the sacral sense—Middle Ages.22 An early “syncope of</p><p>Western Tradition” had, in fact, come to pass with the end of Rome, but it was</p><p>followed by the translation of Empire into the hands of the Nordic races, who</p><p>in breathing new life into romanitas allowed Tradition one final great appear-</p><p>ance in the West. The apogee was the Germanic Holy Roman Empire, where</p><p>Tradition had “its last bright flicker” with the Swabian emperors.23 In that insti-</p><p>tution we see for the last time the fullness of royal tradition, inseparably priest-</p><p>ly and warlike. The first significant crisis was caused by the Roman Church,</p><p>which with its struggle for the right of episcopal investiture undermined Tradi-</p><p>tion, committing absolute heresy by destroying the unity of the regal and</p><p>priestly functions. After the Swabian emperors, nothing good is left: imperial-</p><p>ism and the state, which – no longer holy – ends up a simple, plebeian organi-</p><p>zation, take over.</p><p>Even medieval chivalry, which swore loyalty to the Empire and thus recog-</p><p>nized it (and not the papacy nor the Christian religion) as the sole spiritual</p><p>authority of universal status, had reproduced in itself the synthesis of the war-</p><p>rior and priestly functions, as its members were a consecrated military caste,</p><p>belonging to a super-territorial and super-national Order. Anything but Chris-</p><p>tian, the knights had initiation rites (the vigil of arms, penitence, fasting, the</p><p>lustral bath, the dressing, the benediction of arms) and performed deeds (the</p><p>devotion to the beloved lady, the quest for the Grail) that concealed esoteric</p><p>rituals. Even the seemingly Christian practices served exclusively as a mimetic,</p><p>cosmetic, esoteric element, adhering only formally to devotional Christianity,</p><p>which was considered an inferior form of spirituality.</p><p>The most representative case is that of the Templars, “warrior monks, re-</p><p>nouncing the pleasures of the world for a discipline that was not exercised in</p><p>the monasteries but on the fields of battle, with a face that was consecrated</p><p>22 TN: The Guelphs and Ghibellines were two factions that dominated Northern and Central</p><p>Italian politics between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries. In the beginning, the Ghibel-</p><p>lines were supporters of the Holy Roman Emperors in Italy, while the Guelphs supported</p><p>the Popes. As the original allegiances were forgotten, the two groups became mere politi-</p><p>cal factions with their own sub-factions. In Italy, a reference to the Guelphs and Ghibel-</p><p>lines suggests a vicious, yet ultimately unfounded, rivalry, much like the Hatfields and</p><p>McCoys in the United States.</p><p>23 J. Evola, Revolt Against the Modern World cit. (p. 71 of the Italian edition).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 7116</p><p><UN></p><p>more with blood and victory than with prayer.”24 Their destruction by Philip</p><p>the Fair and the pope was therefore a second cause</p><p>for crisis, corresponding</p><p>with the end of the ecumenical Empire.</p><p>Considering that in Wolfram von Eschenbach’s Parzival, which, written in the</p><p>early thirteenth century, was the first recounting of the story of the Grail in the</p><p>German language, the castle that guards the Grail is called Temple and its</p><p>guardians are called Templeise, it was not difficult for Evola to finalize the graft-</p><p>ing of the Templar myth onto that of the knights of the Holy Grail begun by pre-</p><p>vious authors, even going so far as to suggest that they were one and the same.25</p><p>For Evola, the “Grail saga” also possesses a clear connection to the “Royal</p><p>religion”—not Catholic, not Eucharistic, but on the contrary endowed with a</p><p>heroic and initiative character which recalls a spirituality of a totally different</p><p>kind. Seeking and finding the Grail, “the highest ideal of medieval chivalry,” in</p><p>fact signified a “royal recovery,” symbolized by the healing of the Fisher King.</p><p>The knights, therefore, must restore a new order:</p><p>The Middle Ages awaited the hero of the Grail, when the head of the Holy</p><p>Roman Empire would become an image or manifestation of the “King of</p><p>the World,” such that all the forces would receive a new life, the Dry Tree</p><p>would bloom again, an absolute power would surge to vanquish all usurp-</p><p>ers, all opposition, all wounds, truly a new solar order would be seen, the</p><p>invisible emperor would also be the manifest and the “Age Between”—</p><p>the Middle Ages—would also mean the Central Age.26</p><p>This, for Evola, is “the secret soul of chivalry.”</p><p>Similarly to the anti-modern Catholic thought that we will discuss in a later</p><p>chapter, Evola thus considers the last Traditional era to end with the decline</p><p>of the medieval oecumene, that is, with the end of the universality of the Em-</p><p>pire. His Traditionalist Middle Ages correspond to a time that precedes the</p><p>24 Ibid. (p. 132 of the Italian edition).</p><p>25 Starting with A.E. Waite, The Hidden Church of the Holy Grail: Its Legends, and Symbolism</p><p>Considered in their Affinity with Certain Mysteries of Initiation and Other Traces of a Secret</p><p>Tradition in Christian Times, Rebman Ltd, London 1909. See on that subject F. Cardini, M.</p><p>Introvigne and M. Montesano, Il Santo Graal cit., pp. 12 ff.; F. Cardini, Templari e templar-</p><p>ismo cit., p. 122; T. di Carpegna Falconieri, L’eredità templare, in G. Andenna, C.D. Fonseca,</p><p>E. Filippini (eds.), I Templari. Grandezza e caduta della “Militia Christi,” Vita e Pen-</p><p>siero, Milano 2016, pp. 225–233; S. Merli, Templari e templarismo: un mito dalle molteplici</p><p>declinazioni, in T. di Carpegna Falconieri, R. Facchini (eds.), Medievalismi italiani cit.,</p><p>pp. 93–114.</p><p>26 J. Evola, The Mystery of the Grail cit. (p. 159 of the Italian edition).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>117Templars and Holy Grail: Middle Ages of Tradition</p><p><UN></p><p>mid-thirteenth century and has its Golden Age in the twelfth century (the cen-</p><p>tury of Templars, Crusades, great emperors, and the earliest legends of the</p><p>Grail). National states, Renaissance, individualism, “irrealism,” the “regression</p><p>of the castes,” collectivism, and all that follows up to nefarious modernity, rep-</p><p>resented by the Russian and American monsters, constitute the successive</p><p>phases of the “fall of the West.”</p><p>There is a cure for all this, albeit one that is temporary and considered, even</p><p>by Evola himself, ineffective at altering the processes of “degeneracy” that he</p><p>judges already irreversible, except as a defensive retreat. The solution—the</p><p>“straightening out” of the modern world by a return to Tradition—cannot</p><p>come to pass through the endeavors of an ill-defined, Guénonian, intellectual</p><p>elite, but only through the concrete formation of an aristocratic elite of knights,</p><p>an Order infused with ascetic and warlike values and ideals. Thus his words in</p><p>introducing his Italian tradition of Guénon:</p><p>We believe that by far the most suitable and least equivocal concept</p><p>[with respect to that of the intellectual elite] would be that of an Order,</p><p>on the model of those that existed both in the European Middle Ages,</p><p>and in other civilizations. In such an Order a tradition of initiation may</p><p>still exist, albeit alongside a virile formation of character expressed in a</p><p>precise style of life and in a more real connection to the world of action</p><p>and history.27</p><p>In another text, Evola is even more explicit:</p><p>Only a scant minority could understand that just as the ascetic and mo-</p><p>nastic Orders performed a fundamental role amid the material and moral</p><p>chaos caused by the collapse of the Roman Empire, the same kind of Or-</p><p>der, in terms of a new Templarism, would be of decisive importance in a</p><p>world that, like the one in which we live, presents forms even more driv-</p><p>en by dissolution and internal rupture than that period.28</p><p>And here we are, having finally come down this road to find the current knights</p><p>and new Templars: The Templars are Among Us, was the title of a book from the</p><p>Sixties.29 We were made aware of the truth of this title on July 22, 2011, after the</p><p>27 Id., Introduzione, in R. Guénon, La crisi del mondo moderno, Edizioni Mediterranee, Roma</p><p>20032 (Italian edition of La crise du monde moderne cit.), pp. 7–16: 13 ff.</p><p>28 Id., The Mystery of the Grail cit. (p. 224 of the Italian edition).</p><p>29 G. de Sède, Les Templiers sont parmi nous, ou, l’énigme de Gisors, R. Julliard, Paris 1962.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 7118</p><p><UN></p><p>massacre perpetrated by Anders Behring Breivik (who does not, however,</p><p>seem to be familiar with the works of Evola). Among these new Templars,</p><p>some are affiliated with political movements of the extreme right that, having</p><p>constructed a chivalric self-image, consider themselves, to use the concluding</p><p>words of Evola’s Mystery of the Grail, “the only ones who may legitimately call</p><p>themselves alive.”30 And it is across his same mediation that analogies are</p><p>made possible between the medieval chivalric orders and the SS, compared by</p><p>Evola to “an Order, in the ancient sense.”31</p><p>Evola published his most significant texts concerning an imperial and chi-</p><p>valric Middle Ages in the Thirties, at a moment in which Hitler’s Germany</p><p>was already clearly in view. The books that made him most important to Ital-</p><p>ian neo-Fascism, however, date to 1969 (Revolt) and 1972 (The Mystery of the</p><p>Grail). Those are the years—as we have already seen—of a full revival of the</p><p>Middle Ages, one also tinged with colors of protest. In Italy, Evola’s readers</p><p>listened to De André and read Nietzsche, Pound, Kerouac, Céline. Most of all,</p><p>they read Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, translated in its entirety for the first time</p><p>in 1970.32</p><p>Over the course of the Seventies, the youths associated with the move-</p><p>ments called the New Right revised their mode of conceiving of militancy and</p><p>30 J. Evola The Mystery of the Grail cit. (p. 225 of the Italian edition). The statement is decid-</p><p>edly similar to a line from Braveheart: “Every man dies, but not every man really lives.” On</p><p>the current movements that refer to the Templars and the Grail, see M. Revelli, Il medioevo</p><p>della Destra cit.; M. Introvigne, Il Graal degli esoteristi, in M. Macconi and M. Montesano</p><p>(eds.), Il Santo Graal. Un mito senza tempo dal medioevo al cinema. Atti del Convegno Inter-</p><p>nazionale di Studi su “Le reliquie tra storia e mito: il Sacro Catino di Genova e il Santo Graal,”</p><p>De Ferrari & Devega, Genova 2002, pp. 191–210; Id., Mito cavalleresco ed esoterismo contem-</p><p>poraneo, in F. Cardini (ed.), Monaci in Armi. Gli Ordini religioso-militari dai Templari alla</p><p>battaglia di Lepanto: Storia ed Arte, Retablo, Roma 2005, pp. 160–168; L. Lanna and F. Rossi,</p><p>Fascisti immaginari cit., pp. 153–158 e 459–470; R. Facchini, Il neocatarismo. Genesi e svi-</p><p>luppo di un mito ereticale (secoli xix–xxi), in “Società e storia,” 143 (2014), pp.</p><p>of the representation of the Middle</p><p>Ages is quite vast, starting with G. Falco, La polemica sul medioevo, Biblioteca storica sub-</p><p>alpina, Torino 1933 (n. ed. Guida, Napoli 1988). Today, many textbooks on medieval history</p><p>dedicate a chapter, initial or final, to the “idea of the Middle Ages,” as it is now a common</p><p>opinion that even the cultural representation of a phenomenon is a historical datum, and</p><p>thus open to historical analysis.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>7Introduction</p><p>205137</p><p>and conservative, or rather “left” and “right.” Seen from the left, the Medieval is</p><p>a fundamentally negative period; seen from the right, it is a fundamentally</p><p>positive period.11 This strict partition is crude and imprecise, since the points</p><p>of contact, contamination, and inversion are frequent and significant. Without</p><p>a shadow of a doubt, there exists a Medieval Era seen as positive by progressive</p><p>movements and, vice versa, as negative by conservative movements. These po-</p><p>sitions are often reversed when comparing Anglo-Saxon to Continental cul-</p><p>tures: we will have plenty of time to cover this later. Nevertheless, despite the</p><p>numerous and well-deserved distinguos, the theoretical partition is useful for</p><p>sketching out the analysis in general terms and understanding the reception</p><p>the Medieval Era has had in contemporary politics, from as early as the end of</p><p>the Eighteenth century.</p><p>The paths that lead through the Middle Ages to day or night do not run par-</p><p>allel, but constantly intersect, because the very word “medieval” is ephemeral:</p><p>indeed, we might say it functions precisely because of its ambiguity. Thus, it is</p><p>easy to chance upon symbols or tropes that are considered medieval, but that</p><p>permit us say and think things that are diametrically opposed. Knights, for</p><p>instance, are pure and spotless, or else they are bloodthirsty marauders; they</p><p>are crusaders filled with a steadfast Christian faith, or else they are colonizers</p><p>with no scruples; or, along with bards and druids, they are the last testaments</p><p>to an ancient, pre-Christian, pagan knowledge. The pathways cross each other</p><p>even in people’s consciousnesses, since there is no guarantee that one who ap-</p><p>proaches medievalism today does so with political intentions. Those who read</p><p>fantasy novels or listen to goth music, who visit Merlin’s castle at an amuse-</p><p>ment park with the same joy and curiosity as when they visit the European</p><p>castles of Pierrefonds, Neuschwanstein, and Gradara, those who play role-</p><p>playing games set in medieval scenarios, who remain fascinated by the myste-</p><p>rious Templars, their secrets, and their treasures, who lead a virtual Second Life,</p><p>along with so many other pseudo-friends connected on the Internet, nam-</p><p>ing themselves after damsels, dragons, and knights, building castles, artisanal</p><p>boutiques, or ships that set sail into the unknown—all of them are, generally,</p><p>passionate for that ancient time, which they recreate in their minds with the</p><p>aid of stereotyped descriptions. Their principal sentiment—entirely pre-</p><p>political—is that of nostalgia: nostalgia for green lands, for authentic passions,</p><p>and, in the absolute virtuality of their lives, for a true life, for a lost Holy Grail.</p><p>The Medieval Era, from Romanticism on, is certainly a vessel for nostalgia,</p><p>without necessarily having a political connotation. Nostalgia, on the other</p><p>hand, becomes political when combined with a plan to return to the past:</p><p>11 Cf. for instance, in France, Ch. Amalvi, Le goût du Moyen Âge cit., pp. 199–201.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Introduction8</p><p>205137</p><p>when the laudatio temporis acti (“praise of times past”) that men experience</p><p>just after growing out of their youth translates into a reactionary impulse. Ulti-</p><p>mately, the figures that populate our idea of the Medieval, witches and knights</p><p>for instance, may or may not be imbued with a political significance: on their</p><p>own, they remain inert.</p><p>These are not the only roads that lead to the idea of the Middle Ages: other</p><p>interpretive paths intersect with them, forming an even more complex map.</p><p>In fact, it is even possible to imagine the Middle Ages through another pair of</p><p>opposites: as a “before” and as an “elsewhere.” The Medieval Era is often inter-</p><p>preted as one that is located at the origin of modernity. Situated in a precise</p><p>period of Western history, a prior time, it contains within itself, in potentia, the</p><p>elements that will later find their mature expression in the institutions and</p><p>societies of the following eras. For example, the Middle Ages as the age of</p><p>the foundation and dawn of the West can be considered the mold in which the</p><p>Franks become French, and the Teutons Germans, in which the nation and the</p><p>state start to identify with each other, in which social classes and the very idea</p><p>of Europe are formed. To think of the Medieval Era in this way means attribut-</p><p>ing to it a precise meaning within the course of history, understood as an</p><p>ongoing process of construction and becoming. In this case, we cannot formu-</p><p>late any too-rigid distinction between the thought of the right— conservative</p><p>or reactionary—and the left—progressive or revolutionary: seen from one</p><p>side or the other, the Medieval Era is considered part of a more or less teleo-</p><p>logical course, but nevertheless felt to be necessary. A conservative will main-</p><p>tain that the great Middle Ages must be exalted and imitated, and will per-</p><p>ceive the echoes of ancient traditions in the institutions of his/her time—the</p><p>state, the country, the Church, the monarchy; while a progressive thinker will</p><p>maintain that the grim Middle Ages must be replaced, but not necessarily for-</p><p>gotten, as it remains an undeniable part of the progress of social liberation:</p><p>without the peasant and artisan revolts, without the heretical movements,</p><p>without Robin Hood, Cecco Angiolieri, and François Villon, we would never</p><p>have reached the revolutions that gave rise to democracy. Right and left, in</p><p>short, are not averse to what Bloch called “the idol of origins,”12 and both can</p><p>be Darwinian in their application of historical evolutionism, adapted to the</p><p>concept of the progressive civilization of societies, states, and individuals: in</p><p>a word, of humanity.</p><p>Alongside the idea of the Middle Ages as a historical time “of before,” the</p><p>precondition and origin of the current world, is another vision—ahistorical,</p><p>12 M. Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, trans. P. Putnam, Manchester University Press, Manches-</p><p>ter 1992 (original edition: Apologie pour l’histoire ou métier d’historien, in “Cahiers des</p><p>Annales,” 1949, n. 3).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>9Introduction</p><p>205137</p><p>mythical, and symbolic—that conceives of the Medieval as an elsewhere, a</p><p>place that has no relation to the contemporary.13 Its chronological span, its lo-</p><p>cation between antiquity and modernity, holds no importance: it is merely the</p><p>receptacle that gives shape to the imaginary. It is the hinterland that, not nec-</p><p>essarily linked to political interests, gave birth to the Gothic romance, colored</p><p>the traditional fairy tale, and generated fantasy literature and the recent obses-</p><p>sion with the Grail. Yet it is also the Medieval Era that, permeated with political</p><p>intentions, generates the myth of the primordial hero and the solitary knight,</p><p>of the existential and antagonistic path closed to the uninitiated—that is, the</p><p>Middle Ages of so-called “Tradition.” And it is the perfect time when men lived</p><p>in immediate contact with nature not yet contaminated by ecological disas-</p><p>ters, in a direct relationship with the sacred, whether it be understood in Chris-</p><p>tian, ecological, or neo-pagan terms. This is the time/not-time of numerous</p><p>modernizing and decontextualizing interpretations,</p><p>33–67. On</p><p>the long history of Templarism, which starts in the sixteenth century and has seen a num-</p><p>ber of variants, as well as Templaristic works so common today and links with the “sedi-</p><p>tious plots,” see F. Cardini, Templari e templarismo cit., pp. 121–151; A. Nicolotti, I Templari</p><p>e la Sindone. Storia di un falso, Salerno Editrice, Roma 2011; T. di Carpegna Falconieri,</p><p>L’eredità templare cit.; S. Merli, Templari e templarismo cit.</p><p>31 J. Evola, Le SS, guardia e “ordine” della rivoluzione crociuncinata, in “La vita italiana,” De-</p><p>cember 1938, n. ed. Raido, Roma s.a.; see M. Revelli, Il medioevo della Destra cit., p. 133; G.</p><p>De Turris, Elogio e difesa di Julius Evola: il barone e i terroristi, pref. by G. Galli, Edizioni</p><p>Mediterranee, Roma 1997, pp. 63 ff.</p><p>32 J.R.R. Tolkien, Il signore degli anelli, Rusconi, Milano 1970. On Tolkien’s reception by Ital-</p><p>ian circles of the far right see G. De Turris, L’immaginario medievale cit.; L. Lanna and F.</p><p>Rossi, Fascisti immaginari cit., pp. 219–224; L. Del Corso and P. Pecere, L’anello che non</p><p>tiene cit.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>119Templars and Holy Grail: Middle Ages of Tradition</p><p><UN></p><p>presenting it in symbolic forms. Fascism’s beloved symbols of the lictors’ fasces</p><p>and the Roman salute, its exaltation of the Ventennio and the Italian Social</p><p>Republic, were joined by Evolian models and the exaltation of Nordic, Celtic,</p><p>and chivalric traditions, for which the role of “creator of myth” was attributed</p><p>primarily to Tolkien. In the Tolkienian universe, there are indeed many ele-</p><p>ments that may be appropriated as answers to the New Right’s prayers. Among</p><p>them is the perennial struggle between good and evil, which Tolkien narrates</p><p>as the victorious battle between the free peoples of the West and the Dark</p><p>Lord, with his monstrous Orcs that come from the East: it is the war of Gondor</p><p>and Rohan against Mordor that would become, in the unfolding allegory, the</p><p>struggle between traditional Europe and the Soviet Union. Then there are the</p><p>existential dimension of the journey and the trial, and the role of the Fellow-</p><p>ship of the Ring, which represents the small groups of free, heroic, faithful, and</p><p>courageous beings capable of vanquishing evil by flushing it out of even its</p><p>bleakest depths. There is, moreover, the concept of Middle Earth’s decadence,</p><p>told through a chronology subdivided into four Ages of the world, through the</p><p>memory of places of perfect and remote antiquity (Numenor and the Undying</p><p>Lands), through participation in the history of superior races (Elves, Dwarves,</p><p>the Men of ancient kingdoms) and, vice versa, through the degeneration of the</p><p>Elves into Orcs, the description of the horrors that Sauron wreaks on the lands</p><p>and minds that are subjected to him and what Saruman does to the little, green</p><p>Shire that winds up in his clutches. There is, still yet, the myth of defending to</p><p>the death, the glory of throwing yourself into desperate conditions in the sieg-</p><p>es of Gondolin, Helm’s Deep, and Minas Tirith. Finally, there is the most an-</p><p>cient myth of the return of the hidden king, rendered through symbolic arche-</p><p>types: the deep roots that do not freeze, the White Tree of Gondor that shall</p><p>bloom again, the broken sword that is reforged, and above all else, the charac-</p><p>ter of Aragorn, the warrior king who, like a leader (duce), is predestined to</p><p>reign.33</p><p>It is not difficult to glimpse, in these elements of Tolkien’s myth, a symmetry</p><p>with what we find in Evola (who, for instance, also uses the metaphor of the</p><p>Dry Tree). Which is not to say that Tolkien sought to attribute this kind of po-</p><p>litical meaning to his work: in fact he explicitly eschewed allegory and more-</p><p>over blamed Nazism for having perverted the Nordic spirit.34 It does, however,</p><p>33 Y.-M. Bercé, Le roi caché. Mythes politiques populaires dans l’Europe moderne, Fayard, Paris</p><p>1990. TN: Duce was the title assumed by Benito Mussolini as the leader of Italy’s Fascist</p><p>Party.</p><p>34 J.R.R. Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings cit., pref. to the second edition (1966), unpublished in</p><p>Italy until 2003 (Bompiani, Milano), pp. 10–11: “As for any inner meaning or ‘message,’ it</p><p>has in the intention of the author none. It is neither allegorical nor topical […]. Other</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 7120</p><p><UN></p><p>Dean—and clearly so—that Tolkien, a Germanic philologist cum author of</p><p>fantasy literature, had produced precisely the same mythic and literary con-</p><p>tent that already underpinned Evolian considerations of Tradition. Unlike in</p><p>other countries, it was precisely the filter of Evola’s writings that allowed Tolk-</p><p>ien’s work to be embraced by the Italian New Right. And this assimilation itself</p><p>was the reason why, on the left, Tolkien was considered (but again, only in Ita-</p><p>ly) a reactionary and fascist author. As De Turris writes regarding the reception</p><p>of The Lord of the Rings and its “other world completely realized and realistic”:</p><p>From this, from its characters, its implicit and explicit themes, every read-</p><p>er is able to draw out the aspect (or aspects) most dear to him: the rural,</p><p>anti-industrial, and ecological mirage; the sense of heroism and duty ful-</p><p>filled, of the mission and camaraderie; spirituality, mysticism, and a</p><p>profound sacrality; a new liberty in relation to Nature; the dimension of</p><p>wonder; the esoteric symbolism.35</p><p>The adoption of Tolkienian mythology on the part of Italian neofascism had a</p><p>significant impact above all in the second half of the Seventies: there were,</p><p>from 1977 to 1980, three different “Hobbit Camps,” national gatherings in which</p><p>new musical groups met and previously unthinkable youth organizations were</p><p>created. In their wake followed, albeit on a much smaller scale, the Gatherings</p><p>of Elrond and the Gatherings of the Shire. Tolkien’s epic similarly gave names</p><p>to many magazines and specialized publishing houses in an obviously ideo-</p><p>logical mold: like the magazine Eowyn, founded in 1976 and named after the</p><p>warrior princess of Rohan who kills the King of the Nazgûl.</p><p>The political recruitment of Tolkien by the New Right was highly significant,</p><p>not only because it furnished a new repertoire of images that rendered many</p><p>historical references of the Italian Social Movement obsolete, but above all be-</p><p>cause the status of Tolkien’s literature as a mass phenomenon created for the</p><p>arrangements could be devised according to the tastes or views of those who like allegory</p><p>or topical reference. But I cordially dislike allegory in all its manifestations, and always</p><p>have done so since I grew old and wary enough to detect its presence. I much prefer his-</p><p>tory, true or feigned, with its varied applicability to the thought and experience of read-</p><p>ers.” Cf. P. Gulisano, Tolkien. Il mito e la grazia cit., pp. 175–177; L. Del Corso and P. Pecere,</p><p>L’anello che non tiene cit., pp. 90, 126–128; A. Cortellessa, Quando mettono mano alla pistola</p><p>sfodero subito la cultura, Postfazione, ibid., pp. 203–217: 211–213; C. Medail, Tolkien: Non</p><p>cercate la politica tra gli elfi, in “Corriere della Sera,” Nov. 1, 2003, p. 31. See also J. R. R. Tolk-</p><p>ien, Wikipedia entry, paragraph Politics and Race, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._R._R._</p><p>Tolkien (cons. May 6, 2019), as well as C.A. Leibiger, German Race Laws, entry for M.D.C.</p><p>Drout (ed.), J. R. R. Tolkien Encyclopedia cit., p. 237.</p><p>35 G. De Turris, L’immaginario medievale cit., p. 108.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._R._R._Tolkien</p><p>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._R._R._Tolkien</p><p>121Templars and Holy Grail: Middle Ages of Tradition</p><p><UN></p><p>first time a correspondence between the cultural references of a small political</p><p>group and those of a much wider public, otherwise</p><p>to which the course of</p><p>history is only an accessory.</p><p>The fact remains that the Middle Ages cause some discomfort.14 Its anti-</p><p>nomic value endures, unresolved, in every one of us and in our common West-</p><p>ern sentiment. Whoever engages with the word Medieval attributes to it, time</p><p>after time, one of the two value judgments evinced above. The Medieval Era of</p><p>fairs and turreted castles collides in our mind with that of witches and heretics</p><p>burned at the stake. And, pardon the triviality, the Medieval Era of “courtly</p><p>love” is exactly the opposite of the one contained in the expression, “I’ma get</p><p>medieval on yo’ ass,” a line from Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction (1994) that</p><p>has become synonymous with the most brutal torture.15</p><p>The Medieval Era becomes classical by being anti-classical; modern</p><p>or anti-modern, reactionary, revolutionary, or even anarchist; positive or nega-</p><p>tive; political or apolitical; a requisite before or the absolute elsewhere:</p><p>such, therefore, is the nature of this extraordinary, Janus-faced word. Political</p><p>13 On the Middle Ages as a “fundamentally ahistorical myth” see R. Bordone, Lo specchio di</p><p>Shalott. L’invenzione del medioevo nella cultura dell’Ottocento, Liguori, Napoli 1993, pp. 11–</p><p>16: 12. See also G. Sergi, Antidoti all’abuso della storia. Medioevo, medievisti, smentite, Liguo-</p><p>ri, Napoli 2010, p. 361.</p><p>14 P. Delogu, Introduzione alla storia medievale, il Mulino, Bologna 20032, p. 14: “The Middle</p><p>Ages as a historical period, or, if you will, as a mythic image, constitutes a problem for the</p><p>modern consciousness; that is, it causes discomfort, presenting itself alternately as a</p><p>period to be exorcised or an ideal to be sought.”</p><p>15 See C. Dinshaw, Getting Medieval: Sexualities and Communities, Pre and Post-modern,</p><p>Duke University Press, Durham (NC) 1999, pp. 183–206. I also found, in a blog, the sugges-</p><p>tion that the adjective “medieval” could easily acquire a negative connotation thanks to</p><p>its rhyme with the word “evil”: Ch. Hodgson, Podictionary, the Podcast for Word Lovers,</p><p>http://podictionary.com/?p=533 (cons. Feb. 2, 2010) (the page was found to be inactive</p><p>when cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://podictionary.com/?p=533</p><p>Introduction10</p><p>205137</p><p>medievalism draws liberally from all of these representations. This has been</p><p>happening for over two centuries, since the end of the 1700s, but what is pre-</p><p>sented in this book is much more limited in time. I intend to discuss only the</p><p>way in which, in recent decades, people have made recourse to the “common</p><p>sense of the Medieval,” conferring on it a hundred different political connota-</p><p>tions. The choice of this chronological segment is dictated by two consider-</p><p>ations. The first is the fact that the Medieval Era, after a few decades of relative</p><p>dormancy, returned to the spotlight at the end of the 1960s. Since then, its po-</p><p>litical uses have not diminished, but on the contrary have been amplified by a</p><p>sudden mutation of the global political scene and by epochal events carved</p><p>symbolically into our collective memory by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989</p><p>and the collapse of the Twin Towers in New York in 2001. For fifty years now, the</p><p>Middle Ages can be found everywhere. A negative meaning is attributed to it,</p><p>in so far as it is an intuitive metaphor for a civilization about to collapse, or</p><p>positive, seeking answers in the exempla of the past, be they druids, knights or</p><p>valiant Lombards.</p><p>The second reason for my choice of this chronological segment is that since</p><p>the early 1970s historians—and medievalists in particular—have become</p><p>aware of the cultural appeal lurking in contemporary medievalism (and not</p><p>merely in the well-known phenomenon of nineteenth-century medievalism)</p><p>and have begun to observe this phenomenon attentively. The accelerate con-</p><p>struction of medievalism in our years therefore finds a precise correspondence</p><p>in historiographical analysis. In the case of this book, such analysis is intended</p><p>to be neither apologetic nor destructive, but rather to involve, as much as pos-</p><p>sible, constructive criticism.</p><p>The chapters that follow are concerned with the principal macro-</p><p>interpretations of the idea of the Middle Ages. The first two follow the traces of</p><p>the Middle Ages represented as a time of darkness and oppression, while the</p><p>other ten address the theme of the Middle Ages conceived as the morning light</p><p>at the dawn of contemporary political identities. All these chapters will discuss</p><p>how and why we have constructed these cultural representations for ourselves;</p><p>since, let us be clear, we are almost always operating within “inventions of tra-</p><p>dition” and “imagined communities,” anthropological concepts first embraced</p><p>by historians in the early 1980s.16 Condensed to the extreme, the former con-</p><p>cept expresses the awareness that some Western traditions we believe to be</p><p>centuries or millennia old are in reality much more recent, generally dating</p><p>16 I refer to E.J. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds.) The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge Uni-</p><p>versity Press, Cambridge 1983; B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Ori-</p><p>gins and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, London 1983, n. ed. 1991.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>11Introduction</p><p>205137</p><p>back only to the nineteenth century. The latter can instead be summarized in</p><p>the observation that the identity of organized communities is, for the most</p><p>part, a cultural artifact, the fruit of the activity of leading intellectuals and of</p><p>the popularization of the media, which together lead to mass movements that</p><p>follow a modular form always identifiable despite its adaptation to different</p><p>social situations. Communities become aware of themselves only when they</p><p>have been described.</p><p>Contemporary historiography is fully aware of the foundational role of in-</p><p>terpretation and of how the construction of memory is an artificial instrument</p><p>that can produce falsehoods. Both the individual who remembers, and the so-</p><p>ciety that passes down, reconstructs, or even invents the memory of itself,</p><p>choose, select, interpret, explain, forget, rediscover, magnify, reorganize, switch</p><p>the order of anteriority and posterity, determine and mingle cause and effect,</p><p>construct or destroy, confer a meaning and a direction to history, even when</p><p>history, as the song goes, “un senso non ce l’ha.”17 Maybe nature does not make</p><p>leaps (non facit saltus), but memory certainly does. This is why studies of the</p><p>trickery camouflaging the use and abuse of the great word “history”, are numer-</p><p>ous today.18 Precisely for these reasons, medieval scholars cannot help but</p><p>pose questions about the “common sense of the Middle Ages” and about its</p><p>uses in politics. For such perceptions, which fully contribute to forming our</p><p>complete idea of that period, even when they are fictions, falsehoods, or inven-</p><p>tions of traditions, are partly the fault of historians themselves. And most im-</p><p>portantly, they have real, concrete consequences.</p><p>This line of reasoning directly affects the task of those who are accustomed</p><p>to discussing the sources produced during the medieval millennium. Medie-</p><p>valists themselves are holding a winning hand, since they are in a position</p><p>to establish comparisons between the Medieval Era that emerges from the</p><p>17 V. Rossi, Un senso, 2004: “Voglio trovare un senso a questa storia / anche se questa storia</p><p>un senso non ce l’ha” (“I want to make sense of this history / even if this history makes no</p><p>sense”).</p><p>18 Some examples, not necessarily centered around the Middle Ages: D. Lowenthal, Pos-</p><p>sessed by the Past. The Heritage Crusade and the Spoils of History, The Free Press, New York</p><p>1996; U. Fabietti and V. Matera, Memoria e identità. Simboli e strategie del ricordo, Meltemi,</p><p>Roma 1999; M. Sanfilippo, Storia e immaginario storico</p><p>nella rete e nei media più tradizio-</p><p>nali, 2001, http://dspace.unitus.it/handle/2067/25 (cons. Apr. 28, 2019); J. Ryan, Cultures of</p><p>Forgery: Making Nations, Making Selves, Routledge, New York 2003; E. Traverso, Il passato:</p><p>istruzioni per l’uso. Storia, memoria, politica, Ombre Corte, Verona 2006; S. Pivato, Vuoti di</p><p>memoria. Usi e abusi della storia nella vita pubblica italiana, Laterza, Roma-Bari 2007;</p><p>M. Caffiero and M. Procaccia (eds.), Vero e falso. L’uso politico della storia, Donzelli, Roma</p><p>2008; L. Canfora, La storia falsa, Rizzoli, Milano 2010; G. Sergi, Antidoti all’abuso della sto-</p><p>ria cit.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://dspace.unitus.it/handle/2067/25</p><p>Introduction12</p><p>205137</p><p>sources they analyze, and the common sense of the Middle Ages that they find</p><p>expressed in contemporary society. Having developed efficacious terms of</p><p>comparison, they find themselves equipped to recognize the differences, con-</p><p>tradictions, and distortions, and even to grant them a significance in historical</p><p>terms.19</p><p>Ultimately, this book is about what Erasmus of Rotterdam called opiniones,</p><p>which are not the reality of things. As Folly says, eulogizing itself, it is opin-</p><p>ions, not reality, that grant man happiness.20 But also, not uncommonly,</p><p>unhappiness.</p><p>19 Among the most significant texts on instrumentalized interpretations of the Middle Ages</p><p>determined by political intents, and with which we will weave a continuous dialog in</p><p>these pages, are: G. Sergi, L’idea di medioevo cit.; Ch. Amalvi, Le goût du Moyen Âge cit.;</p><p>P.J. Geary, The Myth of Nations: The Medieval Origins of Europe, Princeton University Press,</p><p>Princeton 2002; F. Cardini, Templari e templarismo. Storia, mito, menzogne, Il Cerchio ini-</p><p>ziative editoriali, Rimini 2005; V. Ortenberg, In Search of the Holy Grail. The Quest for the</p><p>Middle Ages, Hambledon Continuum, New York 2007; J.M. Bak [et al.] (eds.), Gebrauch</p><p>und Missbrauch cit., which collects the proceedings of a meeting held in Budapest, June</p><p>30-July 11, 2003, and March 30-April 2, 2005; G. Scarre, R. Conningham (eds.), Appropriat-</p><p>ing the Past. Philosophical Perspectives on the Practice of Archeology, Cambridge University</p><p>Press, Cambridge 2013. We are still waiting for the acts of some recent conferences; among</p><p>them: Medievalism. 22nd International Conference at Western Ontario, London (ON, Cana-</p><p>da), 4–6 October 2007, partially published in J.M. Toswell (ed.), The Year’s Work in Medie-</p><p>valism, 2008, Wipf & Stock Publishers, Eugene (OR) 2009; Medievalism, Colonialism, Na-</p><p>tionalism: A Symposium, University of California Riverside, November 7–8, 2008; The</p><p>Middle Ages in the Modern World, University of St Andrew, 24–28 June 2013, partially pub-</p><p>lished in B. Bildhauer, Chris Jones (eds.), The Middle Ages in the Modern World cit.; The</p><p>Middle Ages in the Modern World, University of Lincoln, 29 June-2 July 2015; University of</p><p>Manchester, 28 June-1 July 2017; John Cabot University-École française de Rome, Rome,</p><p>21–24 November 2018. In Italy, there are two gatherings where political medievalism is the</p><p>object of analysis: the annual The Middle Ages Among Us conference (Il Medioevo fra noi),</p><p>organized in Urbino and Gradara by the University of Urbino, and the Festival of the Mid-</p><p>dle Ages (Festival del Medioevo) in Gubbio. I have had the opportunity to test some of the</p><p>considerations contained in this book (and above all to receive rich suggestions) during</p><p>discussions at lectures and seminars delivered between 2008 and 2011 in Italy, the United</p><p>States, and Hungary, and, since the 2011 release of the original Italian edition of this book,</p><p>in Catalunia, Portugal, Scotland, England, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Mexico, and</p><p>South Africa.</p><p>20 “Nimium enim desipiunt, qui in rebus ipsis felicitatem hominis sitam existimant. Ex</p><p>opinionibus ea pendet” (“Those who maintain that human happiness derives from the</p><p>thing itself are fools. It depends on opinion”): Erasmus of Rotterdam, Encomium Moriae</p><p>sive declamatio in laudem Stultitiae [1509], apud Andr. Cloucquium, Lugduni Batavorum</p><p>1624, p. 66 (Engl. ed.: The Praise of Folly, ed. Clarence H. Miller, Yale University Press, New</p><p>Haven-London 1979).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���� | doi:10.1163/9789004414983_003</p><p><UN></p><p>Chapter 1</p><p>The Neo-Medieval West</p><p>On the twenty-fifth of September, twelve hundred and sixty-four, at break</p><p>of day, the Duke of Auge appeared at the summit of the keep of his castle,</p><p>there to consider, be it ever so little, the historical situation. It was some-</p><p>what confused. A few odd remnants of the past were still lying around</p><p>here and there, rather messily. On the banks of a nearby gully two</p><p>Huns were camping; quite near them a Gaul, a Haeduan, perhaps, was</p><p>boldly immersing his feet in the fresh, running water. On the horizon</p><p>were outlined the flabby silhouettes of tired Romans, nether Norse-</p><p>men, old Francs, and Christmas Carolingians. A few Normans were drink-</p><p>ing calvados.</p><p>R. QUENEAU, Between Blue and Blue (1965)</p><p>“What is this, the Middle Ages?” is a comment that may pass our lips any time</p><p>we’re faced with a case of injustice, misappropriation, inefficiency, backward-</p><p>ness, obtuseness, ignorance, obscurantism, prevarication, or violence. The met-</p><p>aphor of the age of steel serves as an enduring metric for the infamy of the</p><p>modern world. Mass exterminations, pogroms against the Jews, and the “clash</p><p>of civilizations” between Islam and the West are colored by a sinister déjà vu of</p><p>the Dark Ages of our progenitors.</p><p>Even when dealing with our little daily annoyances, the Medieval Era rushes</p><p>to our aid in constructing similes. For example, in Italy, if you want to critique</p><p>a university (an institution, incidentally, that has its roots in the twelfth cen-</p><p>tury), you call the professors “barons,” while the places where they exercise</p><p>their dominion—faculties, departments, institutes—become veritable fiefs in</p><p>your eyes.1 And this is because “feudal system” is synonymous with “unjust sys-</p><p>tem.” If, however, a diligent traffic cop is hiding with his radar gun behind a</p><p>bush along a deserted straightaway, to write you up a hefty fine for speeding,</p><p>even then our imagination makes us weave a comparison with the unjust lev-</p><p>ies, the highway tolls, the harassment and vexations of those legalized bandits</p><p>that were medieval lords. All this, naturally, has a touristic feel: in Europe, any</p><p>self-respecting castle must instill terror, keep secrets, have a torture chamber</p><p>1 One example: Baroni e “feudi”, la denuncia degli studenti An, “il Giornale,” 30 Oct. 2007, http://</p><p>www.ilgiornale.it/news/baroni-e-feudi-denuncia-degli-studenti.html (cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/baroni-e-feudi-denuncia-degli-studenti.html</p><p>http://www.ilgiornale.it/news/baroni-e-feudi-denuncia-degli-studenti.html</p><p>Chapter 114</p><p><UN></p><p>and maybe a few trap doors, gears, shackles, cleavers, and chastity belts. Only</p><p>once you’ve left and gotten back to the cars and trucks can you begin to breathe</p><p>again.</p><p>The cliché that the Medieval Era is a shadowy land has illustrious origins</p><p>and remains the most diffuse today by a wide margin. So much so that even its</p><p>Romantic revision by which the Middle Ages were instead a time of great civi-</p><p>lization, is so worn out that it has become the necessary complement to the</p><p>former in casual conversation. If we want to simplify as much as possible the</p><p>way that we have represented the Middle Ages as darkness for centuries, we</p><p>must make exclusive reference to two historical moments; its origins and its</p><p>ending. As everyone knows, the Medieval Period begins with the barbarian in-</p><p>vasions of the fifth century and ends with the</p><p>great crisis of the fourteenth</p><p>century. At its debut we find the death of the Roman Empire, the victorious</p><p>onslaught of cultures held to be inferior, the population collapse, the decline of</p><p>cities, people fleeing to the country, the economy contracting to a mere subsis-</p><p>tence level; at the end, we find the Hundred Years’ War and the infinite, devas-</p><p>tating skirmishes led by bands of mercenaries, economic depression, recurring</p><p>famines, the Inquisition, witch hunts, and, above all, the plague. Sandwiched</p><p>between the barbarians and the plague, the Medieval Era is indeed terrifying:</p><p>it is a time of brutality, danses macabres, flagellants, tortures, and fear of the</p><p>imminent end of the world.</p><p>This idea of the Middle Ages (which comes from the Renaissance, and espe-</p><p>cially the Enlightenment) was formed by a process that has only taken the be-</p><p>ginning and ending of the medieval millennium into account, refusing to con-</p><p>sider anything in between even worth mentioning. It is a very effective</p><p>ideological construction and mental representation. It seems, however, to be</p><p>as if, in describing the life of a man, we limited ourselves to mentioning his</p><p>mother’s death in childbirth and then, immediately afterward, his decrepit old</p><p>age. As Francesco Milizia (1725–1798) did, with an extraordinary ellipsis of sev-</p><p>en centuries, when he described Gothic art as “a crudeness introduced into the</p><p>arts after the ruin of the Roman Empire, which was destroyed by the Goths,</p><p>and thus it is called Gothic.”2</p><p>The interpretation of the Medieval Era as an age of darkness is still useful</p><p>today—perhaps especially today—in expressing a great variety of lamenta-</p><p>tions, all converging on the basic idea that the age we live in is somehow unfor-</p><p>tunately comparable to that one. We are dealing with shared interpretations</p><p>that have a considerable impact on public action and, consequently, determine</p><p>2 F. Milizia, Dizionario delle belle arti del disegno, [Remondini], Bassano 1797, vol. i, p. 270, ad</p><p>vocem “Gotico.”</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>15The Neo-Medieval West</p><p><UN></p><p>the idea of the Middle Ages in a fairly definite way. One case, that of the so-</p><p>called “New Medievalism,” even achieves a systematization of the modern/</p><p>medieval relationship in the arena of political theory. So impressive is this case</p><p>in its propositions and conclusions that it alone would be enough to justify an</p><p>analysis of the whole phenomenon.3</p><p>The sensation that the world is returning to a new Middle Ages is extraordi-</p><p>narily popular in our day and age, and all it takes is a trip to the internet to see</p><p>it. Aside from talk of the crisis of public administration and absence of moral</p><p>values, the authors of countless blogs and discussion forums are fond of em-</p><p>bellishing their considerations with the most slavish references to medieval</p><p>barbarism, to the rape, war, and violence of that time. The same even happens</p><p>with distinguished personalities who write for important papers. Two cases</p><p>readily come to mind regarding the tough questions of recent years: one can</p><p>read, for example, that the Mafia mirrors a system of power, and controls its</p><p>territory, in a way that is simultaneously barbarian and feudal,4 or that such</p><p>developing and overpopulated countries as China are acquiring cultivable</p><p>land in Africa and have established a new kind of serfdom there.5</p><p>This way of thinking, as I have said, is not actually new, but rather may be</p><p>the most ancient of all, since the idea of the Middle Ages was born as the bas-</p><p>tard child of history. And therefore, perhaps paradoxically, to speak ill of the</p><p>Middle Ages is the most philologically appropriate attitude. To say that the</p><p>world is getting worse year after year is nothing new. This trope, which origi-</p><p>nated in classical antiquity, has been a constant theme throughout the twenti-</p><p>eth century, one made quite palpable by its disasters: the World Wars, coloni-</p><p>zation and decolonization, the terror of the atom bomb, all the way up to such</p><p>more recent and commonly shared fears as hunger, the under-development of</p><p>the Southern hemisphere, pollution, the loss of traditions and local identities,</p><p>the globalization of productive and economic systems, the clash of civiliza-</p><p>tions, global warming, the hole in the ozone layer, the death of the forest, the</p><p>emergence of unknown diseases and the return of others that were believed</p><p>eradicated, at least in the West.</p><p>3 Cf. infra, Chapter 2.</p><p>4 F. Alberoni, Se lo Stato ha il consenso è piu forte dei barbari. L’esempio virtuoso della Sicilia negli</p><p>anni Novanta, in “Corriere della Sera,” June 9, 2008, p. 1. It’s worth remembering that between</p><p>the adjectives “barbarian” and “feudal” lie five centuries of history.</p><p>5 D. Quirico, Africa in vendita in cambio di cibo. La Fao denuncia: rischio catastrofe. Milioni di</p><p>ettari ad arabi e cinesi per coltivazioni intensive di riso, in “La Stampa,” May 26, 2009; E. Vigna,</p><p>2009, Asia e Africa: la nuova lotta alla servitù della gleba, in “Corriere della Sera Magazine,”</p><p>xxiii (July 23, 2009), n. 29, p. 69.</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 116</p><p><UN></p><p>Even the grave economic crisis in which we are currently floundering has a</p><p>strong odor of the Middle Ages. In June 2010, Minister Giulio Tremonti, at-</p><p>tempting to simplify the legal panorama by modifying two articles of the Ital-</p><p>ian Constitution in favor of recovery, explained that we are not in a position to</p><p>operate competitively today because we are hindered by a neo-medieval “regu-</p><p>latory madness”:</p><p>As in the old Middle Ages, the whole economy was crippled by duties, by</p><p>entrance and exit tolls at the city gates, ports, and crossings, so that our</p><p>current territory is populated by an endless number of legal totems […].</p><p>The true Middle Ages are over, as such. But the new Middle Ages, which</p><p>manifests as the juridico-democratic caricature of the previous one, car-</p><p>ries us off to a sweet death.6</p><p>Testaments to a disgusted attitude toward the world we live in can be found in</p><p>any age, and are even quite common in medieval literature. They have, how-</p><p>ever, become ever more pervasive since the First World War. The terrifying</p><p>Middle Ages of modernity is evoked on various occasions: for example by José</p><p>Ortega y Gasset, who in 1930 read the phenomenon of mass rebellions in the</p><p>twentieth century as a new “vertical” barbarian invasion—that is, originating</p><p>from within and thus self-destructive for society.7 But the general reception of</p><p>this kind of imaginary Middle Ages is more recent, as far as I can tell datable to</p><p>the second half of the Sixties and particularly to the early Seventies—in other</p><p>words, to the period when the Middle Ages returned to the attention and curi-</p><p>osity of an ever broadening public, a period corresponding to the last years of</p><p>the postwar Boom and the first economic, financial, and energy crisis in the</p><p>West after decades of nearly uninterrupted development.</p><p>Among the consequences of this crisis in the idea of progress was a sym-</p><p>bolic “return to the Middle Ages,” which proceeded in two branching direc-</p><p>tions. The first is a sort of refuge in the Middle Ages, seen as a heroic, fairy-</p><p>tale elsewhere to pine over and dream about: once one of the engines of the</p><p>6 The text appears in the speech that accompanies the plan for the new constitutional law for</p><p>modifying articles 41 and 118 of the Italian Constitution. See, Tremonti spiega come uscire dal</p><p>medioevo per liberare le imprese, in “Il Sole 24 ore,” June 26, 2010, www.ilsole24ore.com/art/</p><p>notizie/2010-06-26/usciamo-medioevo-liberare-imprese-080300.shtml?uuid=AYhEiQ2B</p><p>(cons. Apr. 28, 2019). But see especially the harsh comment by Emanuele Conte, professor of</p><p>History of Italian Law: Id., Medioevo negato, www.youtube.com/watch?v=VuAqOVvFzCA</p><p>(cons. Apr. 28, 2019).</p><p>7 J. Ortega y Gasset, The Revolt</p><p>of the Masses, trans. A. Kerrigan, University of Notre Dame Press,</p><p>Notre Dame (IN) 1985 (original edition: La rebelion de las masas, in “Revista de Occidente,”</p><p>viii (1930).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2010-06-26/usciamo-medioevo-liberare-imprese-080300.shtml?uuid=AYhEiQ2B</p><p>http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2010-06-26/usciamo-medioevo-liberare-imprese-080300.shtml?uuid=AYhEiQ2B</p><p>http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VuAqOVvFzCA</p><p>17The Neo-Medieval West</p><p><UN></p><p>Romantic movement of the 1800s, it has come to drive twentieth- and twenty-</p><p>first century fantasy fiction and film—which we will speak of at length later.</p><p>The other direction is the terror of modernity perceived as neo-medieval: this</p><p>is what we are talking about in these early chapters. The why is clear: hunger,</p><p>plague, and war—the terrifying triad of Furies that we attribute to the Middle</p><p>Ages—reappear in the flesh as “world hunger,” aids (along with sars, mad</p><p>cow disease, anthrax attacks, swine flu…), and naturally the “clash of civiliza-</p><p>tions” and World War iii.</p><p>From the Seventies until now many novels, films, and comics have appeared</p><p>that straddle the line between medieval revival and science fiction, providing</p><p>us with an abundance of macabre details of the possibility of an imminent</p><p>catastrophe (atomic, economic, etc.) that will hurl us right back to the deepest</p><p>Middle Ages.8 They present dystopias, not much different from a thousand</p><p>others produced in the course of the twentieth century, that evoke alienated</p><p>societies, world wars, and apocalypses, all thrown together as necessary ingre-</p><p>dients for the representation of the Medieval in the future. In the “post-atomic”</p><p>or “apocalyptic” genre, we come full-circle and the Middle Ages return, bold</p><p>and barbaric: armed bandits, ruined cities, scattered villages, endless deserts,</p><p>humanity reduced to a subsistence living and scavenging whatever is left of the</p><p>old technology, all make up the landscape of this film typology: Soylent Green</p><p>(1973), The Ultimate Warrior (1975), The Warriors (1979), the Mad Max series</p><p>(1979–2015), Escape from New York (1981), up to Waterworld (1995) and all the</p><p>way to Doomsday (2008).9</p><p>As this is an early sketch of the adamantine idea of the Middle Ages as a</p><p>time of crisis and catastrophe, we can try to reflect more systematically on re-</p><p>cent years, when we may glimpse a sometimes asphyxiating use of the medieval</p><p>8 R. Vacca, The Coming Dark Age, Doubleday, Garden City (NY) 1973 (original edition: Medioevo</p><p>prossimo venturo: la degradazione dei grandi sistemi, Mondadori, Milano 1972). The same par-</p><p>allelisms between a frightening 1300s and an even more terrifying 1900s are explicit in</p><p>B. Tuchman, A Distant Mirror cit.; cf. N. Cantor, Inventing the Middle Ages: The Lives, Works</p><p>and Ideas of the Great Medievalists of the Twentieth Century, Harper Perennial, London 1993,</p><p>p. 17. For a much more recent example in the same vein: J.H. Kunstler, The Long Emergency:</p><p>Surviving the Converging Catastrophes of the Twenty-first Century, Atlantic Monthly Press,</p><p>Boston 2005.</p><p>9 See V. Attolini, Cinema di Fantascienza e medioevo, in “Quaderni medievali,” viii (1983), n. 16,</p><p>pp. 137–148. (TN: Several further examples from Hollywood cinema come to mind. In Reign of</p><p>Fire (2002), human settlements struggle to survive when ancient dragons reawaken in Lon-</p><p>don; The Road (2009), based on the novel by Cormac McCarthy, The Book of Eli (2010), and the</p><p>popular Walking Dead franchise (2010-present) all portray futures in which some form of</p><p>apocalyptic event has reduced humanity to a medieval existence, complete with walled city-</p><p>states connected by roads plagued with banditry.)</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>Chapter 118</p><p><UN></p><p>metaphor. The first way we refer to the Middle Ages today is in a millenarian</p><p>key.10 In its simplest form, this concept does not give rise to any real political</p><p>theory. A huge gap lies between those who are still expecting the end of the</p><p>world from one moment to the next, and those who invented and thus deni-</p><p>grated the Middle Ages. The men of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries re-</p><p>jected the Middle Ages for the mirage of an even older golden age; in the same</p><p>way, shifting our point of view, the progressive thought of the last two and a</p><p>half centuries has largely rejected the Middle Ages in pursuit of the optimistic</p><p>conviction that mankind can continually better itself. Today, however, many of</p><p>those who judge the modern age negatively, comparing it to the Middle Ages</p><p>with disgust, feel imprisoned, gripped in the coils of a dragon that seems im-</p><p>possible to escape. For them, the world is languishing in a decadence that</p><p>knows no end. We are dealing with an interesting mental attitude, as it gives us</p><p>the possibility of attempting comparisons between the way people living in</p><p>the Middle Ages thought of the future and the way many of us represent it in</p><p>our day: “Hora novissima tempora pessima sunt: vigilemus.” 11</p><p>The reference point may be that of the post-modern, with its conviction, as</p><p>popular as it is vague, of living in an age of doubt regarding modernity, pitting</p><p>the idea of decadence against the positivist, Enlightenment idea of the con-</p><p>stant progress of history and the continual perfectibility of human reason. In</p><p>the Middle Ages, people thought that “the world is aging” and that the things</p><p>considered best—the incarnation and resurrection of Christ, the height of the</p><p>Empire—had already happened. Or they also believed, as in the Viking North,</p><p>that Ragnarok, the fall of the Æsir, was imminent. For this reason, the post-</p><p>modern attitude has been, not unjustly, equated with the concept of deca-</p><p>dence that permeated Medieval society for so many centuries, establishing a</p><p>sort of equivalence between “postmodernity” and the “neo-medieval.” The use</p><p>of the Middle Ages in this vein may therefore be considered one of the ways—</p><p>not the only one, but one of the most easily understood—by which current</p><p>cultures define themselves: the medieval becomes its own interpretive catego-</p><p>ry. Franco Cardini sums up the concept in the following terms:</p><p>10 U. Eco, Dreaming of the Middle Ages cit.; G. Duby, An 1000 an 2000. Sur les traces de nos</p><p>peurs, Textuel, Paris 1995; L. Pandimiglio, “Estote parati.” L’attesa della fine del millennio, in</p><p>“Quaderni medievali,” xxv (2000), n. 49, pp. 64–80; M. Sanfilippo, Storia e immaginario</p><p>storico cit., Part 1, Ch. 6: Apocalissi di fine millennio.</p><p>11 “It is the final hour, the times are most wicked—be watchful!” Bernard of Morval, De con-</p><p>temptu mundi (1140 ca.), v. 1. (Scorn for the World: Bernard of Cluny’s De Contemptu Mundi:</p><p>The Latin Text with English Translation and an Introduction by Ronald E. Pepin, Colleagues</p><p>Press, East Lansing , MI, 1991).</p><p>Tommaso di Carpegna Falconieri - 978-90-04-41498-3</p><p>Downloaded from Brill.com11/21/2020 08:10:09AM</p><p>via University of Cambridge</p><p>19The Neo-Medieval West</p><p><UN></p><p>In search of models, at the very least analogical, to help him more easily</p><p>understand his woes, the man of today finds them in themes and epochs</p><p>that to his culture speak the language of the “Medieval.”12</p><p>In the Seventies and Eighties, a belief in the imminent end of the world gave</p><p>rise to many cults and shaped certain currents of New Age culture. After so</p><p>many other predictions, an umpteenth apocalypse was supposed to happen in</p><p>2012 (on December 21, to be exact), the result of magnetic storms confirmed by</p><p>the Mayan calendar.13 Another one should follow in 2036, thanks to the asteroid</p><p>99942 Apophis, which will come hurtling towards the Earth—another celestial</p><p>body of ill omen, like the comets once detested by medieval chroniclers.</p><p>Two jarring moments of terror have already come to pass in the transition</p><p>from the second to the third millennium: 31</p>